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Abstract 
 
 
Islamic banking is a new industry which has attracted the attention of many 
economists in the world regarding its ability to operate successfully and its 
instruments for mobilising and allocating monetary resources (Deposits). Usually, in 
the majority of Islamic countries and in some non-Islamic countries, Islamic banking 
works as one part of a banking system. There are few countries where the banking 
system is completely Islamic and the Islamic Republic of Iran is one of them. In a 
country in which the entire system is Islamic there are more questions about its 
activities. The most important questions are: how can bank managers ensure the 
Shariah-compliance of banking system activities and how can they contribute to 
economic development? These are the two main questions of this research. 
 
In order to answer the first question, the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran was 
analysed and it was shown that this law is Shariah-compliant. However, the most 
important issue is to make sure that all banks in the country work according to the 
Law of Usury-Free Banking. In order to explore this semi-structured interviews were 
carried out with twelve interviewees including managers of the Central Bank and 
commercial banks and researchers. The result of the interviews was the introduction 
of several instruments used in the banking system of Iran for the supervision of 
banking activities and to ensure their Shariah-compliance. A new issue in this 
research is that being Shariah-compliant does not only mean utilising appropriate 
contracts for each project but also using deposits for the most efficient and profitable 
projects. This is because banks are the agents of the depositors and therefore they 
must use their deposits for the best possible projects. The vast majority of 
interviewees believe that Islamic banking system in Iran works in conformity with the 
Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran.  
 
Regarding the second main question, this study utilised both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in order to obtain sufficient data to analyse it. The secondary data 
was taken from Iran‘s Central Bank Annual Reports, other Iranian banks‘ reports, the 
Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Statistics Centre of Iran. 
Although the main period of the study was 1989-2006, in order to make a comparative 
study the periods 1961-1978 and 1979-1988 were considered in some parts of the 
study. For a more accurate study, not only were the amounts of deposits and financial 
facilities in the periods before and after the Islamic Revolution compared, but their 
ratio to liquidity (M2) and GDP were also compared. Our finding was that Islamic 
banking was relatively more successful than conventional banks operating before the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran. One important aspect of the contribution of the banking 
system in Iran to economic development is direct investment. The Islamic banking 
system in Iran has carried out thousands of huge projects directly most of which 
cannot be undertaken by private sector including: highways, petrochemical industries, 
wood and paper industries, industrial farming and animal husbandry, automobile 
manufacture, the cement industry, railways and so on. In addition, primary data was 
collected via semi-structured interviews. The majority of interviewees believed that 
Islamic banking in Iran has had a positive effect on economic development. 
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Chapter One:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Today, financial systems and banking play an important role in economic activities in 
all countries, especially with regard to those activities related to economic 
development. Indeed, there is a direct relationship between the level of development 
in a financial system and economic development in general.  
While economic growth is an essential condition for economic development, 
investment is an important factor for economic growth. Thus a financial system, 
especially banking, which provides credit to investors, plays an important role in 
financing economic development. As there are two main groups in every society, 
those who have surplus money but are not able to or do not want to invest and 
produce, and those who are able to operate as producers, and even originators, but do 
not have enough money to invest, the main responsibility of banks is to collect surplus 
money from savers and depositors (mobilization), and allocate it to producers and 
creators. However, since there is an interest rate, ‗riba‘, in conventional banks, which 
is prohibited in Islam, Muslims have a problem with this type of banking; therefore, 
Muslim thinkers have tried to establish a bank which is able to carry out the main 
functions of conventional banks without the problem of riba. 
Islamic banking in its modern form is a new experience in the banking industry. It is 
approximately 50 years old. ―The first Islamic bank was established in Pakistan in the 
1950‘s no interest was charged for the credit, but a small fixed administrative fee was 
levied to cover the operating expenses of the bank‖ (Wilson, 1983: 75). However, the 
first Islamic bank in the Middle East was established in Egypt. 
Before the Islamic Revolution in Iran the country had some simple Islamic banks; 
known as Qardh-Al-Hasanah Funds (loan without interest funds), but there were also 
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many conventional banks too. At that time many religious people preferred not to 
cooperate with conventional banks. 
 After the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) concurrently with the steps 
being taken for the reformation and structural improvement of the 
banking system, studies were undertaken for the Islamization of the 
banks. The first step toward the abolition of interest only resulted in the 
reduction of rate of interest nomenclature to a maximum service charge 
and a guaranteed minimum profit. As a result, interest on all asset-side 
transactions was replaced by a four percent maximum service charge 
and by a four to eight percent minimum profit rate, depending on the 
type of economic activities. Interest on the deposits was also converted 
into a guaranteed minimum profit. As these steps could not bring about 
a fundamental change in the previous banking system, preparation got 
under way for the submission of comprehensive legislation to bring the 
operation of the entire banking system into compliance with Islamic 
principles. The legislation was passed by Parliament in August 1983 as 
the ―Law for Usury-Free Banking‖ (Hedayati, 1999).  
The new banking law was implemented in 1984 and the banking system in Iran was 
changed completely to an Islamic model. Although there are many Islamic banks with 
a capital of more than $200 billion in the world, only one country (Iran) has a 
completely Islamic banking system today. 
1.2 MOTIVES FOR THE STUDY  
One of the most important goals of the ―Law for Interest-Free Banking‖ of Iran has 
been to help different sectors of the economy to develop, and the banking system in 
Iran has been working according to this law for more than two decades. The role of 
Islamic banking in economic development in general, and Islamic banking in Iran in 
particular, is debatable however, and according to many books and economic bulletins 
on banking system activities which have been published and issued by the Central 
Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Statistics Centre and contain a lot 
of data on this subject, it seems that it is time to consider its role and contribution to 
economic development. Thus, this study tries to analyse both its being Islamic and its 
contribution to economic development. So the following research questions will be 
considered: 
1.3 THE KEY QUESTIONS 
1- How does the Islamic banking system in Iran work? 
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2- How do the banks ensure that the deposit and financial facilities they offer are 
Shariah-compliant? 
3- What was the effect of the ―Law for Usury-Free Banking‖ of 1983 on Iran‘s 
banking system?   
4- Has the elimination of riba encouraged more people to open bank accounts?  
5- Has Islamic banking in Iran had a positive effect on the country‘s economic 
development and if so in what way?        
1.4 THE SUB-QUESTIONS 
1- What is the economic structure in Iran? 
2- What was the economic development process in Iran? 
1.5 HYPOTHESES 
1- The banking system in Iran ensures that the deposit and financing facilities it offers 
are Shariah-compliant by operating in strict accordance with the Law for Usury-Free 
Banking in Iran and with the supervision of contracts both by the Central Bank and by 
commercial banks themselves. 
2- The banking system affects economic development by mobilizing monetary 
resources and allocating them to the most efficient projects. 
3- Islamic banking in Iran had a positive effect on economic development between 
1989 and 2006. 
4- Despite their natural ability and potentiality, because of Iran‘s economic structure 
and weakness of competition in its banking system, the effect of Islamic banking was 
not as great as expected. 
5- Due to the religious beliefs of the Iranian people and the profitability of Islamic 
banks in Iran, they have been relatively successful in the mobilisation of monetary 
resources (deposits). 
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1.6 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The aims and objectives of this research are as follows: 
 (i) To discuss the Islamic banking system in Iran, its characteristics and model of 
operation, especially, its financial instruments for mobilisation and allocation of 
monetary resources (deposits).  
 (ii) To discuss ways of making sure that banking activities are Shariah-compliant. 
 (iii) To investigate the structure of Iran‘s economy in general and the banking system 
in particular.  
 (iv) To identify the process of economic development in Iran. 
 (v) To examine the contribution of Islamic banks to economic development in Iran. 
This will be achieved by using descriptive quantitative analysis and qualitative 
analysis of semi- structured interview. 
This research will have three sections: 
1.7 THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS  
In this section the following discussions will be carried out: 
 (i)  Introducing modality of performance of the ―Law for Usury-Free Banking‖ in 
Iran.  
 (ii) Review of literature on the role of the banking system in general and Islamic 
banking in particular in economic development.  
 (iii) Islamic banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran, its background and circumstance 
of its activity with regard to the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran, especially, 
financial instruments. 
 (iv) Ways of making sure that Islamic banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
Shariah-compliant. 
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1.8 THE EMPIRICAL (QUANTITATIVE) ANALYSES  
This section will involve the following: 
 (i) Examination of the main features of the Iranian economy in general and the 
banking system in particular by using secondary data on the subject. 
 (ii) Analysis of economic development financing by the banking system in Iran 
through the Central Bank of Iran‘s reports and other related reports. 
1.9 THE EMPIRICAL (QUALITATIVE) ANALYSES 
This section will involve the following: 
 (i) Using semi-structured interviews with some managers in the banking system of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and some researchers to examine Shariah-compliance. 
 (ii) Using semi-structured interviews with some managers in the banking system of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and some researchers to examine the contribution of 
Islamic banking to economic development.  
1.10 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of this research will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. In this 
chapter methodology is discussed briefly. As this research has three parts: the 
theoretical part, the quantitative analysis part, and the qualitative part, three kinds of 
method should be utilised. 
1.10.1 Theoretical Discussion 
This section is divided into two sections. The first deliberates on whether or not the 
banking system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is shariah-compliant. In this section 
analysis will be made using divine sources reflected in the jurisprudents‘ opinions 
(Fatva Al Foghaha). The second section discusses the potentiality and ability of 
banking systems in general and Islamic banking in particular to finance economic 
development. However, in discussing this issue, the opinions of the economists, 
especially, Muslim economists and also some existing literature in this regard will be 
utilised.  
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1.10.2 Quantitative Research Methods 
Quantitative research methods are used for collecting and analysing numerical data. 
These data are called secondary data which is usually collected from official centres 
and institutes. In order to show a picture of the Iranian economy and also to examine 
the contribution of Islamic banking to economic development, quantitative research 
method will be utilised. For this reason secondary data will be collected from different 
sources such as: 
a) Economic Statistics Office of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
its reports and balance sheets for different years. 
b) Economic Accounts Office of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Iran‘s Economic Changes Report in the Real Sector, first three months of 1385(2006). 
c) Economic Research and Policy Department of the Central Bank of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
d) Performance of Iran‘s banking system during 2005 and 2006 for 2003-2006.  
These collected data will be analysed manually and descriptively. 
e) Iranian Banking System Report (2006). 
f) The Statistics Centre of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
g) Ministry of Industries and Mining reports. 
h) Ministry of Road and Transportation reports. 
i) The Journal of Banker. 
After collecting these data, the researcher will perform some necessary calculations 
upon them and will analyse them descriptively. 
1.10.3 Qualitative Research Methods 
There are some important and useful data which do not appear in the statistics because 
they are non-numerical data. So, the qualitative research methods aim to collect these 
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kinds of data. The use of this method has grown increasingly during recent decades. 
In this research the semi-structured interview has been selected to investigate the main 
research questions. Twelve interviewees were selected from among officials of the 
Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its commercial banks (state-owned and 
private), researchers in the field of Islamic banking and Islamic scholars. After 
conducting the interviews their results are analysed manually in Chapters Seven and 
Eight.  
In Chapter Seven questions regarding shariah-compliance will be asked. It is worth 
mentioning that as banks are agents of the depositors and according to the contract 
they are engaged to utilise deposits in the best profitable projects, profitability of the 
contracts also becomes one condition of being shariah-compliant. So, questions of 
profitability and efficiency will appear in Chapter Seven. Chapter Eight will be 
allocated to the contribution of Islamic banking to economic development. 
1.11 LIMITATIONS   
This study may have limitations as follows: 
 (i) One of the data sources in this research is secondary data taken from Iran‘s 
Central Bank‘s annual reports, other Iranian banks, the Ministry of Industry, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Statistics Centre of Iran and so on. In this regard we may 
face two kinds of problem (inadequacy and inconsistency of data).  
 (ii) Another source of data is the semi-structured interview which may face problems 
due to time constraints and the difficulty of finding suitable interviewees and making 
appointments with them.  
1.12 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
To fulfil the aims and objectives of the study and answer the research questions, this 
research is designed to do its job as well as possible according to the ability and 
knowledge of the researcher and time limitations. This thesis has been divided into 
three parts as follows: Part One, theoretical approaches and literature survey 
containing Chapters 1-4, Part Two quantitative approach containing Chapters 5-6 and 
Part Three, qualitative approach and conclusion containing Chapters 7-9.  
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In the first chapter, questions, motives, hypotheses, aims and objectives, 
methodology, limitation of the study and organization of the study are discussed.  
Chapter Two presents the literature review and some theoretical issues. In this chapter 
some theories regarding the role of banking systems in general and Islamic banking in 
particular in economic development are presented. In addition, to cover the 
background of the issue more completely, some literature regarding the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth is reviewed. Also, empirical 
evidence and case studies on different countries are mentioned. It also contains 
methodology in Islamic economics in order to prepare the way for the use of divine 
resources as acceptable and even most important resources in Islamic economics 
including Islamic banking. Finally, some advantages of Islamic banks compared with 
conventional banks with regard to their role in economic development are presented. 
Chapter Three introduces the Islamic banking system of Iran, the Law for Interest-
Free Banking of Iran and its performance. In this regard aims, functions, Islamic 
banking modes in mobilisation and allocation of monetary resources (deposits) and 
monetary policy instruments in Islamic banking in Iran are discussed. It is worth 
mentioning that some critical issues regarding Islamic banking in Iran, such as in-part- 
payment profit rates, expected profit rates, circumstance of determination of final 
profit rate and share of each party from the profit and bonus in Qardh-Al-Hasanah 
account, which some people think is the same as a lottery, are discussed according to 
the shariah principles.  
Chapter Four provides a survey of research methodology issues with the emphasis on 
issues related to this research. Therefore, it presents some empirical methods which 
are utilized in empirical research in general, (apart from being belonging to Islamic 
economics or conventional economics). In this regard, quantitative research methods 
and qualitative research methods are introduced in this chapter. Also, the semi-
structured interview, which is a tool for collecting primary data in this research, is 
explained. 
Chapter Five provides a picture of the Iranian economy structure and process of 
economic planning in Iran. For this purpose, the banking system, capital market, 
metal exchange, agricultural products exchange, participation papers, agriculture 
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sector, manufacturing, mining and oil related activities, energy, construction and 
housing, transport and GDP by sector are considered. 
Chapter Six examines the contribution of the Islamic banking system in Iran to 
economic development using quantitative research method. In other words, this 
chapter offers a descriptive quantitative analysis of the process of economic growth, 
success of Islamic banking in the mobilisation and allocation of monetary resources 
(deposits) and their effect on economic development. Although, the main period 
considered in this research is 1989-2006, for a comparison with the conventional 
banking system the period before the Islamic revolution is also studied.  
Chapter Seven is the first qualitative analysis chapter. In this chapter, using the semi- 
structured interview method, issues related to the shariah-compliance of Islamic 
banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran, from the interviewees‘ point of view, is 
examined. Specifically, ensuring that banking activities in Iran are Shariah-compliant, 
problems with which Islamic banking can be faced, solution to these problems, 
determination of final profit rates for depositors, determination of final profit rates for 
facilities applicants, Shariah Board, problems which caused the absence of a Shariah 
Board in Islamic banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran and solutions to the 
problems regarding the Shariah Board are asked of the interviewees. 
Chapter Eight is the second qualitative analysis chapter. In this chapter, one of the 
main questions of the research is asked of the interviewees and their responses are 
analysed manually. Once again the semi-structured interview was chosen to conduct 
the interview survey in this chapter. Specifically, the issues asked of interviewees in 
this chapter are:  
 (i) Effect of performance of the Law for Interest-Free Banking of Iran on the 
mobilisation of monetary resources (deposits). 
 (ii) Effect of performance of the Law for Interest-Free banking of Iran on the 
allocation of monetary resources (financial facilities). 
 (iii) Effect of performance of the Law for Interest-Free Banking of Iran on 
encouraging people to deal with the banking system. 
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 (iv) Effect of performance of the Law for Interest-Free Banking of Iran on 
employment, inflation, economic crisis, liquidity, internal trade, external trade, real 
GDP and profitability. 
 (v) Possible disadvantages of Islamic Banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
regarding economic growth. 
Chapter Nine includes the Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations. 
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Chapter Two:  
BANKING SYSTEM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
(A LITERATURE SURVEY) 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the literature and investigates theories regarding the role of 
banking systems in general and Islamic banking in particular in economic 
development. We know that there are some differences between economic 
development and economic growth (the most important difference is that while in the 
former the emphasis is on the qualitative aspects, in the latter, the emphasis is on the 
quantitative aspects). However, it is obvious that not only is economic growth an 
important factor in economic development but it is also a necessary condition for it. 
Therefore, because of this and because economic growth can be measured, we will 
focus on economic growth rather than economic development. In the next part of this 
chapter I will attempt to define some terminologies such as economic development, 
economic growth and financial development and I will provide further explanation of 
them. 
In the third part, I will review some selected literature, especially the contribution of 
Schumpeter, MacKinnon, Shaw, King and Levin, and in the fourth part I will focus on 
theories and opinions regarding the role of the financial system in economic growth, 
with emphasis on the banking system. Furthermore, I will put forward opinions on the 
role of Islamic banking in economic growth. 
2.2 DEFINITIONS AND BRIEF EXPLANATION 
In this section, we define and explain some terminologies such as economic 
development, economic growth and financial development and discuss them briefly. 
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2.2.1 Economic Development 
Economic development refers not only to economic growth but also to quality of 
production. McKinnon (1973: 9) defines economic development as the reduction of 
the great dispersion in social rates of return on existing and new investments under 
domestic entrepreneurial control. According to Schumpeter (1983: 66) the concept of 
development covers several cases as follows: 
 (a) The introduction of new goods which consumers are not yet familiar 
with or of a new quality of a goods.(b) The introduction of a new method 
of  a new production that is one not yet tested by experience in a branch of 
manufacture concerned, which need by no means be founded upon a 
discovery scientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of handling a 
commodity commercially.(c) The opening of a new market that is a market 
that into which the particular branch of manufacture of the country in 
question has not previously entered, whether or not this market existed 
before.(d) The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or half 
manufactured goods.(e) The carrying out of the new organization of any 
industry, like the creation of monopoly position (for example through 
fructification) or the breaking up of a monopoly position. 
Moreover, there are other opinions regarding the definition of economic development. 
One is that economic development is a fundamental change in the structure of an 
economy, such as a change in the share of industry and agriculture in the GDP in 
favour of industry, moving people from villages and rural areas to live in cities and 
changing consumption patterns. People no longer spend the majority of their income 
on necessities; rather, they buy durable consumption goods and have more leisure-
time. However, another factor in economic development is people‘s participation in 
the process of change; everyone in a country should benefit from changes including, 
but not solely or even mainly, foreigners. 
A key element in economic development is that the people of the country 
must be major participants in the process that brought about these changes 
in structure. Foreigners can be and inevitably are involved as well, but they 
can not be the all story. Participation in the process of development as well 
as participation in those benefits. If growth benefits only a tiny wealthy 
minority, whether domestic or foreign, it is not development (Perkins, et al. 
2001:9).   
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2.2.2 Economic Growth  
Economic growth, which is defined as an increase in Gross National Product (GNP) 
or increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), has been the main purpose of most 
economic studies and models from Adam Smith (the father of Classical Economics) 
until the present time. Even before Smith there were some opinions regarding this 
issue.  
Today growth is still an important topic of serious discussion among economists. 
Transfer from exogenous to endogenous growth models was in fact a progress toward 
a better explanation of reality. While in exogenous growth models the focus was on 
the accumulation of capital and innovations and technological changes were 
determined outside the model, in endogenous growth models they are determined 
within the model. For example, in Romer‘s model (1987) the technology factor is 
determined by the knowledge spillover effect. He followed Arrow (1962) who 
reasoned that every investment unit not only increases physical capital stock but also 
increases the technology level of firms via the knowledge spillover effect. Romer 
(1990) also developed a new growth model which is a combination of the knowledge 
spillover effect model and the monopoly power model. Furthermore, Romer (1994) 
compared endogenous and exogenous growth models according to the five realities 
which every growth model should contain. 
In addition, King and Levine (1993c: 514) developed an endogenous growth model 
focussing on connections between finance, entrepreneurship, and economic growth. 
Their model as an endogenous growth model aimed at: 
Featuring connections between finance, entrepreneurship, and economic 
growth suggested by the insights of Frank Knight (1951) and Joseph 
Schumpeter (1912).  We combine the Knightian role of entrepreneurs in 
initiating economic activities with two ideas of Schumpeter. First, we build 
on the well-known Schumpeterian view that innovations are induced by a 
search for temporary monopoly profits
1
. Second, we incorporate the less 
well-known Schumpeterian idea that financial institutions are important 
because  they evaluate and finance  entrepreneurs  in their  initiation of  
                                                 
1
 Recent general equilibrium frameworks embed Schumpeterian ideas of ‗creative destruction‘, 
following Shleiffer (1986). Our model is in the class of endogenous growth models developed by 
Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990). 
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innovative activity and the bringing of new products to market. (King and 
Levine, 1993c: 514) 
In the endogenous growth models there are some factors which affect economic 
growth, including services provided by financial intermediation which have a positive 
effect on economic growth. 
2.2.3 Financial Development 
Every financial system usually provides special functions and services which can 
affect the mobilization of savings, the allocation of resources and economic 
development. Whenever they perform their functions better and more successfully, 
their development improves. 
Financial development occurs when financial instruments, markets, and 
intermediaries ameliorate – though do not necessarily eliminate – the effects 
of information, enforcement, and transactions costs. Thus, financial 
development involves improvements in the (i) production of ex ante 
information about possible investments, (ii) monitoring of investments and 
implementation of corporate governance, (iii) trading, diversification, and 
management of risk, (iv) mobilization and pooling of savings, and (v) 
exchange of goods and services. Each of these financial functions may 
influence savings and investment decisions and hence economic growth. 
Since many market frictions exist and since laws, regulations, and policies 
differ markedly across economies, improvements along any single dimension 
may have different implications for resource allocation depending on other 
frictions (Levine, 2004: 5-6). 
 
2.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
Instead of discussing the relationship between financial (banking) systems and 
economic growth, economists usually discuss the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth, but both state the same reality. However, not all 
agree with the importance of the financial system in the growth process. Lucas 
(1988:6) believes that economists ‗badly over-stress‘ the role of financial factors in 
economic growth, while Robinson (1952: 86) articulated the view of many when she 
wrote, ‗where enterprise leads, finance follows‘. According to this view economic 
growth is the reason for financial development. It creates demands for particular types 
of financial arrangements and the financial system responds automatically to these 
demands. However, the idea that there is a positive relationship between financial 
development and economic growth has attracted many economists since Walter 
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Bagehot‘s time. Bagehot (1873) argues that the financial system played a critical role 
in igniting industrialization in England by facilitating the mobilization of capital for 
'immense works' (taken from Levine, 1997:1). 
Schumpeter was the most famous theorist who strongly supported the idea that there 
is a positive relationship between well functioning banks and economic growth by 
providing credit to the entrepreneurs for the best projects which leads to technological 
innovation via mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, managing risk, monitoring 
managers, and facilitating transactions. As we see, Schumpeter believed that 
entrepreneurs have a critical role in economic development and financial 
intermediaries and bankers in particular have an important role in their financing. 
Schumpeter (1983: 89) states that:  
Yet the personality of the have what of a ―leader‖ looks like, so much so that 
there is some difficulty in realizing that he comes within the sociological 
category of leader at all. He ―leads‖ the means of production into new 
channels. But this he does, not by convincing people of the desirability of 
carrying out his plan or by creating confidence in his leading in the manner of 
a political leader- the only man he has to convince or to impress is the banker 
who is to finance him-but by buying them or their services, and then using 
them as he sees fit. 
Schumpeter believes that development is not possible without credit (see Schumpeter, 
1983:105-106). He also explicitly rejects Ricardo‘s opinion about the inability of 
banking operations to increase wealth. Schumpeter (1983:98) says: ―No one can 
reproach me with offending against, Say and Ricardo‘s statement that ―bank 
operations‖ cannot increase a country‘s wealth‖.       
McKinnon also supports the notion that there is relationship between financial 
systems and economic development. McKinnon (1973: 2) states that: ―Money and 
finance, as governed largely by the banking system are given a degree of importance 
much greater than that accorded by most authors concerned with development‖. 
McKinnon also believes that capital markets can aid economic development via 
efficiency by increasing the return rate of existing capital stock. MacKinnon (1973:9) 
states: ―The capital market in a developed economy successfully monitors the 
efficiency with which the existing capital stock is developed by pushing returns on 
physical and financial assets toward equality, thereby significantly increasing the 
average return‖. McKinnon also provides evidence from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
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Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, Germany and Japan. He suggests that a better functioning 
financial system leads to faster economic growth.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) in their article, ―Stock Markets, Corporate 
Finance, and Economic Growth: an Overview‖ focused on four issues as follows: 
a) They constructed some new measures or criteria of stock market development 
comparing liquidity, concentration, volatility, institutional development, and 
international integration across forty-four industrial and developing countries from 
1976 to 1993.    
b) Using these data they investigated the relationships between stock markets and 
financial intermediaries. They found that: 
Countries with better-developed stock markets also have better-developed 
banks and non-bank financial intermediaries—such as finance companies, 
mutual funds, investment companies, brokerage houses, and pension funds—
and countries with weak stock markets tend to have weak financial 
intermediaries. (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996) 
c) They also analyzed the relationship between stock market development and long-
run economic growth and concluded that ―the level of stock market development does 
a good job of predicting future economic growth. This aspect is important for the 
World Bank and policymakers in developing countries because it means that in many 
countries capital market reforms should be high on the reform agenda‖ (Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine,  1996). 
d) They investigated ties between stock market development and financing choices of 
firms. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) found that: 
In many countries, improvement in the functioning of the stock market 
produces a higher debt-equity ratio in firms. While stock market development 
naturally implies greater use of equity markets in raising capital, it also 
stimulates greater use of bank finance, so corporate debt-to-equity ratios 
actually rise. Thus, for these countries, stock markets and banks are not 
substitute sources of corporate finance; stock market development actually 
tends to increase the quantity of bank loans. Complementing these empirical 
findings, the research also starts to build a theoretical framework for 
understanding the interactions among banks, equity markets, and corporate 
decisions. 
There is a large amount of literature that discusses the relationship between financial 
intermediaries and economic development. We cannot cover all of it or even most of 
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it in this chapter, so we will try to look at some of the literature briefly. Beck et al 
(2000), Bekaert et al (2001) and Beck and Levine (2004) strongly supported the idea 
that there is a positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. 
Levine and Zervos (1998) studied the empirical relationship between stock market 
development, banking development, and long-run economic growth. Their research 
shows that stock market liquidity and banking development are both positively and 
robustly correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of economic growth, 
capital accumulation and productivity growth. 
Levine et al (2000) evaluated whether the exogenous component of financial 
intermediary development influences economic growth and also whether cross-
country differences in legal and accounting systems explain differences in the level of 
financial development. In this regard they used traditional cross-section, instrumental 
variables procedures and dynamic panel techniques. Their analysis shows that there is 
a strong relationship between the exogenous component of financial intermediary 
development and long-run economic growth. They also show that each of the three 
financial intermediary development indicators (private credit, commercial-central 
bank and liquid liabilities)
2
 is significantly correlated with economic growth at the 
five percent significance level.  
Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2005) examined the causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in Egypt for 1960-2001. They used Granger 
causality tests. They concluded that financial development promotes economic growth 
either through increasing investment efficiency or capital accumulation. 
Tang (2006) using a modified growth model investigated whether financial 
development would have facilitated economic growth among the APEC countries 
from 1981 to 2000. Tang did this by specifically focusing on the effects of three 
                                                 
2 Liquid liabilities equals liquid liabilities of the "financial system (currency plus demand and interest-
bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank" Financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. This is a typical 
measure of "financial depth' and thus of the overall size of the "financial intermediary sector (King and 
Levine, 1993a). 
Commercial-Central Bank equals the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by commercial bank plus 
central bank assets. 
Private credit equals the value of credits by "financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by 
GDP. 
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aspects of financial development on economic growth: stock market, banking sector 
and capital flow.  Tang found that the level of stock market development would have 
no impact on the growth effect of capital flow increase among the APEC countries. In 
the banking sector his study shows that a well-functioning banking sector would only 
boost the growth effect of capital flow on the APEC developing countries. 
Beck et al (2000) evaluated the empirical relation between the level of financial 
intermediary development and (i) economic growth, (ii) total factor productivity 
growth, (iii) physical capital accumulation, and (iv) private savings rates. They used 
(a) a pure cross-country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous 
component of financial intermediary development, and (b) a new panel technique that 
controls for biases associated with simultaneity and unobserved country-specific 
effects.  Beck et al (2000) found that there is a robust, positive link between financial 
intermediary development and both real per capita GDP growth and total factor 
productivity growth. The results indicate that this is not due to biases created by 
endogeneity or unobserved country-specific effects. Using both the pure cross-
sectional instrumental variable estimator and the system dynamic-panel estimator, 
they found that higher levels of financial intermediary development produce faster 
rates of economic growth and total factor productivity growth. They also found that 
while there tends to be a positive link between financial intermediary development 
and both physical capital accumulation and private savings rates, these results are 
sensitive to alterations in estimation techniques and measures of financial 
intermediary development. 
Bashir and Hasan (2003) examined the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth in some Muslim countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia 
and Turkey). They selected the vector auto regressive model, VAR, for their study 
and they believed that: 
This mode offers an easy solution in explaining and predicting the values of a 
set of economic variables at any given point in time. VAR is a 
straightforward, powerful statistical forecasting technique that can be applied 
to any set of historical data. Like the structural model, the VAR system also 
generates a system of equations that can project the future path of economic 
variables by extrapolating from their past values. However, the main 
difference between the VAR system and structural models is that the VAR 
system is based entirely on empirical regularities embedded in the data. The 
structural model is tied closely to the economic theory and has to follow the 
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assumption and a priory restriction imposed therein. (Bashir and Hasan, 
2003) 
They utilised five variables for measuring financial development. (1) The ratio of 
bank credit to the private sector to total domestic credit (DCPR) with a higher ratio 
indicating a shift from public to private financing. (2) The ratio of domestic credit to 
GDP (DC) with a higher ratio indicating a higher level of domestic investment. (3) 
The ratio of M2 to GDP for measuring liquid liabilities in the economy with a higher 
ratio meaning higher intensity of the banking system. They stated that ―the 
assumption here is that the size of the financial system is positively associated with 
the financial services‖ (King and Levine, 1993). They called this indicator financial 
depth and showed it as (M2). (4) The ratio of deposit money banks‘ assets to GDP 
(DPST). Bashir and Hasan (2003), explained that ―like the previous one, this measure 
also indicates the intensity of the financial intermediaries since it corresponds to more 
financial services and, hence, more financial development‖. (5) The interest rate. 
Bashir and Hasan (2003) pointed out that:  
financial development is expected to benefit from interest rate liberalization in 
terms of higher savings rate and, consequently, a higher volume of investment.‖ 
They used the discounted rate
3
 (R) to measure the degree of financial 
liberalization in the economy. Furthermore, they used ―the real rate of growth of 
GDP as an overall indicator of the possible efficiency-enhancing gains from 
financial liberalization. 
Consequently, Bashir and Hasan‘s conclusions are as follows: 
1- For Egypt their main indicator of financial depth (FDEP) had a positive impact on 
GDP growth. Bashir and Hasan (2003) also concluded that ―other measures of 
financial development have a different impact on the rate of growth, with the interest 
rate R, having a positive impact for the first four years before becoming negative 
thereafter. The banking variable, DPST, also has a positive but insignificant impact on 
the GDP growth rate. Moreover, the FEVD analysis shows that the GDP growth rate 
accounts for less than four percent of its own variation, indicating that financial 
development has a strong impact on growth in Egypt. Furthermore, GDP growth has 
positive impacts on all financial variables included in the equation‖.  
                                                 
3
 The discount rate is the rate at which the central bank extends credit to commercial banks. The 
discount rate is used due to the unavailability of either the lending or the deposit rates in their sample 
countries. 
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2- For Jordan Bashir and Hasan (2003) concluded that ―DSPT, DCPR and FDEP have 
a positive effect on GDP growth, while R has a negative effect. The FEVD results 
indicate that the growth rate accounts for 44 percent of its variation, implying a strong 
effect on the growth rate from the financial variables. It is worth mentioning that GDP 
growth has a positive impact on the measure of financial depth (FDEP), DCPR and 
DPST‖. 
3- For Morocco Bashir and Hasan (2003) concluded that ―the GDP growth rate has a 
positive impact on all variables except R. More importantly, the financial depth 
variable affects growth positively. The FEVDs show that GDP growth rate accounts 
for 18 percent of its variables, a strong indication that the financial variables account 
for much of the variation in growth‖.  
4- For Tunisia, Bashir and Hasan‘s (2003) VAR results show that ―all variables affect 
each other positively except for R. The fact that GDP growth accounts for 39 percent 
of its own variation indicates a strong linkage between growth and financial 
development in that country.‖ 
5- For Turkey, Bashir and Hasan (2003) found that there is ―a positive impact of 
FDEP on the growth rate, DC, DCPR and DPST. The empirical results also show the 
positive impact of the growth rate on all variables. The fact that GDP growth rate 
accounts for 55 percent of its own variation indicates that the linkage between the real 
and financial variables is not as strong as indicated on the other countries in the 
sample‖.  
In addition, in order to understand the trend between financial and real variables they 
examined causality for five countries. Bashir and Hasan (2003) stated their results as: 
the time series analysis and data are more fruitful in investigating causality 
between finance and growth. When it comes to the question of causality, the 
answer depends very much on the institutional characteristics, including the type 
of financial system and the type of financial policies followed. More importantly, 
the financial indicators used tend to have significant explanatory powers in 
explaining growth in our analysis.  
2.4 FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Gurley and Shaw (1955:515) believe that: ―conventional theories of income, interest 
and money have given insufficient attention to the important reciprocal relationship 
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between real development and financial development‖. They emphasised that 
financial systems and financial intermediaries play an important role in economic 
development. To illustrate this, Gurley and Shaw divided the final buyers of output or 
spending units into three groups: 
a) Spending units with balanced budgets: their spending on consumption, investment 
or government goods and services are the same as their income. If they save they 
invest the same amount. 
b) Spending units with surplus budgets: If they save their saving exceeds their own 
investment. Hence, their financial position improves and they are suppliers of 
loanable funds. 
c) Spending units with deficit budgets: Their expenditure is more than their income 
and their saving is negative. Hence, they are demanders of loanable funds and they are 
releasing financial assets or issuing debt. 
They also stated that loanable funds supplied are equal to loanable funds demanded 
and the increase of net financial assets for surplus spending units equals increase of 
net financial liabilities for deficit spending units. They continued their discussion by 
saying that: ―an ex-ante balance between income and spending, saving and investment 
and surplus and deficit implies ex-ante balance between offers of and bids for 
loanable funds, offers of and bids for financial assets, willingness to incur debts and 
willingness to hold debt instruments. Equilibrium of income and wealth is associated 
with an equilibrium level of debt and its counterpart in financial assets.‖ 
According to Gurley and Shaw‘s article (1955) financing generally takes place in 
three ways as follows: 
a) Self Finance: In this way each person or company invests whatever they save. In 
fact if they have a balanced budget their expenditure is equal to their income and their 
investment is equal to their saving. Although, self finance continues in most 
sophisticated economic systems, its importance has decreased significantly.  
b) External Finance: This may take place in two forms:  
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(1) Direct Finance: In this way the deficit spending units borrow from the surplus 
spending units. ―If spending on capital formation is directly financed, debt tends to 
accumulate pari passu with wealth‖ Gurley and Shaw (1955: 519).  
(2) Indirect Finance: For this an intermediary is required. Indirect finance plays an 
important role in economic development and growth. Let us return to Gurley and 
Shaw‘s analysis. Gurley and Shaw (1955: 535) stated that: 
Economic development is retarded if only self-finance and direct finance are 
possible, if financial intermediaries do not evolve. The primary function of 
intermediaries is to issue debt of their own, indirect debt in soliciting loanable 
funds from surplus spending units, and to allocate these loanable funds among 
deficit units whose direct debt they absorbed. When intermediaries intervene in 
the flow of loanable funds, the accumulation of financial assets by surplus 
spending units continues to equal the accumulation of debt by deficit units. The 
rise of intermediaries- of institutional savers and investors does not affect at all 
the basic equalities in a complete social accounting system between budgetary 
deficits and surpluses, purchases and sale of loanable funds, or accumulation of 
financial assets and debt. But, total debt, including both the direct debt that 
intermediaries buy and the indirect debt of their own that they issue rises at a 
faster pace relative to income and wealth than when finance is either direct or 
arrange indirectly. Institutionalization of saving and investment quickens the 
growth rate of debt relative to the growth rate of income and wealth. 
It can be seen from their analysis that in the case of the existence of financial 
intermediaries the rise of total debt is faster than income and wealth which can 
increase the growth rate, and banks are the most important of all financial 
intermediaries.  They believe that there are some key functions for banks. First, 
borrowing loanable funds from suppliers and second, transmitting the borrowed funds 
to the demanders who have deficits in their budget. However, these bank functions 
ease borrowing and lending by increasing confidence between demanders and 
suppliers of credit. 
King and Levine (1993b) examined whether Schumpeter is right or not. In this regard 
they designed four indicators of financial development in order to measure the 
services provided by financial intermediaries and some growth indicators as follows: 
a) Financial Depth Indicator: Usually assumes that the size of financial 
intermediaries has a positive relationship with the financial services provided. This 
means that whenever the financial intermediaries are larger the financial services will 
be further expanded. So, King and Levine defined financial depth as ―the overall size 
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of the formal financial intermediary system, i.e., the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP‖ 
(King and Levine, 1993b:3). 
b) Bank Indicator:  This indicator has been designed to measure the relative 
importance of a specific financial institution and can be defined as: ―the ratio of 
deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money bank domestic assets plus 
central bank domestic assets‖ (King and Levine, 1993b:6). Despite some weaknesses 
in this indicator, it is useful if used as a complementary measure. 
c) Private Indicator: This indicator and the next one are designed to measure the 
quality of distribution of domestic assets. A financial institution from which the state 
sector receives a considerable percentage of its credit is not able to evaluate managers, 
select investment projects, pool risk, and provide financial services such as financial 
systems that allocate credit to the private sector. ―Thus, we compute the proportion of 
credit allocated to private enterprises by the financial system. This measure equals the 
ratio of claims on the non financial private sector to total domestic credit (excluding 
credit to money banks)‖ (King and Levine, 1993b:6). 
d) PRAVY Indicator: The final indicator for financial development is the PRAVY 
Indicator which is defined by King and Levine (1993b:6) as: ―the ratio of claims on 
the non financial private sector to GDP‖. To be clearer, they divided them into two 
components: the rate of physical capital accumulation and everything else. 
e) GYP Indicator: They used this indicator as the growth indicator which is ―the 
average long-run real per capita GDP growth (GYP)‖ (King and Levine 1993b:7). 
Furthermore, they discussed the linkages between the financial indicators and the 
sources of growth. King and Levine (1993b) used cross-country evidence by using 
data from 80 countries for the period 1960-1989. After analysing data using 
econometric methods, they concluded that various measures of the level of financial 
development are strongly associated with real per capita GDP growth, the rate of 
physical capital accumulation, and improvements in the efficiency with which 
economies employ physical capital. Further, the predetermined component of 
financial development is robustly correlated with future rates of economic growth, 
physical capital accumulation, and economic efficiency improvements (King and 
Levine (1993b). 
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2.4.1 How Financial Systems Affect Economic Growth 
In discussing this issue we should look at the factors which lead to economic growth 
and then investigate the ways which financial systems, especially the banking system, 
can affect these factors. There are some factors which accelerate economic growth 
and some factors which are moderators and decelerators of economic growth. 
2.4.1.1 Economic growth accelerator factors 
a) Physical Capital 
Physical capital plays an important role in almost all economic growth models, even 
in the conventional models; physical capital was introduced as the main and only 
effective factor. Many economists believed that the main problem for poor countries 
is their poverty and shortage of physical capital. Today, physical capital also has 
special importance.  
b) Human Capital 
The importance of human capital has recently appeared in economic literature, 
especially economic development literature. In the past, economists concentrated on 
physical capital and not only declared inequality to be permissible but also 
encouraged it in the early stages of economic development. They believed that 
because the poor‘s propensity to consume is higher than that of the rich, we should 
permit the majority of national production to go to the rich in order to increase savings 
and consequently investment and physical capital (see for example Simon Kuznets, 
1955). Since the 1970s a new idea has appeared which focuses on human capital. 
Supporters of human capital believe that although physical capital is a necessary 
condition for economic development, it is not a sufficient condition. What is more 
important than physical capital is human capital. This is because humans use and 
manage physical capital and without specialized workers and proper human capital, 
the physical capital will be wasted. Therefore these new thinkers and economists 
place emphasis on equality and justice in obtaining growth and sustainable 
development (see for example Sen‘s works). He believes that in a society with a high 
poverty rate many people who are able to be entrepreneurs will be deprived of 
education. Consequently the society will be divested of their potential abilities. 
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c) Efficiency  
Efficiency is an important issue in economic activity. Efficiency means a situation in 
which a firm has maximum production in its activity with a fixed amount of input or 
has minimum cost with a determined amount of production. Fried et al (1993) and 
Coelli et al (1998) explain efficiency as follows:‖ A production function is efficient, 
in the Pareto and Hoopman sense, when it represents the maximum output attainable 
from each input level, or the minimum level of each input leaving the output 
unchanged, as is well known from the theory of duality‖ (taken from Maggie Tall, 
2003: 5). Without efficiency, in fact, producers waste part of their input. Therefore, 
the banking system can influence economic growth by both its efficiency and the 
efficiency of those firms whose operations depend on the banking system. 
2.4.1.2 Economic growth decelerator factors  
a) Risk 
Generally, people are divided into three groups regarding risk: risk averter, risk taker 
and risk neutral. Most people are risk averters who do not take risks which have a 
negative effect on their activities. When one is thinking about investment, risk is a 
determining factor in decision-making. Even for risk takers who love risk it may be a 
negative factor for decision making regarding investment. Of course they are not as 
sensitive as risk averters in this regard.  Hence, every factor which can decrease risks 
would be able to cause an increase in investment. 
b) Monopoly 
It is evident from the economic literature that competition is an important factor in 
efficiency and growth. When there are many firms which compete with each other by 
decreasing prices or increasing their efficiency, the rate of growth is expected to 
increase.  Therefore monopoly, which is the opposite of competition, has a negative 
effect on efficiency, productivity and consequently growth. 
c) Government Ownership 
One subject which should be considered when discussing the relationship between the 
financial system and economic growth is the ownership of the banks. 
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Government owned (henceforth ‗state‘) banks provide an effective means for 
politicians to influence the allocation of credit, allowing them to support firms 
and enterprises that may further their political interests. This view, known as 
the ‗political view of state banks‘, has a clear policy implication: privatising 
state banks can improve the efficiency of credit allocation and, consequently, 
can have positive effects on the quality and quantity of investment. 
Privatisation of government-owned banks is also likely to promote financial 
development, since private banks would be in a better position to attract funds 
into the banking system than inefficient state-owned banks. (Demetriades and 
Andrianova, 2003:16) 
According to the economic literature and most accepted economic theories, state 
(government) ownership is not generally efficient and the banking system is no 
exception to this rule. However, despite this fact, there are some advantages to state- 
owned banks and therefore, we can see these banks even in developed countries.  ―A 
study of 92 developed and developing nation as of 1995 finds only seven nations with 
no state-owned banks, Canada, Cyprus, Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Africa, 
United Kingdom and United States‖ (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002, 
taken from Len N. Berger et al, 2004).  
One of the most important advantages of state-owned banks is that they finance some 
small firms which are not able to obtain credit from private banks. Also, because of 
the lack of a strong and transparent private sector and their opportunistic behaviour in 
most developing countries, people‘s confidence in state-owned banks is sometimes 
more than in private banks and therefore depositors prefer less efficient but safer 
banks.  A number of researchers have investigated the relationship between state-
owned banking systems and economic growth and development. For example La 
Porta et al (2002) state that there are some cross-country correlations which show that 
the degree of government ownership in a banking system has a negative relationship 
with subsequent financial development and economic growth, and a positive 
relationship with financial instability.  
Also, Andrianova et al (2003) provide further insight into the relationship between 
institutions, state banks and financial development using a locational model of 
banking in which there are two types of private banks –‗honest‘ and ‗opportunistic‘ – 
and the state bank. Private banks are assumed to offer more competitive interest rates 
to depositors than the state bank. In the absence of deposit-contract enforcement 
problems they are therefore always preferred by depositors. However, if deposit 
contract enforcement is weak and the number of opportunistic banks is large, then 
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some depositors would prefer to place their savings in the state bank, which offers a 
risk-free, albeit lower, rate of return. In the end they concluded that the privatisation 
of state banks is at best unnecessary, since it is better to build institutions that foster 
the development of private banks and remove subsidies from state banks. At worst it 
is detrimental, since when institutions are weak it will almost certainly lead to 
financial disintermediation (taken from, Demetriades and Andrianova, 2003). 
We can conclude that, although, there are many disadvantages in government-owned 
banking it could still be useful to have a few branches of these banks in every country. 
However, they should not make up more than 10 to 15 percent of the banking system. 
So, government ownership can damage efficiency and the productivity of the banking 
system if it applies to the whole or most of the system. 
2.4.1.3 Functions of financial system 
There are many channels through which financial institutions affect growth. Banks in 
particular perform some very important functions for society and, in the process, 
significantly influence major economic variables. Of these functions two are 
especially important: one is intermediation between ultimate savers and borrowers 
and the other is the administration of the payments mechanism. (Iqbal and Ahmad, 
2005:1).We will now investigate briefly functions of the financial system as follows: 
A) Mobilisation and Allocation of Savings (Monetary Resources) 
In every economy and society there are two groups of people. The first are those who 
have surplus budgets and are savers. The second are those who have deficit budgets 
and need credit for investment or consumption. The problem is that these two groups 
are not the same and they have different tastes, motives, desires, information and 
abilities. So it is necessary for there to be some institutions as intermediaries to join 
them indirectly.  
This transfer is effected either by means of direct finance through securities 
markets or through the process of financial intermediation in the financial 
market, with the latter being more important. The importance of financial 
intermediation can be seen by the fact that around two-thirds of new 
investment passes through this in most countries, and even more in less 
developed countries. Thus development and financial intermediation are very 
closely linked to each other and financial sector development is a prerequisite 
for economic development. (Iqbal and Ahmad, 2005:1). 
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Sirri and Tufano, 1995 describe mobilization as follows: 
―Mobilization - pooling - involves the agglomeration of capital from disparate savers 
for investment. Without access to multiple investors, many production processes 
would be constrained to economically inefficient scales‖ (Sirri and Tufano 1995, 
taken from Levine, 1997: 20).  
Furthermore, mobilization involves the creation of small denomination 
instruments. These instruments provide opportunities for households to hold 
diversified portfolios, invest in efficient scale firms, and to increase asset 
liquidity. Without pooling, households would have to buy and sell entire firms. 
By enhancing risk diversification, liquidity, and the size of feasible firms, 
therefore, mobilization improves resource allocation (Sirri and Tufano, 1995). 
In addition there are several advantages of mobilisation and allocation of savings 
which make them necessary in the modern economy. These advantages may include: 
a) Acquiring Information and Declining the Information Costs 
Acquiring information on firms, projects and market opportunities is very difficult 
and expensive for savers and could prevent capital accumulation, which is a necessary 
factor for economic development. It could even prevent savings being used for the 
best available projects. This problem could also decrease the propensity of people to 
save. Therefore intermediaries such as banks, by collecting information on behalf of 
savers and depositors, play an important role in encouraging saving, capital 
accumulation and consequently economic growth. This was explained clearly by 
Levine (1997: 9) with the following example: 
Assume, for example, that there is a fixed cost to acquiring information about a 
production technology. Without intermediaries, each investor must pay the 
fixed cost. In response to this information cost structure, however, groups of 
individuals may form (or join or use) financial intermediaries to economize on 
the costs of acquiring and processing information about investments. Instead of 
each individual acquiring evaluation skills and then conducting evaluations, an 
intermediary can do it for all its members. Economizing on information 
acquisition costs facilitates the acquisition of information about investment 
opportunities and thereby improves resource allocation. 
b) Reduction of Asymmetric Information 
As mentioned before, surplus and deficit units are not the same. Therefore they need 
some information from each other and especially from the projects and they do not 
have equal access to the information. Investors usually have much more information 
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about projects. This asymmetric information may lead to moral hazard
4
 on one hand 
and adverse selection
5
 on the other hand. According to Iqbal and Ahmad (2005:1) 
―financial intermediaries can benefit from economies of scale and hence reduce the 
transaction costs of transferring funds from surplus units to deficit units. For the same 
reason, they are also in a better position to tackle the problems arising from 
asymmetric information‖.  
c) Feasibility of Investment in Large and Long Term Projects 
Usually depositors are small units and their amount of money is small, while investors 
are interested in investing in substantial projects. Also, savers are usually interested in 
leaving their money for short time, while investors need credit for the long term, 
indicating that:  
Financial intermediaries remove this size mismatch by collecting small 
savings and packaging these to make them suitable to the needs of the users. 
In addition, users of funds in general need funds for relatively long-term 
deployments, which cannot be met by individual suppliers of funds. This 
creates a mismatch between the maturity and liquidity preferences individual 
savers and users of funds. The intermediaries resolve the conflict again by 
pooling small funds (Iqbal and Ahmad 2005: 2). 
d) Facilitating Risk Amelioration 
Risk is a prevailing factor in economic activities, especially for depositing and 
investment. There are several types of risk such as: credit risk, idiosyncratic risk and 
liquidity risk. Liquidity risk plays a negative role in investment and economic 
development because higher return projects have high liquidity risk.  
Liquidity is the ease and speed with which agents can convert assets into 
purchasing power at agreed prices. Thus, real estate is typically less liquid 
than equities, and equities in the United States are typically more liquid than 
equities traded on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Liquidity risk arises due to 
the uncertainties associated with converting assets into a medium of 
exchange.  Informational  asymmetries   and   transaction  costs  may   inhibit 
                                                 
4
 The risk that a party to a transaction has not entered into the contract in good faith, has provided 
misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity, or has an incentive to take unusual 
risks in a desperate attempt to earn a profit before the contract settles. 
5
 This refers to a market process in general or in a banking system in particular in which "bad" results 
occur when buyers and sellers or banking system and interpreniors have asymmetric information (i.e. 
access to different information): the "bad" products or customers are more likely to be selected. 
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Liquidity and intensify liquidity risk. These frictions create incentives for the 
emergence of financial markets and institutions that augment liquidity. 
Liquid capital markets, therefore, are markets where it is relatively 
inexpensive to trade financial instruments and where there is little 
uncertainty about the timing and settlement of those trades (Levine, 2005: 6). 
Banks are able to reduce the liquidity risk and encourage high return projects which 
speed up economic growth. As Bencivenga and Smith (1991) state:  
Banks can offer liquid deposits to savers and undertake a mixture of liquid, 
low-return investments to satisfy demands on deposits and illiquid, high-
return investments. By providing demand deposits and choosing an 
appropriate mixture of liquid and illiquid investments, banks provide 
complete insurance to savers against liquidity risk while simultaneously 
facilitating long-run investments in high return projects. Banks replicate the 
equilibrium allocation of capital that exists with observable shocks. By 
eliminating liquidity risk, banks can increase investment in the high-return, 
illiquid asset and accelerate growth. (Levine, 2005: 7). 
Also, banking systems provide insurance to depositors against the idiosyncratic risk 
that a single investment pays no return and the liquidity risk that depositors may need 
to withdraw investments before returns are available. As a result, high-return projects 
with long gestation periods or high but diversifiable risk are more likely to be funded. 
These diversification services are provided in part through the unbundling and pricing 
of risk, which leads to a better allocation of individual risks. In turn, growth and 
investment may be enhanced through the selection of higher-return investment 
projects. 
Besides the link between risk diversification and capital accumulation, risk 
diversification can also affect technological change, which in turn can affect 
economic growth.  Agents are continuously trying to make technological advances to 
gain a profitable market niche. Besides yielding profits to the innovator, successful 
innovation accelerates technological change. Engaging in innovation is risky, 
however. The ability to hold a diversified portfolio of innovative projects reduces risk 
and promotes investment in growth-enhancing innovative activities (with sufficiently 
risk-averse agents). Thus, financial systems that ease risk diversification can 
accelerate technological change and economic growth (King and Levine, 1993c). 
e) Monitoring Managers and Exerting Corporate Control 
Naturally, everybody who lends money to a company is interested in monitoring it 
and its manager. As there are a lot of depositors who are worried about how their 
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funds are used, the monitoring cost would be very high, so banks, on behalf of all 
depositors, monitor the firm and its managers. This in turn reduces the monitoring 
cost and encourages savings which increases economic growth. Diamond (1984) 
argues that: 
Besides particular types of financial contracts, financial intermediaries can 
reduce information costs even further. If borrowers must obtain funds from 
many outsiders, financial intermediaries can economize on monitoring costs. 
The financial intermediary mobilizes the savings of many individuals and 
lends these resources to project owners. This "delegated monitor" arrangement 
economizes on aggregate monitoring costs because a borrower is only 
monitored by the intermediary, not all individual savers (taken from, 
Levin.1997: 697). 
f) Creation of Money  
Another factor which some economists emphasize as a facilitator of growth is the 
creation of money by banks. By creating purchasing power, banks enable 
entrepreneurs to buy capital goods on the one hand and consumers to purchase 
consumption goods on the other hand. Schumpeter (1983: 72) argues that:  
there is another method of obtaining money for this purpose, which claims our 
attention, because it, unlike the one referred to, does not presuppose the 
existence of accumulated results of previous development, and hence may be 
considered as the only one which is available in strict logic. This method of 
obtaining money is the creation of purchasing power by banks.    
2.4.2 Universal Banking  
Before investigating the advantages of Islamic banking, it is important to briefly look 
at universal banks and their role in economic development. There is another banking 
system known as universal banking which is closer to Islamic banking. Some 
economists even believe that it is a component of Islamic banking. For example Al-
Jarhi (2003: 5) argues that: 
Some specialists in Islamic monetary and financial economics have insisted 
that universal banking is one of the main components of Islamic banking.  
Islamic banks provide finance to enterprises through either sharing directly in 
the net results of their activities or financing their purchases of assets, goods 
and services on credit.  We can therefore expect Islamic banks to hold equity in 
corporations and sit on their boards of directors.  They use the information 
obtained from their vantage point to reduce risk from information asymmetry 
and to fine-tune their finance directed to the same corporations.  In addition, 
they can trade in goods and services, provide Islamic insurance, and operate in 
financial markets.  In other words, they operate like universal rather than 
commercial banks.  
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Other economists state that: 
Universal banks are allowed to hold equity and also to carry out operation 
such as trading and insurance, which usually lied beyond the share of 
commercial banking. Universal banks are better equipped to deal with 
information asymmetry than their commercial counterparts. They finance their 
business customers through a combination of share holding and lending. In 
Anglo-Saxon countries, commercial banks dominate, while in Germany, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Japan, universal banking is more popular 
(Iqbal and Ahmad, 2005: 3).  
It is clear then that it is a manner of financing very similar to that of Islamic banks and 
its success in financing economic growth could be a sign of the potentiality of Islamic 
banking in financing economic growth. 
Neuburger, (1977: 5) introduces universal banks as follows:  
Kredit banken are also referred to as universal banken or universal banks. This 
term is an apt one because these banks combined functions that had never 
before been united in a single German financial institution. The function of 
commercial banks, investment banks, development banks and investment trust 
were all brought together in the kredit bank…during the 1880s and most 
clearly after 1890, the kredit banken achieved a complete fusion of commercial 
and investment banking.  
Some comparative studies show that Germany‘s banking system, as an example of 
universal banking, was more successful than that of the United Kingdom as an 
example of the conventional banking system. 
There is a second part to the Anglo-German comparison; involving the relative 
success of the two banking systems in promoting industrial growth at the end 
of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth. Britain is thought to 
have lost ground relative to its continental neighbours at the turn of the century, 
due to a failure to innovate and invest at the forefront of technology (Al-Jarhi, 
2003: 24). 
Chandler (1990) concluded that ―Germany had decisively outpaced Britain in 
producing and exporting the products of the Second Industrial Revolution‖ (taken 
from Al-Jarhi, 2003:24). Al-Jarhi (2003) concluded that ―Thus, German banks are 
thought to have promoted economic growth more effectively and efficiently than the 
British banks.  
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2.4.3 Islamic Approaches 
2.4.3.1 Islamic economics methodology 
Principally, when one is talking about Islamic banking, it should be considered as a 
part of the Islamic economic system which differs considerably from capitalist and 
socialist systems. These differences have been shown completely and clearly by Ayat-
Allah Sayyed Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr
6
 in his book ―Iqtisaduna‖ (our economy)7. 
There are some assumptions in western economics which are debatable from the 
Islamic point of view. For example, from the western economists point of view: ―(i) 
The basic assumption is that man is selfish by nature and he behaves rationally.(ii) 
Material progress is a supreme goal.(iii) Every person has an inherent tendency to 
maximise his material welfare and he also has enough knowledge and ability to decide 
what is good for him‖( Siddiqi, 1982:18). In contrast, firstly, Islam encourages people 
to sacrifice in favour of other people, especially in favour of poor people. 
There are many verses in the Holy Quran and also many traditions from the Holy 
Prophet (peace be upon him and his respected family) and from the Imams (AS) 
which encourage people to be altruistic and prefer others to themselves. For example, 
the Holy Quran, when talking about the Holy Prophet‘s comrades (Ansar) says 
positively and encouragingly that "they prefer migrants (Mohajerin) over themselves 
even the same things; and those who are secure from the greed of their own souls, 
(like these assisters) they have indeed attained salvation (the Holy Quran, chapter 59, 
verse 9). Also, in Chapter Baqarah Glorious God stated :‖(The pious are) those who 
believe in the unseen; are steadfast in performing prayer (five times a day) and spend 
out (to the needy) of what we have provided for them (the Holy Quran, chapter 2, 
verse 3). Furthermore, the Holy Quran introduces the righteous as those who ―for 
Allah‘s pleasure they feed the needy, the orphan and the captive though themselves go 
hungry and they say: we only feed you to obey Allah‘s command and for His sake. 
Therefore, we expect neither your reward nor thanks‖ (the Holy Quran, chapter 76, 
verses 8- 9). 
                                                 
6
 Sayyed Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr was a great Ayatollah who was a strong specialist in jurisprudence 
and Philosophy. Unfortunately, he was killed by Saddam Hosain when he was young. 
7
 Fortunately this book has been translated in English recently by Dr Kadom Jawad Shubber, named 
‖The Islamic Economic Doctrine a comparative Study ‖. 
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There are many stories regarding the behaviour of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon 
him and his respected family) and his family showing that they preferred others to 
themselves. For example, Aisha, the wife of the Holy Prophet (PUHAHF) narrated: 
―The Prophet (PUHAHF) had never spent three consecutive days having eaten to his 
full when he left this world. Although he could have, had he wanted to; but he used to 
place others before himself [Al-Hamdan, n.d. taken from Mohammadi Rayshari 
(2009: 2)]. Also, Abu Hurayra narrated:  
A man came to the Prophet (Peace be upon him and his respected family) 
and complained to him of hunger, so the Prophet (Peace be upon him and 
his respected family) sent a messenger to the home of his wives, but they 
said that they had nothing but water. The Prophet asked: ‗who can host 
this man tonight?‘Ali Ibne Abi Taleb (AS) said, I will host him, O 
Messenger of Allah,‘ he came to Fatima (AS) and asked her,‘ What do 
you have, O daughter of the Prophet?‘ she said, we have only food for 
tonight, but we would rather give it to our guest.‘ He (AS) said, ‗O 
daughter of Mohammad, take the children to bed and put off the lamp. 
[Al-Tusi (1414 AH) taken from Mohammadi Rayshari (2009: 2)] 
In addition, Imam Ali Ibne Abi Taleb (AS) said: Sacrifice is the highest level of belief 
(Hakimi et al, 1979: 241). Also, Imam Ali Ibne Abi Taleb (AS) stated that: Sacrifice 
is the end of goodness (Hakimi et al, 1979: 241). It is clear from the above-mentioned 
evidence that not only is selfishness not accepted by Islam but also, sacrifice is 
encouraged by both the Holy Quran and the Traditions. 
It should be noted that this does not mean that there is no selfishness in human beings, 
rather that despite the existence of selfishness in human wishes and human behaviour, 
which is actually necessary to sustain life, Islam (and religions in general) have 
educated people to prefer others to themselves by hoping for reward in the Hereafter. 
It should be clear from the above mentioned issues that belief in the Hereafter plays 
an important role in controlling and adjusting human behaviour even in economic 
issues.  
Secondly, although economic growth, or in other words material progress, is an 
important issue encouraged by Islam, it is not the main aim from the Islamic point of 
view. One verse of the Holy Quran states: ―and to the tribe of Thamud their brother, 
Salih, (was sent). He said: O my people! Worship Allah, you have no other God save 
Allah; Allah is the one who produced you from the earth and has left its reclamation 
to you‖ (the Holy Quran, chapter 11, verse 61). God in this verse asks us to inhabit 
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earth and develop it. What is important is that it is not a final adjective; rather it is a 
medium adjective. 
Material progress is not the supreme adjective in an Islamic society
8
. It 
is desirable goal but it is subservient to certain rewards in the here 
after. The prophet (Peace be upon him and his respected family) led a 
simple life. Material prosperity is a desirable in so far as it helps man 
to perform his duties toward God, society, family and himself. Taking 
material progress as the supreme adjective of life is opposed to the 
Islamic framework (Makian, 1997: 6). 
Thirdly, although, the human being is unique among all creations regarding having 
the power of thought and even wisdom, which is one of the sources
9
 used by 
jurisprudents for inference of the shariah commands and laws, human wisdom is not 
enough to understand what is best for him and that is why God has sent prophets to 
show the right way to the people. For instance, after determining the share of 
inheritance to be allocated to family members, the Holy Quran says:‖ You do not 
know which of them, your parents or your children, will be useful to you; these fixed 
shares are decreed by Allah; and Allah is the Absolute Knowing Decreer‖ (Holy 
Quran, chapter 4, verse 11; See also the Holy Quran chapter 7, verse 187). So, 
according to Islam only God‘s knowledge is perfect.  
As Islamic economics is different from capitalistic economics epistemologically, it 
needs a special methodology. There are two kinds of assumption in Islamic 
economics. First, those which are based on divine sources, such as the Holy Quran 
and Sunnah which are completely true and reliable and there is no need for 
verification at all regarding these, although some scholars‘ understanding of some of 
these sources, which are somewhat complicated in meaning, may be different and 
consequently should be counted as human knowledge. Second, assumptions based on 
human knowledge which are on a lower level of creditability and subject to criticism. 
The issue is that economics focuses solely on human knowledge which is not 
completely reliable and denies divine knowledge which is certain. 
Thus on these basic assumptions Islamic economics has a different 
position. This provides, in part, need and justification for a separate 
                                                 
8
 The Holy Quran, chapter 6, verse 32; chapter 14, verse 3 and chapter16, verse 107. 
9
 There are four sources used  by jurisprudents as the authoritative source of guidance for inference of 
the shariah commands and laws, the Holy Quran, the revealed word of Allah, Sunnah, the sayings and 
practices of the Prophet Muhammad and his successors, Wisdom (Aql) and unanimity between scholars 
(Ijmaa). 
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methodology of Islamic economics…This is not a contention that the 
process of criticism and rational examination of economic theories 
itself is questionable. It only means that economics does not have any 
hard core of sure knowledge which may be treated as a point of 
reference and criteria for judging the truth and falsity of various 
theories. Therefore, there is a need for a methodology which not only 
provides basis for sure knowledge but also eliminates confusion of 
contradictory theories by laying down a criterion for judging the 
contending theories. Since mainstream Islamic economics is divine 
knowledge, it cannot accept a methodology which relies only on 
human knowledge (Akram Khan, 1987: 19-20) 
The difference between Islamic and secular methods appears mostly in theoretical 
methods and in the empirical methods; it is expected that there are no important 
differences between them.   
2.4.3.2 Role of Islamic banking in economic growth 
Islamic banking can have a positive impact on economic growth. Some economists 
even believe that because of the elimination of interest (riba), working according to 
Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) and its similarity to universal banks, Islamic banking 
has a more important role than conventional banking systems in this regard. There are 
several empirical works regarding the role of Islamic banking in economic 
development. For instance: Ahmed (2005) investigated the role of the Islamic 
financial system in economic development. He first discussed the factors of economic 
growth and then analysed the role of Islamic financial institutes and instruments in 
facilitating the growth factors. Ahmed (2005) showed that there are operational 
problems related to the use of equity-based instruments to finance different financial 
growth factors, in particular working capital. Ahmed (2005) argued that debt contracts 
and leasing contracts cannot be used to finance working capital and also that there are 
no operational models for using murabahah and mosharakah to finance working 
capital. Ahmed (2005) believed that in order to solve the problem of financing 
different growth factors it is necessary to work on developing operational models of 
corporate finance in general and workable equity-based instruments and institutions in 
particular. 
Al-Hallaq (2005) examined the role of Islamic banks in economic growth in Jordan 
during the period 1980-2000. He used the Two Stages Ordinary Least Square method 
(2SLS) to examine the direct and indirect effects of the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) on 
the real per capita income as a proxy for the rate of economic growth. His model 
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contains two endogenous variables [real per capita income (log per) and the change in 
total volume of investment (log I)], and five exogenous variables [the change in 
transfer from abroad (log Re), the change in total credit by conventional banks (log 
TCB ), the change in the growth domestic product (log GDP), the change in real 
interest rate (log R), the change in JIB financing and investment as a percentage of 
total credit by conventional banks (log RAT)]. 
After estimating the model, Al-Hallaq (2005: 212) concluded that: 
1) Both the change in total investment and the change in net transfers from 
abroad proved to have a positive and significant impact on the dependent 
variables, such that if gross investment increased by one per cent, the per 
capita income would increase by 22 per cent, whereas the increase in net 
remittances by one per cent would lead to an increase in the per capita income 
by 24 per cent.   
2) The impact of total credit by the conventional banks proved to be 
insignificant, and showed a positive coefficient. This can be explained by the 
fact that conventional banks are interested only in getting their predetermined 
rate of interest regardless of the type of projects borrowers choose to 
implement. In Jordan, unfortunately, a large portion of investment is devoted 
to the service sector where it reduces the chances of increasing job 
opportunities, and thus reduces the level of employment.      
 3) The impact of change in financing and investment of the JIB as a 
percentage of total credit by conventional banks was positive but insignificant. 
This can be explained by the fact that most of the financing operations of the 
Jordan Islamic Bank are for the short or medium term, and it has to hold high 
levels of liquidity in the form of cash to meet any emergencies, while it lacks 
as many financial instruments as conventional banks. 
As the reduced form explains both direct and indirect effects of independent variables 
on the dependent variables, he used reduced form to analyse the direct effects of the 
Jordan Islamic bank‘s financing and investment on total investments, and the indirect 
effect of JIB financing and investment on real per capita income. The result was as 
follows: 
The volume of investment affects positively the level of gross domestic 
product, which in turn affects the real per capita income. Thus, the indirect 
effect of GDP on per capita income will be associated positively with the level 
of investment. The indirect effect of total financing and investment made by 
the JIB as a percentage of total credits by conventional banks was relatively 
small (0.048) on the real per capita income. But this rate must be looked at as 
a good start by Islamic banks compared to 0.50 by conventional bank‘s total 
credits. The indirect effect of the real interest rate on the real per capita 
income was negative and relatively small due to the fact that the real interest 
rate was fixed and controlled by the monetary authority for a very long period 
of time (Al Hallaq, 2005: 214). 
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Sadr et al (2000) examined the role of credits of agricultural banks on value added in 
this sector in the Islamic Republic of Iran during the period 1961-1996. They used the 
Three Stages Ordinary Least Square Method (3 SLS) to examine the effect of Iranian 
agricultural banks on value added. The purpose of this research was as follows: 
a) To examine the effect of agricultural banks credits on investment flows and capital 
accumulation in the agricultural sector. 
b) To examine the effect of agricultural banks credits on value added in the 
agricultural sector. 
c) To examine the effect of short run and long run credits and also obligatory credits 
in agricultural banks on value added in the agricultural sector. 
d)  To determine the effect of the implementation of the Law of Usury-Free Banking 
on the role of the credits of agricultural banks in value added in this sector. 
Their model contains three structural equations (investment function, capital identity 
and production function). After estimating the model, they concluded that: 
(i) It is approved that in the period under consideration, credit had a positive and 
significant impact on value added in the agricultural sector, such that if credit for 
physical capital increased by one percent, production would increase by 0.093 
percent. However, an increase in credit for working capital by one percent would lead 
to an increase in value added of 0.046 percent.  
(ii)  The random variable coefficient for Islamic banking is positive; this could be 
because of bank participation in production, increase in farmer information, decrease 
in investment risk, both due to the partnership of banks with farmers and the 
elimination of usury. 
This research concluded that, the implementation of the Law of Usury-Free Banking 
has a positive and significant impact on the value added in the agricultural sector. 
However, some economists cite several factors which enable Islamic banking to play 
a more efficient role in economic development, which is explained below. 
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2.4.3.2.1 Response to the different motives of depositors 
Depositors may have different motives for saving and depositing.  
a) Spiritual Motives 
Some people save to be able to provide worthy needs such as help to charities or 
lending to the poor without charging. Islamic banking is able to respond to this motive 
via Qardh-Al-Hasanah accounts. 
b) Preservation of Assets and Guarantee of Deposit Return 
Preservation of assets is possible in two ways (1) nominal value: when one deposits 
money in a bank he/she expects that at least the initial amount of the deposits will be 
returned. If these depositors use Qardh-Al-Hasanah saving deposits accounts (or 
current accounts) banks are responsible for guaranteeing the initial amount of the 
deposits. Problems arise when they deposit in other accounts. In this situation, there 
are two solutions. First, these people can ask the banks to use their deposits in special 
contracts such as Joaalah, Salam and Ijarah, in which not only is the initial amount 
returned to them but they can also earn a guaranteed benefit. Second, as Islamic banks 
use deposits jointly with other deposits and invest them in many projects, it is 
expected that they will have an overall benefit. (2) Real value: depositors are 
concerned with preserving the real value of their assets and expect it to at least remain 
the same. In conventional banks, where depositors receive fixed interest, if the 
inflation rate is higher than the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate will be 
negative and consequently the real value of deposits will decrease and depositors will 
lose their money. In Islamic banking, in contrast, because of the existence of the profit 
and loss sharing (PLS) mechanism, the effects of the inflation rate are eliminated 
automatically and the nominal interest rate is usually higher than the inflation rate or 
at least equal to it and consequently the real profit is positive or zero.  
C) Income 
One of the most important motives in depositing is to obtain an income. When people 
save they in fact substitute present consumption with future consumption and expect 
to consume more in the future. There are several contracts and accounts in Islamic 
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banking in which people can deposit and earn profit. Experience, for example in 
Pakistan during the time of Zia El Haq, shows that Islamic banking is more profitable 
than conventional banking. 
2.4.3.3 Advantages of Islamic Banking 
Some Islamic economists cite some advantages for Islamic banking compared with 
conventional banking. These advantages can be listed as follow: 
a) Efficient Use of Money 
In an economy based on interest, there is a price for money which leads to some 
traders using bartering which is inefficient. 
There is a strong school of economists who argue that interest based finance is 
sub-optimal on purely economic grounds. Despite the fact that the rate of 
interest operates in conventional economies as a price, monetary economists 
insist that a zero nominal interest rate is a necessary condition for optimal 
allocation of resources. The reason is simple. After switching from metallic to 
fiat money adding one marginal unit of real balances costs the community no 
real resources. Therefore imposing a positive price on use of money would 
lead traders to economize on the use of money, in their efforts to minimise 
transaction costs. They would therefore use some real resources instead of 
money.  (Iqbal and Ahmad, 2005: 2)  
In Islamic banking ―while the time value of money is maintained, there is no need to 
handle the complicated question of how to bring the rate of interest down to zero in 
order to reach the optimal allocation of resources. In other words, Islamic finance is a 
short-cut to the efficiency in the financial sector‖ (Al-Jarhi, taken from Iqbal and 
Ahmad, 2005). 
b) Distribution of Risk between Entrepreneurs and Depositors 
While in conventional banks all the business risks are imposed on the borrower 
―Guaranteeing in advance a fixed return on a loan without taking risk into 
consideration‖ (Iqbal and Ahmad, 2005: 3) in a banking system based on profit and 
loss sharing the risk is distributed between the partners. 
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c) The Importance of the Quality of a Business Plan is Greater Than the Credit 
Rating of Borrowers 
As conventional banks receive a fixed amount as interest and there is no ownership 
relationship between the bank and the client, banks are not concerned with business 
plans. What is important for them is the credit rating of the borrowers which 
guarantees the return of the initial loan plus interest. In contrast, in Islamic banks, 
because of the existence of profit and loss sharing and because of the changeable 
profit, the quality of a business plan and the ability of borrowers (entrepreneurs) is 
more important than the credit rating of the borrowers.  
d) Stability 
In the conventional banking system the relationship between banks and clients is 
based on debt. Borrowers have to pay the initial amount plus interest (there is no 
difference whether they make a profit or not) on the one hand and banks have to pay 
the initial amount plus interest to depositors on the other hand. As there are usually 
business cycles in the economy, during periods of recession borrowers are not only 
faced with problems regarding repayment of their loans but banks also have problems 
in connection with the repayment of deposits. In contrast, because of the profit and 
loss sharing factor in Islamic banking depositors automatically share the risk and there 
is no obligation to pay more than their profit before selling the goods for both 
investors and banks. Consequently, they are less likely to face major problems, 
especially bankruptcy. 
In conventional finance, present money is traded against future money in debt or 
bond markets, which are highly integrated at both the national and international 
level. Bond market provides an easy and automatic mechanism through which 
short-term funds flow at will from one country to another. Much of those flows 
follow factors that are only nebulously related to the economic fundamentals, 
threatening national economies with instability and contagion. The experiences of 
the Southeast Asian economies and others have motivated some economist to 
propose placing restriction on capital movements. In contrast, debt is created in 
Islamic finance through selling goods and services on credit. The resulting debt 
instruments are not readily tradable. We can visualize the existence of credit 
market for each commodity and service in which the demand and supply to buy 
on credit determines a mark-up rate. Such credit market would be fully 
segmented; there is no room for sudden and mass movement of funds. 
Possibilities of instability and contagion would therefore be remote and the need 
to choke capital movements through imposing restrictions would lose its 
justification. (Al-Jarhi, 2005: 20) 
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e) Control of Excessive Credit Creation  
In Islamic finance, there is a close relationship between money and the production of 
goods and services which are connected to each other. So it is not easy for banks to 
create money excessively. Al-Jarhi (2005: 20) states that:  
All Islamic modes of finance involve money on the one hand and/or services 
on the other. Monetary flows through Islamic financial modes would have to 
be tied directly to commodity flows. In other words, Islamic finance removes 
the dichotomy between financial and real activities. Obvious, this leaves little 
room for excessive credit expansion, as the financed provided by financial 
institutions to business units is automatically earmarked for specific use.  
F) Decrease of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection  
Since Islamic banks operate as universal banks they are likely to be more efficient in 
monitoring and surveillance, thereby reducing the risk of adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Al-Jarhi, 2005:20, cited in, Calomiris, 2000). As there are many finance 
applicants and banks do not have enough information to select the best, they are 
usually faced with adverse selection. The more information there is the less the 
adverse selection. It is obvious that because Islamic banks act according to the profit 
and loss sharing principle, they are likely to be more able to avoid adverse selection 
compared to conventional banks through more effective monitoring.  
Since the Islamic banking system often acts according to profit and loss sharing, the 
motivation for moral hazard is stronger than for conventional banks. On the other 
hand, because of the existence of monitoring in Islamic banks the probability of moral 
hazard decreases. However, empirical works show that in bank systems such as 
Islamic banks and universal banks which use debt, equity finance and profit and loss 
sharing simultaneously, they are more likely to avoid moral hazard and adverse 
selection. According to Dewenter and Hess (1998): 
Empirically, it has been found that if banks use a combination of debt and 
equity finance, this seems to carry several advantages to both banks and firms, 
confirming the theoretical findings. Banking theory would indicate that banks 
would be relatively more exposed to adverse selection during economic 
upturns and moral hazard during downturns. Applied research has found that 
universal banks face lower risk than commercial banks during both upturns and 
downturns. In addition, the risk differential between universal banks and 
commercial banks gets wider and more significant during downturns (taken 
from Al-Jarhi, 2005:21). 
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Some advantages of Islamic banking can be summarized as follows:  
 (i) There is a high level of variety and diversity with different levels of risk in the 
contracts (partnership contracts and exchange contracts) which can facilitate making 
contracts in Islamic banking for both savers and entrepreneurs. 
(ii) It is possible to establish financial institutions with different modes which can 
increase the stability of a financial system.  
 (iii) It is expected that competition between Islamic banks with different models will 
increase the efficiency of the financial system.  
 (iv)The financial needs of Muslims are a reality as with any nation and faith. These 
needs can be provided by Islamic banks in accordance with their belief. This public 
admission can have an important role in establishing a stable and efficient market. 
 (v) In profit and loss sharing models, in all facility demands, profitability of the 
project is considered carefully, so the efficiency of Islamic banks would be expected 
to be greater than that of conventional banks. 
 (vi) Islamic banks do not finance projects which are not acceptable to Islamic society 
which reflects its greater responsibility. 
 (vii) Because of partnership contracts, the liabilities side of the balance sheet tends to 
become isochronous with the assets side, so Islamic banks are more resistant to 
external shocks and delayed repayment loans. 
 (iix) Profit and loss sharing makes depositors sensitive to the operations of their 
banks, their transparency and their efficiency. On the other hand, banks try to evaluate 
the projects which they are asked to finance more carefully. According to Iqbal and 
Ahmad (2005:7):  
(1) Since (in the case of both profit-sharing and sale-based contracts) 
bank assets are created in response to investment opportunities in 
the real sector of the economy, and all financing is linked to 
commodities or assets, the real factors related to the production of 
goods and services (rather than speculative manoeuvres) become 
the prime determinants of the rates of return. (2) Debt creation in 
Islamic finance is generally not possible without the backing of 
goods and services. Monetary expansion would thus tend to take 
place in step with the growth of the real economy. This is expected 
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to control inflationary pressures. Destabilizing speculation would 
also be significantly curtailed as would the erratic and mass 
movement of short-term funds. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter aimed to investigate the relationship between banking systems and 
economic development, in other words the role of banking systems in general and 
Islamic banking in particular in economic development. For this reason the relevant 
literature has been analysed. The vast majority of the reviewed literature showed there 
to be a significant positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth in several countries. Also, some research has confirmed that contribution of 
Islamic banking to economic development has been reported. 
Furthermore, some theories and opinions regarding the role of financial systems, with 
an emphasis on the effect of the banking system on economic growth, have been 
discussed. They showed the ways in which banking systems can affect economic 
development. In addition, advantages of Islamic banking regarding economic 
development have been considered. According to this review there are several 
advantages in Islamic banking in this regard including: efficient use of money, 
distribution of risk between entrepreneurs and depositors, importance of quality of a 
business plan rather than credit rating of the borrowers, stability, control of excessive 
credit creation and decreasing moral hazard and adverse selection.  
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Chapter Three:  
ISLAMIC BANKING IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 
IRAN (ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF USURY-FREE 
BANKING OF IRAN) 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned in Chapter One, before the Islamic Revolution in Iran there were some 
simple Islamic Banks there, known as Qardh-Al-Hasanah Funds (loans without 
interest) but there were many conventional banks too. After the Islamic Revolution, 
the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran nationalized all the banks and also,  
37 banks have been merged into six commercial banks including Bank Refah 
(Welfare Bank), Bank Melli Iran (Iran National Bank), Bank Saderat (Export 
Bank), Bank Tejarat (Trade Bank), Bank Mellat (Nation Bank), and Bank Sepah 
(Army Bank) and three special banks including Bank Keshavarzi (Agricultural 
Bank), Bank Maskan (Housing Bank),and Bank Sanat va Maadan (Mining and 
Industry Bank), ( Bank refah, September 20, 2007).  
The government faced a big problem regarding banking system activities after the 
Islamic Revolution because as the revolution was an Islamic one the government had 
to eliminate interest. The problem was firstly that a large numbers of banks had to be 
changed to Islamic ones and secondly, they did not have Islamically-specialised bank 
staff. It would have been easier to establish new banks than that to convert the 
existing ones to Islamic banks. This is because, from the outset, the government could 
establish a proper structure and flowchart for the bank and also select proper staff for 
it. In contrast, in the second case, the government faces a situation where it has no 
proper choices regarding structure, flowcharts and staff employment. The staff have 
already been chosen and it is not possible, or at least it is difficult, to change them. 
The greatest problem was that the government could not stop the banking system 
activities, so they had to think first of a temporary and then a permanent solution. 
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The first step taken toward the abolition of interest only resulted in the reduction 
of rate of interest nomenclature to a maximum service charge and a guaranteed 
minimum profit. As a result, interest on all asset-side transactions was replaced 
by a four percent maximum service charge and by a four to eight percent 
minimum profit rate, depending on the type of economic activities. Interest on 
the deposits was also converted into a guaranteed minimum profit. As these 
steps could not bring about a fundamental change in the previous banking 
system, preparation got under way for the submission of comprehensive 
legislation to bring the operation of the entire banking system into compliance 
with the Islamic principles. The legislation was passed by the parliament in 
August 1983 as the ―law for Usury-Free Banking (Hedayati, 1999)    
The Law of Usury-Free Banking which was passed by the Iranian parliament in 
August 1983 shaped the new banking system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this 
chapter I will explain general conditions for contract accuracy which all contracts 
must fulfil. Also, some general contracts which are used in both the mobilisation and 
the allocation of deposits will be discussed briefly. In the final section, objectives, 
duties and financial instruments of the banking system in Iran according to the Law of 
Usury-Free Banking of Iran will be examined.  
3.2 BASIC CONDITIONS FOR CONTRACT ACCURACY AND SOME 
GENERAL CONTRACTS 
As the operation of Islamic banking is based on Islamic contracts, it is worth briefly 
discussing the contracts themselves. Although each contract has its own condition, 
there are some conditions which are necessary for all contracts and are vital for 
contract accuracy. 
3.2.1 Intention of all Parties 
This is a very important condition, especially in Islamic banking operations. It means 
here, intention regarding the performance of the special contract. The late Allameh 
Sheikh Mortadha Ansari (1991: 117) said: 
from conditions is to intend the meaning of the contract. There is no controversy 
between jurisprudents in this regard that intention is not only a condition for 
contract accuracy but also in fulfilment of its purport. So the contract does not 
take place either without verbal intention or without meaning intention. 
For instance, if a person says by mistake or in jest, ―I sell you my car‖ it is not really a 
contract. In the same way, in Islamic banking operations, understanding the meaning 
of a contract and intention of that meaning is essential. Therefore, the banking 
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authorities, are responsible for explaining the meaning of the contracts used in their 
operations clearly either in a leaflet or verbally.  
3.2.2 Satisfaction of Both Parties 
Another condition for contract accuracy is satisfaction or agreement of both parties. In 
books of jurisprudence this condition is introduced as option (ekhtiar) or authority, 
which is not in contrast with compulsion (ijbar) but is in contrast with reluctance 
(ikrah). It is worth noting that there are three concepts which are similar to each other 
but different in jurisprudence. The first is compulsion (ijbar) which means that the 
party has no any choice. The second is reluctance (ikrah) which means that the party 
has a choice but a third party threatens him, For example, if an oppressor threatens 
somebody, saying ―you should sign this contract, otherwise I will hurt you or I will 
kill you‖. The third is distress (idhterar) which means because of some needs, 
someone accepts a special condition in a contract or sells his commodity cheaper than 
the market price. 
Compulsion and reluctance lead to nullification of contracts but distress (idhterar) 
does not. Imam Khomeini in Tahrir Al-Wasilah said: ―distress (idhterar) does not 
harm contract accuracy‖. This brings about the matter that in the case of banking 
activity, those requiring financial facilities usually find themselves in a situation 
whereby, because of their need for those facilities they have to accept them even if 
they do not agree with the conditions imposed on them. The question is whether this 
constitutes compulsion (ijbar), reluctance (ikrah) or distress (idhterar). The answer is 
that they are from meanings (masadiq) of the distress (idhterar). So there is no 
problem regarding the accuracy of these contracts. 
3.2.3 Competence of Both Parties 
Both parties should have competence of possession of their properties which is 
obtained by three conditions, namely: maturity, growth and wisdom. It means that 
they should be at least fifteen years old for men and nine years old for women 
according to shariah law. It is worth mentioning that according to the civil law of Iran 
this has been increased to eighteen years for both men and women. Also, they should 
not be insane or of a state of mind where they are unable to recognize the benefit of 
the property.  
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3.2.4 Necessity of Determination of the Subject of the Contract  
It is important that not only the subject of the contract is determined but also every 
adjective which affects the value of the contract subject should also be determined, 
otherwise the contract would be uncertain (gharari) and all jurisprudents believe that 
uncertain (gharari) contracts are null. This condition is very important especially in 
salam transactions (post delivery sale) and sale by instalments which are used in 
banking activities. 
3.2.5 Necessity of the Purpose of the Contract being Shariah-Compliant 
There is a specific purpose for every contract which takes place.  This purpose should 
be shariah-compliant. For example, when somebody buys grapes it is possible to use 
them to make wine which is prohibited in Islam or it is possible to use them in a halal 
way. Of course, it is not necessary for the seller to ask the buyer their reason for 
buying the grapes, but if the buyer says that they want them to make wine or the seller 
understands himself that they want them for this purpose, the seller must not sell the 
grapes to them.  
If we do not know whether the contract fulfils the general conditions for contract 
accuracy, we should believe in its accuracy because of Asalat Al-Sehhah which means 
any contract of which you are in doubt of its accuracy should be considered accurate. 
According to article 133 of Iran‘s Civil Law, ―every contract which takes place is 
correct except those that their corruption is proved‖. 
Before discussing Islamic banking in Iran, it is worth looking at some contracts which 
are used in Iran‘s Islamic banking regardless of type of activity. Contracts such as 
agency (vekalat), guaranty (dhemanat) and solh are used very much in different areas 
of Islamic banking, not only in Iran but in all Islamic banks. 
3.2.6 Agency Contract (Vekalah ) 
Agency (vekalah ) means that one person or a group of people hand over their affairs 
to another person to carry out on their behalf while they are still alive. Imam 
Khomeini in Tahrir-Al-Vasilah (n.d: 186) says ―agent is giving over an affair to 
another person to do it for client during the client‘s life‖. In Islam jurisprudence, 
agency (vekalah) is for specific contracts, so, all the basic conditions for contract 
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accuracy must be fulfilled. Agency (vekalah) is easier than most contracts as it does 
not need special words; in fact it does not need any words. Any way that both parties 
make themselves understood is enough for fulfilment of agency. For example, if 
person A makes person B his agent to sell his house and person B, without saying 
anything, starts to sell the house, this starting to work itself is a sign of acceptance and 
is enough for fulfilment of agency by person B. 
Agency is revocable
10
 which can be a weakness in this contract, especially in banking 
activities. However, this weakness can be compensated by ―conditions provided in the 
contract‖11. Moreover, agency is not normally free, so if it is free that should be made 
clear. If agency is absolute and without any clarifications it is not free and the agent 
should be paid the normal rate (Ojrat- Al–Methl). In Islamic banking activities, 
lawyers‘ fees (honorarium) are usually determined in advance. However, according to 
article 677 of the Civil Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the case of silence 
regarding the lawyer‘s fee, the agent can ask for the normal rate (Ojrat –Al-Methl ). 
In addition, both agent and client should be adult, sane and aware and these conditions 
must continue until the end of the contract. So, if during the contract either one or 
both of them lose their sanity or become deprived of possession of their property, it 
will cause nullification of the agency. Imam Khomeini in Tahrir Al-Vasilah (n.d: 187) 
says ―if agent or client become mad or the client is prohibited from possession of his 
property, the agency would become null. However, if the hindrance is removed, a new 
agency contract should be created‖. 
Furthermore, agency is divided into two kinds: (1) Specific agency, which means that 
both case and manner of possession are specific. For example person A tells person B 
―you are my agent to sell my house‖. Here the case is his house and the manner is its 
selling. (2) General agency, which is divided into three kinds. First, it is general in the 
manner of possession but specific in the case. For instance, person A tells person B 
―you are my agent to do everything in my house‖. Second, the case is general but the 
                                                 
10
All contracts are divided into two types, revocable and necessary. Revocable contracts can be 
cancelled at any time by parties whereas necessary contracts can only be cancelled in special 
conditions. 
11
 These are conditions provided in a contract which engage one party or both parties more than the 
contract itself. They may be made within the contract itself or within another contract.  
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manner of possession is specific. For example, person A tells person B ―you are my 
agent to sell all my properties‖. Third, both the case and the manner of possession are 
general. For instance, person A tells person B ―you are my agent to do everything in 
all my properties‖. In Islamic banking in Iran the first kind of general agency is 
normally used. Depositors tell the bank authority ―you are my agent to use my 
deposits in all profitable ways‖. 
3.2.7 Guarantee Contract (Dheman) 
This contract is defined as a contract whereby one person agrees to pay the debt of 
another person. According to Shiah (Jafari School) jurisprudence, dheman means the 
transfer of debt from debtor to guarantor. In this interpretation, after fulfilment of the 
guarantee (dheman), the debtor does not have any responsibility with regard to 
paying. However, there is another interpretation of guarantee which is from Sunni 
schools. According to this interpretation, both debtor and guarantor are responsible for 
paying the debt.
12
 The guarantee which is common in the banking system is the 
second kind; therefore it is not dheman according to the Shiah interpretation. Thus, 
Shiah jurisprudents such as Imam Khomeini have tried to solve this problem by using 
conditions provided in the contract itself or in another contract. For instance, person A 
can stipulate in a contract that if person B does not pay his debt he will pay it for him.   
3.2.8 Solh Contract 
Solh literally means peace (Mahyar, 1991) but in jurisprudence terminology it means 
―mutual consent on something such as making an owner (tamlik) of a thing itself or its 
benefit or relinquishment (esqat) of a debt or right‖ (Imam Khomeini: n.d, volume 2: 
67). It is understood from the jurisprudence definition that the main characteristic of a 
solh contract is mutual consent. There is considerable flexibility in this contract which 
makes it appropriate for solving some problems, especially in banking activities.  In 
this contract, similarity of price and goods in value is not necessary. For instance, it is 
possible to pay hundreds of pounds for one bottle of water on the condition that both 
parties agree.  
 
                                                 
12
 For more information see Abdollahi, Mahmood, 1994, Jurisprudence Basis of Islamic Economics, 
Qom, Islamic Publications Office. 
  
52 
Solh is an independent contract which has its own terms and conditions even in the 
case that its result is the result of another contract. ―Solh in the case of transaction, 
although it is the result of a special transaction, does not have the terms and 
conditions of that transaction, but has its own terms and conditions‖ (article 758 of the 
Civil Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran). In addition, it is not necessary to use 
special words for solh, it can be fulfilled by any words. Furthermore, a solh contract is 
a necessary, uncancellable contract, which can be very useful in banking activities. 
So, it is possible that solh is used instead of a revocable contract in order to have its 
effect but not its revocability. Having introduced some general contracts used in 
Islamic banking in Iran, we will now discuss Islamic banking itself in Iran. It is worth 
mentioning that other contracts used in the Islamic banking of Iran will be discussed 
in its particular place in the banking system. 
3.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE ISLAMIC BANKING SYSTEM IN IRAN  
Every banking system has special objectives to which all banking activities should 
conform. While in conventional banking systems these aims are mainly economic, in 
Islamic banking, ethical issues are important too. As the banking system in Iran is an 
Islamic one, it not only has an economic purpose but it also has ethical aims. Some of 
the chief objectives of the banking system in Iran are as follows: 
3.3.1 Establishment of a Monetary and Credit System Based on Rightness and 
Justice  
Before the Islamic Revolution in Iran the majority of people believed that the 
economic system, including the financial and banking system, was not just and 
expected that after the Revolution justice would become an unchangeable principle in 
the economic system. It is worth mentioning that justice in Islam is a very important 
issue, such that according to the Holy Quran, justice was the main purpose for God 
sending the prophets.  
We indeed sent our messengers with clear proofs and sent down to them the 
books and the balance in order for people to act based on justice; we sent iron 
which has harshness and benefits for people and in order for God to know those 
who support him and his messengers through (their belief) in the invisible 
world; surely God is Powerful and Mighty.‖13  
                                                 
13
 The Holy Quran, Chapter 45, verse 25. 
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There are many verses in the Holy Quran that emphasize justice both in private and 
social aspects. Furthermore, there are large numbers of traditions from the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) and Imams
14
(AS) which talk about justice, its meaning and its 
importance in Islam. For example the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) said ―definitely, 
the most beloved of people for God in the Hereafter and nearest to him is the just 
leader.‖ (Nahj Al-Fasahah). Also, Imam Ali Ibn-Abitaleb (AS) said :‖Allah, glory be 
to Him, made justice a support for mankind an elimination of wrings and sins, and a 
facilitator for Islam‖(Al-Amadi.1930, No: 4789) He also said: ―Blessings are 
multiplied through justice‖ (Al-Amadi. 1930, No: 4211) Moreover, Imam Jafar Al-
Sadeq (AS) Imam of the Jafari school (Shiah) said: ―Justice is sweeter than honey, 
softer than butter and smells more fragrant than musk‖ (Koleini, n.d: 147). Because of 
the above mentioned importance of justice in Islam, the first purpose of Islamic 
banking in Iran according to Article 1 of the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran is: 
―Establishment of a monetary and credit system based on fairness and justice (as 
delineated by Islamic Jurisprudence) for the purpose of regulating the sound 
circulation of money and credit to enhance the health and growth of the country‘s 
economy‖(part one of Article 1). 
3.3.2 Enhancing the Health and Growth of the Economy  
One threat which definitely affects efficiency and the effect of the banking system on 
economic development is corruption. In developing countries, because of a shortage 
of capital, access to capital and facilities creates an opportunity for investment and 
consequently for becoming rich. In addition, the only place which provides cheap 
money is the banking system. Therefore, the banking system exposes corruption better 
than other economic establishments. Before the Islamic Revolution in Iran, especially 
in the years leading up to it, corruption in the economic system and especially the 
banking system was very high and serious
15. A lot of people close to the Shah‘s 
                                                 
14
 According to the Shiah School of thought, there are twelve successors to the Prophet Mohammad 
(PBUH) all of whom are from his family (Ahlul Bait). The first is Imam Ali Ibne- Abitaleb and the last 
is Imam Mahdi, son of Imam Hasan Askari (AS) who is alive with God‘s permission now, but is 
hidden from people. When God allows him he will appear and will destroy oppression and will 
establish a world state based on justice. 
15
 For more information regarding high corruption during the Shah‘s regime see: Fardoost, 
Hosein.(1369, 1990-1991). Appearance and Deposal of Pahlavi‘s Monarchy. Volume 1, pp263-274, 
Political Studies and Research Institute, Tehran. 
This book is the memorabilia of Hosein Fardoost. He was the closest friend of the Iranian king 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from childhood until end of kingdom in Iran and occupied many high 
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regime took out huge loans and transferred the money to foreign banks causing 
bankruptcy to several banks. For this reason the new banking laws in Iran emphasised 
not only the health of the banking system but also the health of the economy overall.  
Economic growth is another aim of the Islamic banking system in Iran and it is 
closely related to the health of the economy. This is because, when corruption exists 
in the banking and economic system, resources cannot be allocated efficiently and 
consequently economic growth is negatively affected. So, according to the last section 
of clause (1) of Article 1 of the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran, enhancing the 
health and growth of the economy is another aim of the banking system. 
3.3.3 Creation of Necessary Facilities for the Extension of Cooperation between 
Depositors and Investors  
It is the aim of any banking system to facilitate cooperation between surplus holders 
and investors who are in need of financial credit. So clause (2) of Article 1 of the Law 
of Usury-Free Banking in Iran states that one aim of the banking system is the 
―creation of necessary facilities for the extension of cooperation and Qardh-Al- 
Hasanah among the general public through the attraction and absorption of surplus 
funds, reserves, saving and deposits, and the mobilisation thereof in provision of 
conditions and opportunities for gainful employment and investment‖. 
3.3.4 Maintenance of Currency Value  
Maintenance of currency value is a very important issue. It is necessary for every 
banking system to be able to repel fluctuation in the currency value; therefore clause 
(4) of Article 1 of the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran obligates the banking 
system to maintain the currency value and equilibrium in the balance of payments and 
facilitating commercial exchanges.  
3.3.5 Facilitating Payment and Receipt, Exchanges, Transactions and Other 
Services 
Facilitating payment and receipt, exchanges and transactions are some of the services 
provided by a banking system which have an important role in facilitating economic 
activities and consequently, economic development. According to Article (1) of the 
Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran another aim of Islamic banking in Iran is to 
                                                                                                                                            
positions in that Regime. In the final years of kingdom he was a general and minister of the King‘s 
court.  
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facilitate payment and receipt, exchanges, transactions and other services ―to be 
performed by the banks, as determined by the law‖.  
3.4 FUNCTIONS 
There are many functions in the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran which are 
important, but it may be said that the most important functions of the banking system 
are the mobilisation and allocation of monetary resources (deposits) and monetary 
policy. So in this section we will concentrate on them.     
3.4.1 Mobilisation of Monetary Resources (Deposits) 
Since there is usually resource scarcity, especially in developing countries, the 
mobilisation of monetary resources plays an important role in the ability of banking 
systems to finance productive projects. In conventional banks the most important 
instrument used in this regard is the loan with interest. Due to the prohibition of 
interest in Islam, the Islamic banking system has had to introduce new instruments for 
this aim. Therefore, there are several accounts in Islamic banking some which are 
similar to conventional bank accounts and some which have major differences. The 
accounts used in the banking system of the Islamic Republic of Iran are as follows: 
3.4.1.1 Qardh-Al-Hasanah accounts (free loan accounts)  
There are two kinds of account in this category, the Qardh-Al-Hasanah current 
account and the Qardh-Al-Hasanah saving deposit account. 
a) Qardh-Al-Hasanah Current Account (Free Loan Current Accounts)  
This account is similar to current accounts in conventional banks, in which every 
depositor is given a cheque book by the bank for withdrawing and paying in and no 
interest rate is charged. Of course, occasionally, some conventional banks pay interest 
on this account too. In all countries this account is usually used for transaction and 
payment purposes. As these depositors do not share the profit, these deposits are 
guaranteed by the banks. However, this guarantee is reasonable because the 
ownership of deposits transfers to the bank completely so both profit and loss is 
accepted by the bank. 
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b) Qardh-Al-Hasanah Savings Deposit Account 
In this type of account depositors receive a booklet from the bank and withdraw with 
this each time. This type of account does not involve any interest rate either. Usually 
this type of account is opened by those who do not want to receive benefit and their 
aim is to contribute to the development of their country or to help poor people. Of 
course, banks can offer some incentives to them such as: non-fixed rewards, discount 
on some payments and also giving them the right to suggest to the bank to pay the 
same amount to a specific individual as Qardh-Al-Hasanah loan (free interest loan). 
In addition, the bank is responsible for guaranteeing the initial amount of the deposits 
as with the previous type of account. Article (4) of the Law of Usury-Free Banking in 
Iran states clearly that ―banks are obliged to repay the principles of Qardh-Al-
Hasanah (savings and current) deposits and may undertake and/or insure the 
principles of the term investment deposits‖. In these two above-mentioned accounts 
the ownership of the deposits transfers to the bank, so the bank can use and control the 
funds according to the view of the bank managers, but these deposits are expected to 
be used as Qardh-Al-Hasanah loans by the bank. 
3.4.1.1.1 Bonus in Qardh-Al-Hasanah (is this a lottery?)  
One critical issue in the Islamic banking of the Islamic Republic of Iran is that the 
bonus paid to depositors is the same as lottery or riba (usury). The question is: Are 
these claims true? To answer this question, the meanings of lottery and riba (usury) 
should first be explained. In a lottery one person pays an amount of money to be 
considered in the lottery and the money paid by him/her is not returnable while in 
Qardh-Al-Hasanah accounts banks guarantee repayment of the full amount. In 
addition, in a lottery the lottery authorities have to consider the name of every body 
who has bought ticket, but in Qardh-Al-Hasanah accounts there is no guarantee of 
this. So it cannot be a lottery.  
Regarding riba (usury), there are three conditions for any contract to be considered as 
based on riba (usury) as follows
16
: 
                                                 
16
 For more information see: ―Imam Khomeini, Roohollah (n.d: 653). Ketab Al Baia (Booh of Selling), 
Vol 2, Ismaeilian institute, Qom‖. And‖ Imam Khomeini, Roohollah (n.d). Tawdhih Al Massael 
Explanation of questions). Explanation number 2283, Qom‖. Also,‖Bahjat, Mohammad Taqi (n.d)). 
Tawdhih Al Massael Explanation of questions). Loan section, Qom‖. Also, see ―Makarem Shirazi, 
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(i) There should be a loan contract. So, if the contract is not a loan there would not be        
riba (usury) at all. 
(ii) There should be a surplus to be paid to the lender. 
(iii) This surplus should be predetermined by the contract. So, if the debtor pays an 
amount more than the loan itself without any contract, not only it is not prohibited in 
Islam but also it is encouraged. 
Now we can analyse whether it is based on riba (usury) or not. Although the motive 
of the depositor in Qardh-Al-Hasanah accounts is morality, the banking system in 
Iran gives some rewards to the depositor. Such rewards are at the banks‘ discretion 
and there is no guarantee that any particular depositor will receive them, or even that 
his/her name will appear on the list of those selected to receive a reward, at the time 
the contract is made. The reason is that according to the indult of many Shiah 
jurisprudents, including the late Imam Khomeini, any surplus, even fiat surplus, with 
above mentioned conditions, is counted a fiat riba (usury). Because of this, the Law of 
Usury-Free Banking of Iran states that banks may, ―not be obliged‖, through 
promotional methods, to give some rewards to the depositors. In order to attract and 
mobilize deposits, the banks may, through promotional methods, give the following 
rewards to depositors: 
(i) Non-fixed and indefinite bonuses in cash or in kind to Qardh-Al-Hasanah deposits. 
(ii) Exemption of depositors from or granting discounts thereto, in payment of 
commissions and/or fees. 
(iii) ―According priority to depositors in the use of banking facilities…‖ [Article (6) 
of Iran‘s Law of Usury-Free Banking]  
In conclusion, it can be said that due to the lack of a guarantee of these rewards, 
according to the above mentioned conditions it is not counted as riba (usury) 
                                                                                                                                            
Naser (n.d). Tawdhih Al Massael (Explanation of questions)‖ and, ―Bani Hashemi, Seyyed Mohammad 
Hasan(1378,1999-2000,: 338) ). Tawdhih Al Massaele Maraje (Explanation of questions of Great 
jurisprudents). Vol. 2, Islamic Publisher Office, Qom‖.  
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3.4.1.2 Term investment deposits accounts  
Some people who wish to have an income from their extra money invest in these 
accounts. Principally, banks guarantee neither deposits nor a predetermined profit rate 
for these accounts. However they sometimes, as a third party, guarantee both and this 
is not counted as riba but as a kind of dheman. Generally, these accounts are divided 
into two kinds, short term and long term. According to Iran‘s banking system, short-
term deposits should be left in the bank for at least three or six months for ―short-term 
deposits‖ and ―special short-term deposits‖ respectively, but the period for long-term 
accounts is one, two, three, four and five years. The most important difference 
between this bank and conventional banks is apparent in these types of accounts. In 
contrast with conventional banks, Islamic banks do not own the deposits in this 
account, rather depositors remain the owner of the deposits and banks are only the 
agent of the depositors in order to use their money in legal profitable activities. The 
depositors also allow the bank to use their deposits with other deposits and their own 
assets in the shape of joint ownership. Another difference between Islamic banking 
and conventional banking is in their payment to depositors. While conventional banks 
pay a fixed interest rate to them, payment in Islamic banking is not predetermined, but 
depends on the profitability of the bank‘s projects. 
However, the bank is required to determine its benefit at the end of every six months 
in order for it to be divided between the bank and depositors according to their 
contract regarding the bank‘s share as its honorarium.  
In the cases where combined resources of the bank and the depositors are 
invested, the return to depositors is calculated in proportion to the amount of 
invested deposits after subtracting the required reserve portion from the base 
amount. The banks are required to announce their profits at the end of each six 
months of their operation and transfer the shares of the depositors‘ profits to 
their accounts. Deposits withdrawn earn no profits before the minimum time 
required or are reduced below the required minimum, (Ideology and history, 
n.d, Islamic banking around the world, case of Iran.).  
 
3.4.1.2.1 In-part-payment profit rate  
One critical and debatable issue in the Islamic banking system of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran is that the Central Bank determines a profit rate as in-part-payment profit rate 
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which all banks have to obey. This means that when the profit rate is not clear the 
bank announces a rate and pays it to the depositors. It is not a final rate, which means 
that at the end of the financial year the banking system calculates the real profit rate. 
After that the in-part-payment profit rate is compared with the real profit rate, if the 
real profit rate is more than the in-part-payment profit rate the banking system should 
pay the difference between the two rates to depositors and if the real profit rate is less 
than the in-part-payment profit rate the banking system should ask depositors to return 
the difference. Problems arise when the banking system guarantees the in-part-
payment profit rate for depositors. Some people think this is a kind of riba, especially 
when they see that for several years that amount is paid to depositors. Here the 
following questions arise:  
 (i) Why do banks guarantee the profit rate?  
 (ii) Is this really riba? 
 (iii) Does it have a positive or negative role in Islamic banking?  
The answer to the first question is that banks think some people are risk averters, so 
they prefer to have a minimum avouched revenue from their money. On the other 
hand, wherever deposits are more, the benefit of the banks is more. So, banks 
encourage people to deposit more in their bank in this way. 
Regarding the second question the simple answer is ―no‖, because unlike the Qard- 
Al-Hasanah account in which the bank and depositors are the main parties, in these 
accounts the main parties are the depositors and investors (financial facility 
applicants) and the bank is only the intermediary and agent of the depositor. Therefore 
the bank, as the third party, can guarantee the principle deposit and a minimum profit 
expected from the previous year‘s experience in-part-payment to encourage 
depositors. For example, in Iran banks announce at least x percent for short term 
deposits and y percent for long term deposits. This means that, according to their 
experience, they are sure that banks will have at least such a profit that the share of 
depositors will be that percentage and guarantee them. However, this percentage is 
not a final one; rather the final profit rate is determinable only after determining the 
real profit at the end of the financial year. In the end, there are three probabilities.  
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 (1)The real profit is the same as the expected profit. 
(2)The real profit is more than the expected profit  
(3)The real profit is less than the expected profit. 
In the first case, there is no problem and banks pay the same percentage as the final 
profit. In the second case, banks have to pay the real profit which is more than in-part- 
payment. The problem is in the third case in which the real profit is less than in-part -
payment. In this case depositors must mainly be paid less than they have expected but, 
in order to encourage them to deposit more and more, banks pay the difference 
between real profit and in-part-payment profit from their own recourses and there will 
be no problem according to Shariah law (according to the Jafari school of 
jurisprudence). The reason is that, as mentioned before, in these accounts the bank is 
not the main party of the contract, they are only the agent or the depositor‘s 
middleman. It is like a situation in which person A says to person B, ―if you make me 
your agent and give me your money to share with person or company C on behalf of 
you, I predict that you will obtain 20% net profit. Otherwise, I guarantee to 
compensate your loss with my own money‖. It should be clear that as person A is not 
a party to this contract his paying to person B is not counted as interest (riba) which is 
prohibited in Islam. However, the bank (person A in this example) pays the difference 
between real profit and expected profit in order to encourage depositors (person B in 
the example) to give their money to the investor (partner) and it becomes available for 
the bank to get more honorariums (their commission). 
In answer to the third question it can be said that although it may attract some 
depositors and although it is not riba, because of some misunderstanding it is better 
for it to be avoided. 
3.4.1.2.1.1 Root of misunderstanding 
As mentioned before some people may misunderstand in-part-payment profit rate 
therefore it would be useful to analyse why. As stated before there are three situations 
regarding comparison of real profit rate and in-part-payment profit rate which in two 
situations (when they are equal and when real profit rate is less than in-part-payment 
profit rate) banks pay in-part-payment profit rate to depositors. As most years these 
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two cases occur, some people who are not aware of the contracts think banks pay a 
predetermined profit rate which is riba. What is important is that in some years when 
real profit rate is more than in-part-payment profit rate, banks pay real profit rate, not 
in-part-payment profit rate. In some years banks pay 2% more than in-part-payment 
profit rate to depositors
17
. 
3.4.2 Allocation of Monetary Resources (Deposits) 
 
It is assumed that allocation of monetary resources in conventional banks is in the 
form of a loan with interest, and all individuals or companies that need credit and 
prefer to use conventional banking system financing, use loan-with-interest contracts. 
However, allocation of monetary resources in Islamic banking takes place in several 
ways.  
Before discussing how monetary resources in Islamic Banking are allocated it is 
essential to discuss the general conditions for granting facilities. Since Islamic banks 
are trustees and agents of depositors and they must strive to protect the deposits of 
their customers on the one hand, and pursue the objectives of the Islamic Economic 
System on the other hand, it is essential to explore the following important points: 
A) Trustworthiness of Applicants   
Basically, since the Islamic banking system must provide prosperity and ethical 
values and is also responsible for protecting the savings of depositors, it is the duty of 
managers to provide facilities to credible people and they should be more careful than 
conventional banks in this regard. However, this will have many positive effects and 
uses such as: 
 (i) Dignity of Piety and Trust: Piety and trust is the most valuable objective in 
Islamic Ideology and the Islamic economic system and consequently the Islamic 
banking system must concentrate on it in its programs. 
 (ii) Encouragement of Honesty and Punishment of Bad Behaviour: Honesty is 
very important in Islam so Islam tries to encourage people to be honest. One way to 
                                                 
17
 This happened several times, especially during period in which Dr Mazaheri was the general security 
of the Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran. It‘s worth mentioning that this does not mean that 
there are no infractions in the Iranian banking system. 
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improve honesty in society is to behave differently toward honest and dishonest 
people. Therefore, Islamic banks should also behave in a way that leads to the 
encouragement of valuable account holders and punishment of bad behaviour. 
 (iii) Distribution of Wealth in Favour of Righteous and Helpful People and 
Consequently Growth of Charity in the Community 
 (iv) Optimum use of resources: Prohibition of prodigality is an important issue in 
Islam; therefore, Islamic Banks must be careful to provide financial facilities to the 
best projects.  
After noting the above-mentioned issues, we can now continue our discussion about 
the allocation of monetary resources in Islamic banking in Iran. Instruments used in 
Islamic banking in Iran for this purpose are divided into four major types. 
A) Qardh-Al-Hasanah contracts. 
B) Partnership contracts. 
C) Exchange contracts. 
D) Direct investment. 
3.4.2.1 Qardh-Al-Hasanah (Interest-Free Loan) 
The only loan that exists in Islamic banking in Iran is Qardh-Al-Hasanah. As this 
loan is free of any charge and cost, the demand for it is much greater than the 
available resources, so Islamic banks have to allocate some special resources to it to 
strengthen its supply on one hand and establish some limitation to reduce its demand 
on the other. ‗Banks are required to set aside a portion of their own resources to 
extend interest-free loans to (i) small producers, entrepreneurs, and farmers who 
would otherwise be unable to find alternative sources of financing investment and 
working capital and (ii) needy consumers. Banks are permitted to charge a minimum 
service fee to cover the administrative costs‘ (Ideology and history, n.d, Islamic 
banking around the world, case of Iran.).  
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In addition, according to the Law of Interest-Free Banking in Iran, this loan is also 
used for special needs such as: education, marriage and medical needs (Central Bank 
of Iran, Persian, 1984). It is necessary for loaners (debtors) to repay the principle of 
the loan, but no interest rate is charged on this loan. Principally, this contract can be 
used to finance any kind of project and in all economic sectors. However, as this loan 
is free of any charges and costs, there is a much greater demand for it than there are 
available resources. Therefore Islamic banks are usually faced with a surplus demand 
for Qardh-Al-Hasanah and they have to allocate resources to special needs. It is worth 
noting that, as mentioned before, ownership in this loan is transferred, so borrowers 
can utilize it for any purpose and the relationship between borrower and bank is 
creditor and debtor which is why there is no interest on these loans. In fact, after the 
transfer of the loan to the borrower the relationship with its owner is cut and a new 
ownership relationship between property and borrower is created. So, all its profit and 
loss are for the borrower and he/she alone is responsible for paying the nominal 
amount of the loan to the creditor within the predetermined time.  
3.4.2.2 Partnership Contracts  
These contracts are special features of Islamic banking. These kinds of contracts are 
so important that, despite the existence of other contracts in Islamic banks, many 
researchers present Islamic banking as a PLS (profit and loss sharing) system. There 
is one important problem in partnership contracts, all of which are revocable (jayez) 
which means either one or both parties can cancel them at any time. Revocability 
creates two problems for contracts. Firstly, it causes instability which is very harmful 
for banking activities. Secondly, in the case of the death of one party, the contract is 
cancelled automatically and the other party (here the bank) cannot appropriate the 
project at all because it is joint owned. In Iranian banks, this problem has been solved 
by conditions provided in the contract. Banks, by using conditions provided in the 
contract in a necessary contract, for example Solh contract
18
, obligate another party, 
not to use their right of cancellation. Also, a partner can make the bank his/her 
administrator in order to be able to appropriate the project to the benefit of the 
depositors. Several contracts are categorised under this subject as follows: 
                                                 
18
 Solh contract is a necessary, uncancellable contract, with a lot of flexibility. In this contract similarity 
of price and goods is not necessary. For instance it is possible to pay hundreds of pounds for one bottle 
of water in this condition that both parties agree.  
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3.4.2.2.1 Modharabah (bailment of capital)  
In Islamic banking in Iran this contract takes place between a bank and a businessman 
for trading purpose. According to the Jafari (Shiah) school of jurisprudence 
Modharabah should be used only in commercial projects. ―In order to provide 
facilities required for the expansion of commercial activities, the banks may, within 
the framework of the commercial policies of the government, put the necessary 
financial resources at the disposal of the customers on the basis of modharabah, 
according priority to the legally-established cooperatives‖ [Article (9) of the Law of 
Usury-Free Banking of Iran]. In this contract, the bank gives capital to a businessman 
or trader in order to trade with them for a specific time. The owner of the capital is 
called the ‗modhareb’ and the businessman is the agent (amel) of modharabah. At the 
end they distribute profit between themselves according to the contract. For example, 
there may be a mutual agreement between the bank and the businessman that benefit 
is distributed between them 40/60 respectively. In this case if the bank gives £10,000 
to the businessman and, after one year, the trading project has a profit of £1,000, the 
share of the bank would be £400, which means that the bank‘s profit from this 
contract is 4%. It is worth mentioning that this 4% is not pre-determinable, what is 
pre-determinable is 40% and 60% as their share in the final profit. In other words, it is 
possible to determine previously the share in the profit of each side of the contract. 
However, there are some disagreements between Islamic groups with regard to the 
meaning and usage of modharabah. For example, while some Muslim groups believe 
that it can be used in trade and industry, another group believes that it can be used 
only in trade projects. Also, in some Islamic Banks modharabah is used in both the 
mobilisation and allocation of monetary resources. Man (1991:244) states that: 
In the case of modharabah principle the bank also accepts deposits under two 
different accounts: the general and special investment account. Under both 
accounts the bank accepts deposits from customers for investment. Under the 
principle of modharabah the bank will act as the entrepreneur and the customer 
as the provider of capital. The bank will utilise the money for investment and 
share the profit generated in the agreed proportion. In contrast to general 
investment accounts, in which the customers are the general public, the customer 
of special investment deposits are confined to corporate and government sectors 
to which the mode of investment and the distribution of profit may be 
individually negotiated. 
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However, modharabah in Islamic banking in Iran is used only for trade affairs and for 
the allocation of deposits. Although from the point of view of Shariah, modharabah 
can be used in all kinds of trade, including export and import, the banking system may 
be limited because of some government policies. Financing import projects via 
modharabah has been prohibited by the government in support of home industries. 
According to Article 3 of the executive guidelines for modharabah, banks have been 
forbidden from giving financial facilities to the private sector for import purpose. 
One additional point regarding modharabah is that it is divided into two kinds (1) 
General modharabah, which means that the agent of modharabah is able to buy and 
sell all goods of which their buying and selling is not prohibited in Islam. (2) Special 
modharabah, which means that the agent can buy and sell just those goods 
determined by the owner of the capital. Where its kind is not determined it is counted 
as general modharabah. 
3.4.2.2.1.1 Problem of engagement of the agent for paying loss 
As there are a lot of applicants for financial facilities and the banking system is not 
able to respond to all of them, the banking system tries to finance those projects which 
are most efficient. So, the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran determines an 
interest rate called the expected profit rate. This rate is solely for the evaluation of the 
projects. Any project that is expected to be able to have a profit of which the bank‘s 
share will be at least equal to the expected profit rate is accepted to receive financial 
facilities. As mentioned before, this rate is just for evaluation and banks can apply for 
their share from the real profit not the expected profit. However, in modharabah the 
banking system enforces the agent of modharabah to engage in paying the difference 
between real profit and expected profit of his/her own sources. This issue is actually 
debateable and the banking system authority tries to solve the problem by using the 
―condition provided in the contract‖. 
According to Islamic law if there is no profit in the trade the bank cannot receive any 
profit from the act of modharabah. Even if the trader loses in the transaction, financial 
losses are born by the capital owner, whereas the agent only loses time and effort 
invested in the project. As the bank is the agent of the depositor and is responsible for 
protecting their deposits and profit on the one hand and as there are different people 
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with different personalities and different levels of belief and honesty requiring 
financial facilities for modharabah on the other hand, banks are responsible for 
supervising the process of the administration of modharabah in order to prevent loss 
to depositors. Because of the existence of a large number of projects, supervision is 
very difficult if not impossible, so bank authorities have tried to solve the problem. In 
this regard the late Dr Noor Bakhsh, General Secretary of the Central Bank at that 
time, asked the following religious question (Estefta) of the late Imam Khomeini: 
Salamon Alaikom. As, because of the existence of huge numbers of 
clients, banks are faced with problems regarding the supervision of 
implementation of the modharabah contract, they are thinking 
about adding a ―condition provided in the contract‖. So, please 
send us your point of view in this regard. The condition is: ―The 
agent (amel) accepts and engages not to sell goods with a profit 
less than that agreed. If for any reason the agent understands that it 
is not possible to sell the goods at the agreed profit, he/she is 
responsible for contacting the bank and getting the bank‘s 
permission to sell at that price. Otherwise, they should compensate 
the difference between the agreed profit and the real profit from 
their own property‖. The late Imam Khomeini answered: ―The 
above mentioned condition is correct‖ (Rajaei, 1996:179). 
Although this problem was solved by a ―condition provided in the contract‖, and 
there is no problem regarding shariah-compliance, the reality is that it shows which 
banking system is risk averse which is unnecessary. In fact, it could lead to 
misunderstanding for some people who are not familiar with this kind of ―condition 
provided in the contract‖ and think this is the same as conventional banks asking for a 
fixed interest rate. 
3.4.2.2.1.2 More issues about modharabah 
Furthermore, according to Shiah jurisprudence, the capital should be paid in cash, so 
delivery of goods instead of cash is not acceptable. In addition, all modharabah costs 
should be paid by the owner of the capital but, because some costs are not predictable, 
the owner of the capital pays predictable costs and the agent (amel) is engaged to pay 
the probable remaining costs by including conditions in the solh contract. Anyway, 
the costs which are paid by the owner of the capital in internal trade are as follows: 
1- Price of goods.  
2- Transportation costs. 
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3- Insurance costs. 
4- Storekeeper costs. 
5- Impaction costs. 
These costs are in fact necessary capital in internal trade. However, in international 
trade, custom duties are added to the above mentioned costs. As mentioned before, if 
additional costs exist they will be paid by the agent. According to article 9 of the 
modharabah contract, with regard to the solh contract, the agent accepts and agrees to 
pay the remaining probable costs of this contact other than those mentioned in article 
8
19
. 
3.4.2.2.1.3 Determination of the bank’s share in the profit in modharabah 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Central Bank (Banke Markazi) determines an 
expected profit rate for any contract or for any economic sector. The role of this rate 
appears in the evaluation of the project in order to be selected as accepted for financial 
facilities. This means that only those projects which have a profit of which the bank‘s 
share is not less than the accepted percentage for receiving facilities can be approved. 
In this regard, the bank predicts the profit of the project and determines its share in the 
profit in order to gain the expected profit. For example, if we assume that the expected 
profit rate for modharabah in the banking system is 20% we should first determine 
the probable profit rate. This rate is calculated by using this formula: 
R= [(P-C)/C](12/M).100, 
R = Predictable profit rate of the project. 
P = Total sale price. 
C = Total costs (transportation costs, insurance costs, storekeeper costs, impaction 
costs and custom duties).  
M = Duration of the modharabah.  
                                                 
19
 Costs mentioned in article 8 are those which are mentioned above as predictable costs. 
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Let us assume that a trader asks for financial facilities in order to export X goods. If 
we predict that P = £90,000, C = £75,000 and M = 4 month, the predictable profit rate 
would be calculated as:  R = [(90000-75000)/75000] (12/4) 100 = 60 
This means that the total predicted profit will be 60%. Now the bank should decide 
what percentage of this profit should be its share. If the expectable profit rate is 20%, 
then the bank‘s share should be 33.3% which can be achieved by using a simple ratio 
as follows: 
60            100 
20              ?      = 100 (20)/60= 33.3 
After this conclusion, the bank decides to finance the project and determines 33.3% as 
its share in the total profit. In the end, the bank should ask for its share. So, if the real 
profit is equal to the predicted profit, the bank will benefit 20%, but if the total real 
profit is more or less than the predicted profit, the bank will benefit more or less than 
the expected profit respectively. It is worth mentioning that this rate is the yearly rate 
of profit and if 12/M is omitted from the formula, the result would show the profit rate 
for the period of the contract, which in this case will be 6.67%.  
3.4.2.2.2 Civil partnership (mosharakate madani)  
This is defined as: 
Project-specific partnership of short duration in commercial production and 
service activities in which each partner provides a share of the necessary 
capital, and the assets and properties acquired are held as community 
property until the end of the life of the partnership. In these cases, the bank‘s 
share in the capital can exceed the share of the manager-entrepreneur 
initiating or directing the project‘ (Ideology and History: Islamic Banking 
around the World, Case of Iran).  
It is possible for Islamic Banks in Iran to use this contract in many cases such as trade 
or building houses or factories. For example, if a person needs to build a house and 
wishes to use the bank‘s facilities, he/she can go to the bank and fill in an application 
form for bank facilities. In this situation the bank, as the agent of the depositor, 
considers the project and checks its profitability. Once it is sure of the project, the 
bank agrees to be his/her partner in the building of the house. According to article 12 
of the executive guidelines of the civil partnership, the bank‘s maximum share in any 
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project should be 80%. At the end of the project the bank should sell its share to the 
partner who has the option to buy the bank‘s share on credit or in cash. The price in 
the case of purchasing by credit will be higher than the other option.   
3.4.2.2.3 Legal partnership (mosharekate hoqooqi)  
Another kind of partnership in Islamic Banking in Iran is legal partnership. According 
to the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran there are two main differences between 
civil partnership and legal partnership. Firstly, while the first one follows the civil 
law, the second one follows Iran‘s trade law. Secondly, the first one is intended to be 
short term while the second one is intended for a longer duration. It was reported that 
―the second form of partnership is a firm-specific venture of longer duration in which 
the bank provides a portion of the total equity of a newly-established firm or buys into 
an existing corporation‖ (Ideology and History: Islamic Banking around the World, Case of 
Iran). Since banks are agents of depositors they are required to do their best to ensure 
benefits for depositors. Thus they should consider every plan or project in detail, in 
terms of their economic, financial and technical issues in order to understand their 
profitability. 
The banks can participate in the equity of such partnership only after the 
technical, economic, and financial viability of the firm (or the project) has 
been appraised and minimum expected rate of profit from the investment 
appears to be high enough to warrant the undertaking of the venture by the 
bank (Ideology and History: Islamic Banking around the World, Case of 
Iran).  
For this reason, the Central Bank of Iran, as the mother bank and controller, is 
responsible for preparing some directions for execution. ―The Central Bank (Bank 
Markazi) determines the maximum amount of equity participation by the bank, and 
the minimum amount of participation by other partners. The banks are allowed to sell 
and purchase shares whenever they deem it appropriate‖ (Ideology and History: Islamic 
Banking around the World, Case of Iran). At the present time banks can participate up to 
80% in many projects in Iran. This contract can be used in industrial, mining, 
agricultural and services projects and usually in secondary markets.  
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3.4.2.2.4 Mozaraah 
This is a contract between two persons or corporations, one of which works on the 
agricultural land of another. At the end, the production is divided between them 
according to the contract. According to the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran, banks 
are permitted to give their land to farmers for farming purpose. Despite the existence 
of this contract in the Law, this contract has not been used in the Iranian banking 
system until now. 
3.4.2.2.5 Mosaqat 
This contract is the same as mozaraah but is related to orchards. ‖The banks may 
assign mozaraah or mosaqat for agricultural lands and/or orchards which are at their 
disposal or in their possession [Article (17) of the Law of Usury-Free Banking in 
Iran]. As with the previous contract, this one has not been used in the Iranian banking 
system until now either. 
3.4.2.3 Exchange contracts 
Whereas in partnership contracts profit is not pre-determinable; in exchange contracts 
it can be determined. There are several important contracts in this category as follows: 
3.4.2.3.1 Salam transactions (post delivery sale) 
This is a contract in which the price of a commodity is paid in the present, but the 
commodity is delivered in the future. Fahim Khan, M. (1983: 264) states that: 
The bank buys certain goods on post delivery and pays the cost immediately or 
sells certain goods on post delivery and receives its cost immediately. In this sale, 
the cost of goods is fixed and paid in advance but the delivery of sold items is 
postponed or delayed up to a certain period. Similarly, the place of delivery, its 
expenses and quantities of the sold goods should also be fixed and defined as 
they are conditions for such a sale. 
It has also been introduced as a financial instrument in the Law of Usury-Free 
Banking in Iran. 
In order to create the condition required for the provision of working capital 
needed by the productive units, the banks may engage in any of the following 
operations: …b) Upon the request of productive units, to purchase on a forward 
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basis, the easy- to -sell products of the said unit. [Clause (b) of Article (13) of 
the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran]. 
This contract can be used for all productive units, but in Iran it is usually used for 
farmers. As there is usually a considerable distance between cultivation and harvest in 
agriculture, the farmers often face some problems with regard to working capital 
needs and living costs. Therefore, Islamic banks buy their product in advance and pay 
the price to them immediately. After harvesting the output, which is bought by the 
bank, farmers deliver it to the representative of the bank, or the farmers themselves 
sell the product as the deputy of the bank and give the price to the bank.  
In addition to the general conditions of contracts accuracy, there are some special 
conditions for salam transactions as follows: 
a) In the salam transaction, quantity, quality and characteristic of the goods, which 
affect the inclination of people and prices, should be described accurately, otherwise 
the contract will be gharari
20
 and consequently null. 
b) The price should be given in the session completely and if a part of the price is 
paid, the contract will be correct relative to that part and null relative to remaining 
parts. Moreover, in the case that the seller is in debt to the buyer, if it is not due, it 
would definitely be null. However, if it is due its abandonment is closer to 
precaution.‖ (Imam Khomeini, nd, Volume 1:544). 
c) Time and place of delivery of goods should be determined and there should be no 
problem regarding its delivery. 
d) Buyers cannot sell goods before the delivery time either to the seller or to others, 
but after delivery time they can sell goods either to the seller or to others.  
e) At the delivery time, if the seller delivers goods with a lower quality than agreed, 
the buyer has the option of not accepting. If sellers are not able to deliver goods on 
time due to some problems the buyers have two options. (1) They can wait until the 
sellers become able to deliver the goods. (2) They can cancel the contract and ask for 
their initial money but they cannot ask for the present price of the goods. 
                                                 
20
 Gharar means lack of enough information regarding the characteristics of the contract or goods. 
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3.4.2.3.2 Joaalah  
This is ―a contract of reward by which someone offers a certain amount of money or 
property as a reward to any person who brings about a desired result‖ (Frank, E, 
Vogel and Samuel, Hayes 1998: 149). For example if one person loses his car and 
announces ―if anybody finds my car I will give him/her this amount of money‖ or a 
person announces ―if anybody repairs my house or builds this building for me I will 
give him/her this amount of money‖ these are called joaalah. In Islamic banking in 
Iran, joaalah is used for the expansion of productive, commercial and services 
activities. ―In order to provide the necessary conditions for the expansion of 
productive, commercial and services activities, banks may engage in joaalah‖ [Article 
(16) of the law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran]. 
There are two kinds of joaalah. The first is general joaalah which is not limited to a 
specific individual. For example, as mentioned before, if one person loses his car and 
announces ―if anybody finds my car I will give him/her this amount of money‖, it 
would be called general joaalah. The second is special joaalah in which the person 
who wants to do the work must be predetermined. According to the executive guide 
direction of the Law of Interest-Free Banking in Iran banks can only use special 
joaalah. ―Banks may provide or receive services on requirement and charge or pay 
commission or fees for such services. The service to be performed and the fee to be 
charged must be determined at the time of the transaction‖ (Ideology and History: 
Islamic Banking around the World, Case of Iran, n.d).  
For example, if someone decides to repair his house and needs to borrow some 
money, he can go to the bank and fill in an application form for joaalah. After that, 
they sign a contract and the bank agrees to repair his house for a fixed amount of 
money. There are some companies which cooperate with banks and carry out the 
operation of the joaalah according to another contract held between the bank and the 
company. Another example would be if a company wants to import some raw 
materials, instruments or even a factory, the bank can do it via its dependent 
companies which are active and experienced in exporting and importing. It is also 
possible for the company manager to import those goods as the bank‘s representative. 
In this case, the company manager receives a sum of money from the bank and 
imports the goods. The bank‘s benefit in the joaalah is from the difference between 
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the amount of money which is charged by its representative for the price of goods and 
the honorarium and amount of money which it receives from its customers. Joaalah 
can be used in all economic sectors and all kinds of facilities. 
3.4.2.3.3 Sale by instalment  
This is a kind of credit transaction which is used in several projects, especially in 
housing activities in the Islamic banking system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 
this contract the time of payment should be determined exactly. Payment in this 
account can be made in two ways. Firstly, payment takes place completely within a 
predetermined time. Secondly, payment takes place weekly, monthly, seasonally or 
yearly in instalments. Moreover, it is allowed in Islamic jurisprudence for the price of 
a credit transaction to be higher than that of a cash transaction. After selling at a price, 
if the borrower is unable to pay his debt, the debt cannot be increased, as that would 
be counted as a kind of riba, “riba-al-Jaheliyah”, usury from the Period of 
Ignorance,
21
 where the time of payment has been extended by increasing the amount. 
However, in Islamic banking in Iran the second type, instalments, is used ―for the 
purpose of providing facilities, the banks may in coordination with the Ministry of 
Housing and Town Planning, construct low-priced residential units for sale by 
instalments or hire-purchase‖ [Article (10) of the Law of Usury-Free Banking of 
Iran]. Banks usually buy or build buildings and then sell them to the customer by sale 
by instalments. Also banks buy tools and instruments, raw materials and even 
consumption goods such as automobiles, refrigerators and anything else and then sell 
them to their customers via this contract. This contract can also be used in all 
economic sectors. 
3.4.2.3.4 Hire-purchase  
This is a kind of rent by which tenants automatically become the owner of a property 
at the end of the rental period if they fulfil their conditions. This contract is new in 
Iran and appeared for the first time in 1982 in the approved byelaw of the Council of 
Money and Credit of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, because of its 
newness, it has not been discussed by jurisprudents. However, there have been some 
debates between lawyers regarding its essence as to whether it is actually a sale 
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 The Period of Ignorance is the period before Islam in Arab countries. 
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contract or a hire contract. The criterion is that if property transfers to another party 
without any need for a new contract or the decision of one party, it would be a sale 
contract, but if the aim is not to transfer the property but to transfer the benefit of the 
property, it would actually be a hire contract. In conclusion here, it can be said that the 
hire-purchase is actually a hire contract for which there is a resulting condition (sharte 
natijeh) in it which if the tenant fulfils all conditions he/she will become the owner of 
property. In addition to the general conditions of contract accuracy, there are some 
special and standard conditions for hire transactions as follows:  
(i) Sustainability: The goods which are hired should be sustainable. This is because, 
according to definition, rent (ijarah) is: use of a benefit with the goods themselves 
remaining. Therefore, goods which are amortized the first time they are consumed 
cannot be hired.  
 (ii)  Determination of duration: The duration of the hire contract and the hire price 
should be determined. 
 (iii) Responsibility of hirer: The hirer is responsible for doing whatever is necessary 
for the house to be usable, such as repairing and buying necessary equipment.‖ 
Repairing and all costs which are necessary in order for goods to be usable, should be 
paid by the hirer unless there exist other conditions or local common law opposes it. 
Also equipment which is necessary for goods should be bought by the hirer‖ (Article 
486 of the Civil Law of Iran). 
 (iv) Responsibility of the leaseholder: The lessee is responsible regarding taking care 
of the goods, unless his/her situation changes from yade amani to yade dhemani 
which means that in the case of a commodity being damaged he/she should pay all 
detriments which occur to the commodity. 
 (v) Although principally lodgers are not bail, there are different opinions regarding 
making them bail by using conditions provided in the contract. Some jurisprudents 
believe that this condition is the opposite of the contract expedient. So, not only is it 
null itself but it also causes the original contract to be null, see Helli,                                      
(nd:317), Hoseini, (1327LC
22
:252), Shahid thani, (1967:331), Shahid thani, 
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 Lunar Calender 
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(1999:321) Khansari, (nd: 114)
23
 and Sheikh Bahaei, (nd:28), cited in Katoozian, 
(1994:419). Some jurisprudents believe that the condition is null but does not lead to 
nullification of the contract itself. See Tabatabaei Yazdi, (nda:115); Tabatabaei Yazdi, 
(ndb:284); Al-Najafi, (1992:528) and Rashti, (nd:52). cited in Katoozian, (1994:419). 
Finally, some jurisprudents believe that the condition itself is correct by reasoning that 
the condition provided in the contract is permissible. See Tabatanaei Yazdi, (nd: 277) 
and Tabatabaei (2002), cited in Katoozian, (1994:419 ).  
 (vi) When hired goods and commodities go out of usage or do not have the right 
conditions, the contract will be cancelled automatically. 
 (vii) Hire does not become null by the selling of the hired commodities. Neither does 
it become null by the death of hirers or lodgers except in the case of the ownership of 
hirers relative to the benefit of property being limited to their life period. Of course, 
those who become owners of the benefit of the property can permit the hire for the 
remaining time (Imam Khomeini, nd).  
 (viii) If there are no conditions in the contract saying that only the lodger can use the 
property or commodity, the lodger can rehire it at the same price, less or more except 
in the house and shop. In these two properties hiring at a higher price is permitted 
only when the lodger has made some improvement to them.  
In Islamic banking in Iran, this contract is often used in housing projects. In this 
regard its usage is the same as sale by instalments. ―For the purpose of providing 
necessary facilities for the expansion of housing activities, the bank may, in 
coordination with the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning, construct low-price 
residential units for sale by instalments or hire purchase‖ [Article(10) of the Law of 
Usury-Free Banking of Iran]. 
 3.4.2.4 Direct investment  
According to the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran banks are able to invest directly 
in any service and productive activities with some conditions such as: (i) it is not 
permissible for banks to share with the private section in any project via direct 
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 This book is a collection of some lectures delivered by the late Mirza Naeini which was collected and 
published by his student, Sheikh Moosa Najafi Khansari. 
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investment and they cannot invest in projects that produce luxury commodities and 
services; (ii)  total essential capital for the execution of these projects must be 
invested from long-term financial resources; (iii) the bank is responsible for ensuring 
the profitability of the project and the central bank must control this. (iv) it is 
necessary for the percentage of the initial capital of these ventures to total required 
funds is more than 40 percent [Article(10) of the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran]. 
It is worth mentioning that this instrument is usually used in huge projects which are 
too difficult to be undertaken by the private sector, such as highways, petrochemical 
factories, cement factories etc. 
3.4.2.5 Usage of Islamic contracts in economic sectors and private needs in 
Islamic banking in Iran 
Table 3.1 shows the usage of Islamic contracts in economic sectors and private needs 
in Islamic banking in Iran. As can be seen in this table Qardh-Al-Hasanah, sale by 
instalments and joaalah have the most usage. They can be used to finance all 
economic sectors and also private needs. Second are civil partnership, legal 
partnership and direct investment which can be used in all economic sectors but not 
for private needs. Third are salam contracts which can be used in agriculture, 
manufacturing and mining and for private needs. Fourth is hire-purchase and 
modharabah. Hire-purchase is used just for financing building and modharabah is 
used just for financing trade. Of course, as mentioned before this is according to the 
Muslim Jafari (Shiah) school of thought.   
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Table 3.1: Usage of Islamic Contracts in Economic Sectors and Private Needs in 
Islamic Banking in Iran. 
 
                    Sectors     
contracts 
Agriculture I & M* Building  Services Trade Private  
Needs 
Qardh-Al-Hasanah + + + + + + 
Sale by Instalments + + + + + + 
Hire-purchase _ _ + _ _ _ 
Salam + + _ _ _ - 
Modharabah _ _ _ _ + _ 
Civil Partnership + + + + + _ 
Legal Partnership + + + + + _ 
Direct Investment + + + + + _ 
Joaalah + + + + + + 
I & M=Manufacturing and mining 
Note: Plus (+) sample means that the contract can be used in the sector and minus (-) 
sample means that the contract cannot be used in the sector. 
3.4.3 Central Banks and Monetary Policies  
Central banks and their policies play an important role in the stability of economy and 
economic development. In conventional banking systems, there are some instruments 
for the performance of monetary policies, such as interest rates and open market 
operations. Of all instruments, interest rates play the most important role in this 
matter. In times of inflation, when reduction of liquidity is required, central banks 
increase the interest rate. As a result the price of bonds decreases and people buy 
more bonds than before. This leads to a decrease in liquidity and consequently to a 
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decrease in the inflation rate. In contrast, in times of stagnation when expansionary 
policies are required, central banks decrease the interest rates in order to increase the 
price of bonds and people sell more bonds than before. This leads to an increase in 
liquidity and consequently stagnation decreases and inflation increases. 
As in the Islamic banking system interest is prohibited, central banks in an Islamic 
financial system such as the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Bank 
Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran) are not able to use this instrument and therefore have 
to find another instrument as a substitute. However, some new instruments have been 
devised in the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran‖ and they are considered here 
briefly. 
a) Fixing a Minimum and/or Maximum Ratio of Profit for Bank Share 
―Fixing a minimum and/or maximum ratio of profit for banks in their joint ventures 
and modharabah activities; these ratios may vary for different fields of activities‖ 
[clause (A), article 20 of the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran]. In the modharabah 
contract the share of profit of each party must be determined at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract. It can be divided 50/50 between the bank and the agent 
60/40 and so on. If the share of the bank is high, demand for facilities will decrease, 
so during the inflationary period the central bank determines a high ratio of profit for 
banks. In this situation demand for financial facility via modharabah decreases and 
causes a decrease in liquidity. Consequently, by assuming the stability of other 
factors, it leads to a decline in inflation. In contrast, in times of depression an 
expansionary monetary policy is carried out by decreasing the ratio of profit to banks 
share. However, this issue leads to an increase in demand for financial facility via 
modharabah which causes increase in liquidity and consequently a decrease in 
depression and increase in inflation. 
b) Designation of Various Fields for Investment and Partnership and Fixing the 
Minimum Prospective Rate of Profit 
One instrument for monetary policy by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran is the ―designation of various fields for investment and partnership within the 
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framework of the approved economic policies, and the fixing of the minimum 
prospective rate of profit for the various investment and partnership projects; the 
minimum prospective rate of profit may vary with respect to different branches of 
activity‖ [clause (B), article 20 of the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran]. One 
instrument for the performance of monetary policy by the Central Bank is the 
determination of some fields in which the banking system can invest or share in. In 
times of inflation these fields are decreased and in times of depression they are 
increased.  
Moreover, as there are several applicants for banking system facilities with different 
projects at any time, and the bank has to decide to finance some of them on the one 
hand, and has a responsibility to protect the savings of their depositors on the other, 
the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran determines an expected minimum 
rate of profit which banks have to consider when providing facilities to the projects. 
This means that banks are responsible for assessing a project to understand how much 
the profit of that project will be and consequently approximately how much the bank‘s 
share will be. After assessment, if the approximate rate of return is the same or higher 
than the minimum prospective rate of profit it will be accepted, otherwise, it will be 
rejected. It is clear that the Central Bank of Iran is able to implement its monetary 
policies by changing the minimum prospective rate of profit.  
However, it should be mentioned that the minimum prospective rate of profit cannot 
be demanded by banks, it is only used as an assessment of the project and the amount 
which banks can demand as their share depends on the real profit obtained by the 
project. For example, the minimum prospective rate of profit for modharabah in Iran 
is 12%, so if the approximate rate of return is 12% or more than 12%, a project is 
accepted as a candidate for bank facilities. However, the final ratio of the profit for 
bank may be 12% or less and more than it. 
c) Fixing a Minimum and Maximum Margin of Profit 
―Fixing a minimum and maximum margin of profit as a proportion of the cost price of 
the goods transacted, for banks in instalment and hire-purchase transactions‖ 
[clause(C), article 20 of the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran]. In instalment and 
hire-purchase transactions, banks usually add a percentage to the cost price of the 
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goods and properties transacted as their profit. The Central Bank of Iran determines 
the maximum and minimum of this percentage and uses it as a monetary policy 
instrument. This means that in times of depression when expansionary policy is 
required, the Central Bank decreases these ratios in order to demand an increase in 
financial facilities. In contrast, in the inflationary period, when deflationary policy is 
required, the Central Bank increases them in order to decrease the demand for credit 
and consequently bring about liquidity and inflation. 
d) Determination of Types and the Minimum and Maximum Amount of 
Commission 
Another instrument for monetary policy by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran is ―Determination of types and the minimum and maximum amount of 
commissions for banking services (provided that they do not exceed the cost of the 
service rendered) and the fees charged for putting to use the deposits received by the 
banks‖ [clause (D), article 20 of the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran]. 
Determination of types and the minimum and maximum amount of commissions for 
banking services affect the demand side of credit. Banks provide some services, 
including Qardh–Al-Hasanah, to their customers and receive commission for their 
services. As we know, no interest can be charged on Qardh -Al-Hasanah, but banks 
receive commission. The amount of commission is determined by the Central Bank. 
Although it is another monetary policy instrument in the Islamic banking system in 
Iran, it cannot have an effective role in decision-making by customers because it 
cannot be more than the cost of the service rendered and usually the changes are not 
significant. 
As mentioned before, banks in the Islamic banking system of Iran are agents of the 
depositors and receive honorarium for putting to use the deposits received. Because of 
the determination of this honorarium by the Central Bank it can be another monetary 
policy instrument in the Islamic banking system in Iran, which can affect savings by 
changing them by affecting the supply side. When the banking system increases its 
honorarium the supply of deposits to the banking system decreases. In this situation 
the effect of this policy on inflation or depression is not clear because when deposits 
decrease, it is true that supply of credit decreases but it remains in the hands of the 
people and they may use it for economic activities instead of giving them to the bank 
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as deposits. On the other hand in this situation they may increase their consumption 
which can have a positive effect on inflation.   
e) Determination of the Types, Amounts and Minimum and Maximum Bonuses 
As mentioned before, one account in the banking system of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran is the Qardh-Al-Hasanah account. In this regard the Central Bank performs its 
policy via determination of the types, amounts and minimum and maximum bonuses 
―Determination of the types, amounts, minimum and maximum bonuses is the subject 
of article (6) and the establishment of guidelines for advertisement by banks in the 
cases referred to‖ [clause (E), article 20 of the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran]. In 
order to attract deposits, Iranian Banks offer bonuses to depositors according to the 
draw. This subject takes place in the Qardh-Al-Hasanah deposits. Of course its 
effectiveness, like the previous one, is not clear. 
f) Determination of the Minimum and Maximum Ratio in Joint Ventures 
 ―Determination of the minimum and maximum ratio in joint ventures, modharabah, 
investment, hire-purchase, instalment transactions, buying and selling on credit, 
forward deals, mozara-ah, mosaqat, joaalah and Qardh-Al-Hasanah for banks or any 
thereof with respect to various fields of activity; also fixing the maximum facility that 
can be charged to each customer‖ [clause(F), article 20 of the Law of Usury-Free 
Banking of Iran]. Another instrument for monetary policy in Islamic Banking in Iran 
is the determination of some limitations or expansions on facilities which can pay. 
The Central Bank of Iran usually determines the amount which banks can offer for 
each kind of contractor and even for each customer. However, the Central Bank of 
Iran increases the ratio in times of stagnation and decreases it in times of inflation. 
g) Open Market Operation 
Operating on the open market is another instrument for central banks regarding 
monetary policy. It is a very important instrument in open market operation (OMO) 
for both conventional banks and Islamic banks, but some economists doubt its 
usefulness for Islamic countries. 
Open market operations (OMOs) are among the most important tools of 
monetary policy in market economies today, since they allow central banks to 
  
82 
control monetary aggregates easily, and with minima1 unwarranted effects on 
interest rates. Arguably they may be of special importance in some Islamic 
countries, since Islamic banks are not directly influenced by interest rate changes. 
(El-Gamal, 1999:501)  
The most common instrument used in (OMO) is government securities. Principally, 
there are two characteristics in these securities which are selected as main instruments 
in (OMO); firstly, their risk-free nature and secondly their high level of liquidity. 
The virtually risk-free nature of those securities, together with their liquidity 
caused by the central banks‘ readiness to buy them at or near market prices, 
results in high degrees of market activity. This activity, in turn, enhances the 
liquidity of the market in government securities and allows central banks to use 
OMOs as a primary tool of monetary policy. Due to their need for a highly liquid 
outlet for excess funds, banks have become the major participant in primary 
auctions and secondary markets where such government securities (especially 
short-term) are traded. (El- Gamal, 1999:501)  
As, due to prohibition of interest (riba) these securities do not exist in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, it is not possible to use them as an instrument for monetary policy. 
In contrast, they are able to operate the paper and gold markets in partnership. In 
periods of inflation in which a contraction policy is required, the Central Bank sells 
gold coins and partnership paper of secondary market issued by the government. 
However, in times of depression, in which an expansionary policy is required, the 
Central Bank buys gold coins and partnership papers. 
3.4.4 Central Bank and Maintenance of Currency Value 
Despite maintenance of currency value being one of the most important functions of 
the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has not been successful in this 
regard. After the end of the war, especially during President Hashemi Rafsanjani‘s 
era, the inflation rate was very high. For instance in 1995 it was at its highest level. In 
that year the inflation rate was 49%.
24 It showed the devaluation of the currency value 
to be about 50%. It is worth mentioning that this issue does not depend on Islamic 
banking rather it depends on the banking system structure and government policies.  
The big problem was dependency of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
on the government. The main condition for central banks to be able to protect 
currency value is their independency. Central banks should be able to reject 
government requests regarding issuing money and increasing liquidity. As the Chair 
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of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran is selected by the government and 
is responsible to the government, this caused the Central Bank to be considered as an 
agent of the government. 
However, the main reason for the devaluation of the currency value in Iran has been 
financing budget deficit mainly through borrowing from the Central Bank. In Iran 
governments, especially President Rafsanjani‘s government, tried to rebuild war 
damaged infrastructure on one hand and compensate the historical backwardness and 
increase growth rate on the other hand. So, for many years they pursued expansionary 
policies which led to budget deficit. Deficit is usually financed by tax, government 
securities and borrowing from central banks. However, in Iran tax culture is very 
weak and governments do not have enough income via tax, because the majority of 
people think the country has a lot of oil revenues and they are enough to cover all 
government costs. As mentioned before, using government securities is prohibited in 
Islam; therefore the government issued partnership papers instead of government 
securities. The easiest way to finance deficit is to borrow from the Central Bank 
because it operates as an agent for the government. Although, there is no data which 
shows the amount which borrowed by the government from the Central Bank, the 
high level of liquidity growth rate shows that it was considerable. For example, 
liquidity (M2) increased from 18753.3 billion Iranian Rials in 1989 to 1284199.4 
billion Iranian Rials in 2006 which shows an increase of about 68 times.
25
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has aimed to answer some of the research questions including: (1) How 
does Islamic banking work in Iran? (2) Is the banking system in Iran really an Islamic 
one? To answer these questions, first of all basic conditions for accuracy of contracts 
has been considered, including: intention of all parties, satisfaction of both parties, 
competence of both parties, necessity of determining the subject of the contract and 
necessity of the purpose for the contract being shariah-compliant.  
As the second step, the purposes of the Islamic banking system in Iran according to 
the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran were considered. In summary, these purposes 
were: to establish a monetary and credit system based on fairness and justice; to 
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enhance the health and growth of the economy; to create the necessary facilities for 
the extension of cooperation between depositors and investors, to maintain the 
currency value and facilitate payment and receipt, exchanges, transactions and other 
services. 
The third step was to discuss the duties of the banking system. Although the banking 
system has several functions in the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran, this chapter 
focused on its most important duties, namely the mobilisation of monetary resources 
(deposits) and the allocation of monetary resources (deposits) and monetary policies 
by the Central Bank. In the mobilisation of monetary resources (deposits) section, 
three accounts are highlighted which are used which comply with the Shariah, 
namely: Qardh-Al-Hasanah current accounts (free loan current accounts), Qardh-Al-
Hasanah savings deposit accounts and Term Investment Deposits Accounts. 
In the Allocation of Monetary Resources (deposits) section, all contracts used in this 
section are divided into three types. The first are loan contracts on which no interest 
or profit is charged. The only contract in this regard is Qardh-Al-Hasanah (interest 
free loan). The second type is partnership contracts which are based on profit and loss 
sharing, including: modharabah (bailment of capital), civil partnership (mosharakate 
madani), legal partnership (mosharekate hoqooqi), mozaraah and mosaqat. However, 
in these contracts, conditions provided in the contract itself or in another contract have 
been used to overcome problems caused by partnership. The third type is exchange 
contracts which include: salam transactions (post delivery sale), joaalah, sale by 
instalments and hire-purchase in which a fixed profit rate can be determined in 
advance. In addition there is another way for allocation of the money resources used 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran which has an important role in the economic 
development, namely direct investment. The government has financed a lot of 
development projects such as highways, ports, petrochemical projects etc.  
A main function of the central banks is performance of monetary policy and these 
policies in conventional banks are mainly based on interest which is prohibited in 
Islam. The Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran designed special instruments 
which are shariah-compliant as follows: 
(1) Fixing a minimum and/or maximum ratio of profit for bank share. 
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(2) Fixing a minimum and maximum margin of profit. 
(3) Prospective rate of profit. 
(4) Designation of various fields for investment and partnership and fixing the 
minimum. 
(5) Determination of types and the minimum and maximum amounts of commission. 
(6) Determination of the types, amounts and minimum and maximum bonuses.  
(7)  Determination of the minimum and maximum ratio in joint ventures. 
(8) Open market operation. Due to the prohibition of interest in Islam the Central 
Bank of Iran uses buying and selling gold coins and partnership paper as instruments 
for monetary policy. 
In summary it can be said that the Law of Interest-Free Banking in Iran is Shariah-
compliant because all its contracts are in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence 
(Jafari school) approved by parliament and confirmed by the Guardian Council.  
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Chapter Four: 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This research aims to discuss the contribution of Islamic banking to economic 
development, in the case of Iran. For this reason first of all we should examine and 
deliberate whether Islamic banking in Iran is shariah-compliant. There are some 
issues in Islamic banking of the Islamic Republic of Iran which are debatable, such as, 
in-part-payment profit rate, expected profit rate and giving bonus to Qardh-Al-
Hasanah depositors. These are actually challengeable; some people believe that these 
are the same as usury because, when banks promise depositors to pay them in–part- 
payment and guarantee the amount or when banks impose paying expected profit rates 
upon credit demanders, this only means they will give a fixed amount to the 
depositors and ask a fixed rate from credit demanders which is the same as an interest 
rate. These issues should be analysed carefully in order to avoid misunderstanding. 
Secondly, the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on economic development should be 
examined. This is also a controversial issue among economists. As the banking 
system in Iran is based on the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran which is Islamic, it 
is important to demonstrate trends of deposits and credits after the replacement of the 
conventional banking system with the new one (Islamic banking or interest-free 
banking). Here, there exist some theoretical approaches which refer to whether 
Islamic banking in its nature improves efficiency and consequently economic 
development, reduces it or is neutral in this regard. So, in this research both 
theoretical and empirical research methods will be used. Also, as there are some 
empirical issues which should be considered in the analyses, both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods will be utilised. Therefore, several research methods 
will be used in this research.  
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4.2 MEANING AND DEFINITION 
Methodology means understanding or studying appropriate methods of research. 
Researchers usually aim to solve problems or to find new phenomena. As Sekaran 
(2003:3) states ―Research, a somewhat intimidating term for some, is simply the 
process of finding the solution to a problem after a thorough study and analysis of the 
situational factors‖. Sekaran (2003:5) also defines research as ―an organized 
investigation into a specific problem, undertaken with the purpose of finding answers 
or solutions to it. In essence, research provides the needed information that guides 
managers to make informed decisions to successfully deal with problems‖. Asutay 
(2007:1) defines research as ―how one will go about studying a phenomenon‖. 
Generally, there are two kinds of research: theoretical and empirical or applied 
research. While theoretical research principally aims to improve knowledge in 
different areas, applied research, mainly aims to solve some current problems. 
According to Sekaran (2003:8) ―research done with the intention of applying the 
results of the findings to solve specific problems currently being experienced in the 
organization is called applied research.‖   
In every research, researchers should use a method or a set of methods which enables 
them to reach the answer to their question or a new hypothesis. This set of methods is 
the methodology. Methodology has been defined as ―a set of methods and principles 
used to perform a particular activity‖ (Wehmeier and Ashby, 2000:803). It has also 
been defined by Miller and Brewer (2003:192) as ―a set of rules and procedures to 
guide a researcher and against which his/her claim can be evaluated. It is therefore 
fundamental to the construction of all forms of knowledge‖. 
4.3 QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODS 
Generally, there are two kinds of research methods: quantitative and qualitative. 
Quantitative research and methods are usually related to secondary data and numbers. 
They are also related to statistical and mathematical models. Data which is collected 
by quantitative methods can be explained descriptively or analytically using 
mathematical and statistical models. In contrast, qualitative methods are used for 
research which is not related to numbers, but to qualitative issues. In this kind of 
research method, primary data are obtained and analysed. The difference between the 
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two kinds of method goes back to the epistemological issue which creates a general 
framework for approaching an investigation. According to Cassell and Symon 
(1994:2) ―a key straight-point is the recognition that the two different approaches rely 
on different underlying epistemologies‖. 
Philosophically, quantitative methods are related to positivism ―The philosophies 
behind the two sets of techniques are very different. To summarize: the assumption 
behind the positivist paradigm is that there is an objective truth existing in the world 
which can be revealed through the scientific methods where the focus is on measuring 
relationship between variables systematically and statistically‖ Cassell and Symon 
(1994:2). Also, Giorgi (1970) and Spiegelberg (1972) point out that adopting 
qualitative (phenomenological) approaches implies taking a different perspective on 
human behaviour from that adopted in utilizing quantitative (positive) approaches 
(taken from Cassell and Symon, 1994:2).  
Furthermore, Bryman (1988: 106) states that ―there have been two distinct 
explanations of the differences between qualitative and quantitative research. There is 
the epistemological account outlined above but there is also the technical account: 
The alternative standpoint is to suggest that quantitative and qualitative research are 
each appropriate to different types of research problem, implying that the research 
issue determines (or should determine) which style of research is employed‖ (taken 
from Cassell and Symon (1994:3).  
However, despite many papers and books having been published on qualitative 
methods, there is not an agreed definition for it. According to Van Mannen 
(1979:520) ―the label qualitative methods has no precise meaning in any of the social 
sciences. It is at best an umbrella term covering an array of interpretative techniques 
which seek to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the 
meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in 
the social world.‖ Also, Fryer (1991:3) points out that ―qualitative researchers are 
characteristically concerned in their research with attempting to accurately describe, 
decode and interpret the precise meaning to persons of phenomena accruing in their 
normal social contexts and are typically pre-occupied with complexity, authenticity, 
contextualization, shared subjectivity of researcher and researched and minimization 
of illusion.‖  
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Qualitative research genres have become increasingly important modes of inquiry for 
the social sciences and applied fields (Marshal and Rossman, 1999:1).  
4.3.1 Interview: its Advantages and Disadvantages  
Interview is one of the most important instruments for data collection in qualitative 
methods. It has both advantages and disadvantages. 
4.3.1.1 Advantages 
a) Researchers are able to examine broader issues in interviews. King (1994:33) states 
that ―Qualitative research interviews can be used to examine much broader issues, in 
areas such as gender, organizational culture and the effect of unemployment‖. 
b) The interview is an accurate and useful way of obtaining people‘s points of view 
and even their feelings easily. ―It is a very good way of accessing people‘s 
perceptions, measuring, definitions of situations and constructions of reality. It is also 
one of the most powerful ways we have of understanding others‖ (Punch, 2006:168). 
c) In interviews, researchers are able to focus on a particular question. King (1994:33) 
points out that ―It can address quite focused questions about aspects of organizational 
life: for instance, specific decision processes such as selection decisions or decision 
about innovation adoption‖. 
d) The interview is a useful tool for collecting large amounts of data quickly. 
―Interview has particular strengths. An interview is a useful way to get a large amount 
of data quickly when more than one person participates (e.g. focus group interviews), 
the interview process gathers a wide variety of information across a larger number of 
subjects than if there were fewer participants breadth‖ (Marshal, and Rossman, 
1999:108). 
e) Interviews can be used in some topics with different levels of meaning all, of which 
are important for the research. ―The qualitative research interview is ideally suited to 
examining topics in which different levels of meaning need to be explored. This is 
something that is very difficult to do with quantitative methods, and problematic for 
many other qualitative methods‖ (Nigel King, 1994: 33). 
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f) The interview is a research method which all participants like. Interviewees, 
especially those who have a particular idea, are usually eager to deliver their opinions 
somewhere. King (1994: 33) states that ―the quality research method interview is a 
method which most research anticipants accept readily… this is partly due to 
familiarity with interviews in general. However as important is the fact that most 
people like talking about their work - whether to share enthusiasm or to air complaints 
- but rarely have the opportunity to do so with interested outsiders‖.  
4.3.1.2 Disadvantages 
a) The qualitative research interview is a method which is time-consuming for 
researchers and can sometimes be considered a limitation for research which has a 
deadline. ―Developing an interview guide, carrying out interviews and analysing 
transcripts are all highly time-consuming activities for the researcher. It is essential 
that the researcher does not attempt to take on more interviews than he or she has time 
for in a study. (King. 1994: 34) 
b) The qualitative research interview is tiring for researchers because they have to find 
suitable interviewees, arrange appointments with them and then conduct the 
interview. It is recommended that there should not be more than one interview in a 
day. 
c) The qualitative research interview is a method which is also time-consuming for 
interviewees which may lead to some problems in them agreeing to be interviewed. 
―Interviews are a method which is also time-consuming for interviewees, and this may 
cause problems in recruiting participants in some organizations and occupations. The 
best recruitment strategy is probably to send a letter with basic details of the study‘s 
aim and what will be required of the interviewee, with a follow-up phone-call in 
which the researcher can explain his or her aims in more depth and answer any 
queries‖ (King. 1994: 34). 
d) Some interviewees may have a negative view of the topic, which can create some 
problems in responding to the main questions. ―Occasionally, the researcher will 
experience ‗difficult‘ interviewees who are defensive, hostile or unable/unwilling to 
focus on the research topic(s). To be told to your face ‘that was a ridiculous question‘, 
or ‗I cannot see why you are asking me these things‘, is much more uncomfortable 
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than receiving a questionnaire back from a survey participant with, ‗stupid question‘ 
scrawled across it‖ (King. 1994: 34). 
4.3.2 Types of Interviews 
 ―Singleton and Straits (2005) and Rager and Petre (2007) argue that there are three 
main types of interview methods: structured, unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews. In addition, May (1997) and Collis and Hussey (2003) mention that there 
is a fourth type of interview method which is in the form of group interview‖ (taken 
from Aboo Ravi. 2009).  
4.3.2.1 Unstructured interviews  
In unstructured interviews, there is no predetermined question. Sekaran (2003:225) 
states that ―unstructured interviews are so labelled because the interviewer does not 
enter the interview setting with a planned sequence of questions to be asked of the 
respondent. The objective of the unstructured interview is to bring some preliminary 
issues to the surface so that the researcher can determine what variables need further 
in-depth investigation‖. Some of its characteristics are that flexibility is high and 
interviewers are neutral. Punch (2005: 170) states that ―flexibility and variation are 
minimized, while standardization is maximised. In this sort of interview, the 
interviewer attempts to play a neutral role and a neutral manner and demeanour are 
encouraged in executing that role.‖ 
4.3.2.2 Structured interviews  
In contrast, in structured interviews, there are several predetermined questions asked 
of all interviewees. Sekaran (2003:227) states that ―structured interviews are those 
conducted when it is known at the outset what information is needed. The interviewer 
has a list of predetermined questions to be asked of the respondents either personally, 
through the telephone, or through the medium of a PC. The questions are likely to 
focus on factors that had surfaced during the unstructured interviews and are 
considered relevant to the problem. As the respondents express their views, the 
researcher would note them down. The same questions will be asked of everybody in 
the same manner‖.  
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4.3.2.3 Semi-structured interviews 
The semi-structured interviews are somewhere between structured and unstructured 
interviews. While flexibility in the semi-structured interviews is lower than in the 
unstructured interviews, their flexibility is higher than in the structured interview. 
There are some predetermined questions in this kind of interview, but there is an 
opportunity to ask new questions which may arise during the interview. 
Semi-structured interviews are conducted with a fairly open framework which 
allows for focused, conversational, two-way communication. It can be used both 
to give and receive information. Unlike the questionnaire framework, where 
detailed questions are formulated ahead of time, semi-structured interviewing 
starts with more general questions or topics. Relevant topics are initially 
identified and the possible relationship between these topics and the issues such 
as availability, expense, effectiveness become the basis for more specific 
questions which do not need to be prepared in advance. Not all questions are 
designed and phrased ahead of time. The majority of questions are created 
during the interview, allowing both the interviewer and the person being 
interviewed the flexibility to probe for details or discuss issues (Unknown, 
Januarry 14, 2010). 
This kind of interview can be conducted face to face or by telephone. In this 
research this kind of interview will be used for both the examination of Shariah 
issues and the contribution of Islamic banking to economic development.  
4.3.2.4 Group interviews 
The group interview is used by researchers to interview a group of people 
simultaneously. This kind of interview can be divided into several types: unstructured, 
semi-structured or structured interview. Punch (2005:171) states ―there are several 
different types of group interview, and like other interviews they can be unstructured, 
semi-structured or highly structured. Since different types of group interviews have 
different purposes, the type of interview to be used in a particular research situation 
depends on the context and research purpose." This interview is supervised by the 
interviewer and is suitable for highly debatable topics. This kind of interview faces 
the problem of gathering all interviewees in one place, especially when there are more 
than ten persons.  
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4.3.3 Case Study 
The case study is a very well-recognized kind of research which is used widely today. 
It can fulfil one of the main purposes of research which is solving problems. Case 
studies are vital in economics because, by performing this kind of research, 
economists and governments can identify why economic problems arise and find their 
solutions. ―Case study research consists of a detailed investigation, often with data 
collected over a period of time, of one or more organizations, or groups within 
organizations, with a view to providing an analysis of the context and process 
involved in the phenomena under study.‖ (Hartley, 1994: 208)     
One characteristic of the case study is that researchers are able to perform both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. Bryman (1995:175) points out that: 
Case studies provide one of the chief arenas in which quantitative and 
qualitative research can be combined. Most case study research involves more 
than one method of data collection, but this derives from the tendency for 
qualitative research, which typically employs two or more sources of data, to be 
intensively used. The combination of quantitative and qualitative research offer 
further possibilities. One of the most obvious advantages of developing the two 
in tandem is to check the validity of findings using very different approaches to 
data collection. 
 
4.4 METHODOLOGY OF THIS RESEARCH  
This research will have two sections: one theoretical and the other empirical. The 
empirical section is divided into two parts: Quantitative analysis and qualitative 
analysis. These are discussed below. 
4.4.1 The Theoretical Analysis:  
The theoretical approach of this study is mostly based on shariah principle and divine 
sources. To confirm that the Islamic banking system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
shariah-compliant the jurisprudents‘ opinions (fatva) are used which are based on 
four reasons (evidences and sources).
26
 
                                                 
26
 According to the Jafari school of Islam (shiah), there are four sources which should be considered by 
jurisprudents (foghaha) for any religious decree namely: the book (the Holy Quran, Sunnah (the 
sayings and practices of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him and his respected 
family) and his successors [twelve Imams after the Prophet (PUH) first of them is Imam Ali, 
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For Muslims the authoritative source of guidance is the Holy Quran, 
the revealed word of Allah, and the Hadith, the sayings and practices 
of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, referred to as the 
Sunnah. Since the time of the Prophet over 1400 years ago there have 
always been differences of opinion in the interpretation of how this 
guidance should be interpreted and applied. The Islamic scholars who 
specialised in this interpretation are referred to as the ulama or 
foqhaha, the latter being derived from fiqh, the study of Islamic law. 
The study of economic and financial transactions from an Islamic 
perspective is referred to as fiqh muamalat, that branch of Islamic 
jurisprudence that is concerned with commerce and other economic 
activities. The leading Islamic bank in Indonesia, the most populous 
Muslim country, is Bank Muamalat, an institution that tries to apply 
fiqh muamalat in all its financial dealings (Wilson, 2008:177-195). 
Furthermore, we will utilise some theories and also the opinions of some economists, 
Muslim and non-Muslim, in investigating the role of banking systems in general and 
Islamic banking in particular in economic development. 
In this section the following discussions will be carried out: 
(i)  Introducing modality of performance of the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran‖ 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
(ii) Review of literature on the role of the banking system in general and Islamic 
banking in particular in economic development. 
(iii) Islamic banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran, its background and circumstance 
of its activity with regard to the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran, especially, 
financial instruments. 
(iv) Ways of making sure that Islamic banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
shariah-compliant. 
4.4.2 The Empirical Analyses:  
This section is divided into two parts. The first part is quantitative analysis and second 
part is qualitative analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the son of Abitaleb (AS) and the last is Imam Mahdi, the son of Imam Hassan Al Askari (AS) who is 
alive now but disappeared by God‘s will and will appear and constitute a world state based on Justice], 
wisdom and unanimity of all great Muslim scholars (mojtahedin or foghaha).  
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4.4.2.1 Quantitative analysis 
In this section the secondary data has been collected from different sources, namely: 
The Banker (November, 2009), Iranian Banking System report (2006), Ministry of 
Industries and Mining reports, BP Statistical Bulletin (2005), Ministry of Road and 
Transportation reports, Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, Economic Accounts 
Office, Iran‘s Economic Changes Report in the Real Sector, first three months of 1385 
(2006-7), Economic Statistic Office of Central Bank, reports and balance sheets of the 
Iranian Central Bank (Bank Markazi) for different years, Economic Research and 
Policy Department, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Economic Statistics 
Office of the Central Bank and its reports and balance sheets and performance of 
Iran‘s banking system during 2005 and 2006 for 2003-2006. This collected data has 
been analysed descriptively. 
This section will involve the following: 
(i) Examination of the main features of the Iranian economy in general and the 
banking system in particular by using above mentioned data on the subject. 
(ii) Analysis of economic development financing by the banking system in the Islamic 
republic of Iran through the Central Bank of Iran‘s reports and other related reports.  
For this reason, firstly the trend of mobilisation of deposits, which is the main factor 
for the banking system to finance economic development, has been examined. 
Secondly, the allocation of financial resources to the economic sectors in general and 
their allocation to the productive economic sectors in particular have been analysed. 
As the whole banking system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is Islamic and there are 
no conventional banks there, for comparative study between two banking systems, the 
periods of before and after the Islamic Revolution in Iran have been compared. 
In order to avoid showing an increase for the period after the Islamic Revolution due 
to inflation, increase in GDP and increase in liquidity, all comparisons have been 
carried out in real terms and also the ratio of deposits and credit to the GDP and 
liquidity have been compared for the periods before and after the Islamic Revolution. 
It is worth mentioning that because of special conditions in the decades immediately 
after the Islamic Revolution, although comparison was between before and after the 
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Islamic Revolution, the focus has been on comparisons between 1961-1979 and 1989-
2006.  
4.4.2.2 Qualitative research method 
Islamic banking as a system is a new experience in the world and there is not enough 
literature to deliberate this system and its effect on economic factors in depth. 
Therefore, qualitative research method would be useful both in finding new data for 
our analysis and in creating new literature in this regard. Furthermore, it would permit 
the researcher to build up an overall picture of the issue. In addition, it is a good 
instrument for deliberating its compliance with shariah. The importance of qualitative 
research increases significantly because these questions may be asked of banking 
system officials and researchers directly. Thus, qualitative research has been selected 
as part of this research to cover answering questions regarding shariah and effects on 
economic development.  
Qualitative research can be conducted by several methods each of which is 
appropriate for specific research. For example it can be conducted using 
questionnaires or interviews. Also, interviews can be conducted using structured 
interviews, unstructured interviews, semi structured interviews or group-focused 
interviews. The choice of method depends on the type and purpose of research and 
somewhat to the researcher‘s interest. In this research the semi-structured interview 
has been selected for primary data collection. 
4.4.2.2.1 Semi-structured interviews 
In this research, the semi-structured interview has been selected rather than other 
types of interview and questionnaire. This is because: (i) Due to lack of conventional 
banks in Iran for comparison, the questionnaire is not an appropriate tool for 
achieving the research aims. (ii) People, especially well-known people, prefer 
interviews to questionnaires. Saunders et al (2003: 123) state that ―when the topic is 
seen by interviewees as relevant to their current jobs, people cooperate and mostly 
prefer to be interviewed rather than having to complete a questionnaire‖. (iii) 
Structured interviews and unstructured interviews have some advantages and 
disadvantages but semi-structured interviews have the advantages of both of them 
without having their disadvantages. For instance, while we are able to have 
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predetermined questions in semi-structured interviews, it is also possible to raise new 
questions during the interview. (ix) Another advantage of the interview is that it can 
lead to a good rapport and trust between interviewer and interviewee which is very 
helpful in obtaining as much information as possible.  
4.4.2.2.1.1 Preparation for the interviews 
In the summer of 2009 I went to Iran and started conducting the interviews. Before 
that I had been thinking about the kind of interview, questions and interviewees and 
decided to choose the semi-structured interview as the main technique. Apart from a 
few questions, in order for interviewees to feel free in the way they answered the 
questions, open ended questions were selected. The main problem at this stage was 
finding appropriate interviewees with enough knowledge who would be eager to, or at 
least interested in, taking part in the interviews. Fortunately because of my 
background as a researcher in Islamic banking before coming to England for my PhD, 
I knew several researchers in this field. However, due to considerable changes in 
banking system personnel I faced more problems finding interviewees from the 
banking system. Another problem was sensitiveness between the Iranian government 
and the UK government which made it difficult for me to convince the interviewees 
that the data would only be used for my thesis and nothing else. However, because of 
this sensitiveness I needed to be introduced to banking system authorities, especially 
those of the Central Bank. 
I called some of my friends and asked them to assist me with this matter. Fortunately, 
one of them was able to help me a great deal. He asked me to attend a committee 
meeting at the Central Bank, of which he was the Chair, which was working on 
reforming the Law of Interest Free Banking of Iran. Attending that committee was an 
opportunity for me to become familiar with some members of staff of the Central 
Bank (Banke Markazi). I made appointments with three of them and after the 
interviews they introduced me to some members of staff at the commercial banks. It is 
worth mentioning that interviews were in Persian (Farsi) and translated to English by 
the researcher. 
Before starting the interview, the researcher introduced himself to those who did not 
already know him and also briefly explained the aim of the interview. He also tried to 
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conduct a useful interview using following ways: (i) The researcher tried to create a 
friendly environment which helped the interview not to be tiresome and boring. For 
example, the first interview lasted about four hours without any feeling of tiredness. 
(ii) If necessary, he assured interviewees that the interview would be confidential and 
their name would remain confidential so that they would feel free in giving their 
responses. (iii) They were said that they feel free to avoid responding to any question 
they do not wish to answer.  
4.4.2.2.1.2 Sampling 
When discussing qualitative research, Kumar (2005:165) states that: ―the issue of 
sampling has little significance as the main aim of most qualitative enquiry is either to 
explore or describe the diversity in a situation, phenomenon or issues‖. However, the 
researcher tried to select an appropriate combination of interviewees. So some of the 
interviewees were selected from the Central Bank, of which one of its jobs is 
supervising the banking system; some of them were from state-owned commercial 
banks, some of them were from private commercial banks, some of them were 
researchers in Islamic banking and some of them were shariah scholars. 
Lee (1993:65) states that: ―In network sampling (snowball) the researcher starts from 
an initial set of contacts and is then passed on by them to others, who in turn refer 
others and so on‖. In addition to personal contact with interviewees by the researcher 
to make appointments and introductions by friends, the researcher used networking or 
the snow-balling technique in selecting the samples. So, at the end of each interview 
the interviewee would introduce a number of persons for interview and the researcher 
would evaluate their suitability and capability for the interview. Twelve interviewees 
were eventually selected for interview; among them was an Ayatollah who is known 
as the father of Islamic banking in Iran. One factor which was considered in the 
selection of interviewees was their education and experience. All of them had at least 
a Masters degree or PhD, and all of them had significant experience either in working 
in the banking system or in research in Islamic banking.  
4.4.2.2.1.3 Conducting the interviews 
In order to make the interview easier for interviewees, all interviews were conducted 
either in their work place or in a place suggested by them. In addition, as the research 
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has two chapters related to the qualitative research method, one to examine of the 
shariah-compliance of the banking system and the other to discuss the contribution of 
Islamic banking to economic development, the shariah scholar was replaced by a 
well-known active researcher in Islamic banking for interview regarding the 
contribution of Islamic banking to economic development. 
After returning to the UK and considering the questions and answers again, the 
researcher realised that he needed to conduct a complementary interview so he 
returned to Iran in order to do so. Unfortunately, some of the interviewees had 
changed their place of work, so he faced some problems contacting them again. 
Consequently, he could not contact one of them and interviewed some of them by 
telephone and email. After completing the interview their answers were analysed 
using the interpretative method. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this research is to analyse the contribution of Islamic banking to economic 
development. For this reason, the research has been divided into two sections. In the 
first section the shariah-compliance of Islamic banking has been investigated and in 
the second section its contribution to the economic development has been examined. 
Thus, this chapter was designed to discuss the methods which are appropriate to these 
aims.  
In the first section the theoretical approach of this study is mostly based on shariah 
principles and divine sources. To prove that the Islamic banking system of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is shariah-compliant the jurisprudent‘s opinions (fatwa) has been 
used. Furthermore, to examine the role of the banking system in general and Islamic 
banking in particular in economic development theoretically, some evidences from 
literature and from the economists‘ point of view were was utilised. 
In the empirical section two research methods were conducted, namely quantitative 
research method and qualitative research method. In the quantitative research method, 
some secondary data was collected from official centres of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Also, in the qualitative research method, primary data was collected by semi-
structured interview for both examination of shariah-compliance and contribution to 
the economic development.   
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Chapter Five:  
STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THE 
PROCESS OF ECONOMIC PLANNING IN IRAN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Iran is one of the largest producers of oil and natural gas and these have been the main 
source of income for the government for many decades. This fact affects almost all 
aspects of the country‘s economy, which has a large public sector as a defining 
characteristic. This chapter introduces the structure of the economic system in Iran. 
Firstly, focusing on its features and secondly its financial system, in particular the 
banking system, will be considered. Third, the share of each major sector in the 
country‘s economic development will be considered. 
5.2 GENERAL FEATURES 
Iran is an important country in several ways. First of all is its geopolitical and 
strategic situation. It is located in an area in which a considerable amount of oil is 
produced. Second is its size in area and also in population. 
Iran is important for several different reasons. Among them are its geographical 
location, its natural wealth, and its large size, in both land and population.  The 
huge area occupied by present-day Iran, although much smaller than it 
historically was,… an area larger than that of Italy, France, Switzerland, West 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark and Great Britain 
combined (Mofid, 1987:1).  
According to the 1385 (2006-2007) Population and Housing Census (the latest 
census), the total population of the country was 70,495,782, with a population density 
of 43 persons per square kilometre. Of the total population, 68.4 and 31.6 percent 
respectively lived in urban and rural areas; 50.88 and 49.12 percent respectively were 
males and females (Statistical Centre of Iran). Furthermore, Iran benefits from a four-
seasonal climate in every season. For example, in the summer, there are some areas 
with cold weather, such as Khalkhal and some areas with spring weather such as Aab 
ali and Firoozkhooh. Also, in the winter there are some warm areas such as Ahvaz and 
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Bandar Abbas and so on. This kind of weather allows Iranian farmers to produce a 
variety of different agricultural products in each season.  
According to the United Nations estimation, the nominal GDP of the country was 
$543.8 billion, which means that Iran is the 20
th
 economic power of the world. 
However, in GDP per capita, with $7,967 (as GDP per capita) Iran is the 71st 
economy in the world. According to the United Nations Human Development Report 
(HDR, 2007-8) Iran improved its place from 72 to 71 in 2005. Furthermore, according 
to the United Nation Human Development Report (HDR, 2009) despite increasing per 
capita GDP in PPP, to US$10,577 in 2007, the country‘s world ranking remained the 
same as in 2005. 
Like other developing countries, there is a kind of duality in Iran‘s economy.  The 
agricultural sector is representative of the traditional sector and industry is 
representative of the modern sector of the economy. Although in many areas 
machines are used in agriculture, a significant amount of farming is still done 
manually.  However, there is a movement toward modernization in this sector too. In 
general, the modern sector is predominant in Iran‘s economy. In recent years the 
agricultural sector has become more mechanized and its share in industry has 
increased. There are some factors which are helpful for development in Iran such as: 
a) Islamic Culture: This motivates people to learn as much as possible and travel 
great distances for learning as learning is counted as a form of worship. The Prophet 
Mohammad (peace be upon him and his family) said: ―learning and studying is 
obligatory for every Muslim, man and woman‖ (Nahj El Fasahah, 64, N.D) and he 
also said: ―seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave (end of life)‖ (Nahj El 
Fasahah, 64). The Prophet also said:‖ Seek knowledge even by going to China‖ 
(China here means any very distant place) (Nahj El Fasahah, 63). The question that 
arises here is why are most Islamic countries still developing with no Muslim country 
regarded as an advanced developed country? This is not the place to answer this 
question but we will just say briefly that the main reason is that Muslims have turned 
their backs on religion and are not actually practising Islam. Another factor which is 
important for development is that we should perform our duties as well as possible. In 
this regard the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him and his family) said:  ―When 
each one of you performs an action, he (or she) should do it with resolve‖ (Nahj El 
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Fasahah, 43). Iran is also an ancient civilization which, combined with Islamic 
civilization, could result in there being many entrepreneurs. 
b) Human Capital: In recent years, the government has invested in education, 
especially higher education and research. For example, in 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 
2002-2003, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, the number of students studying in state 
universities was 795,870; 809,520; 923,913; 1,354,279 and 1,191,048 respectively 
(Science, Research and Technology Ministry, taken from the Central Bank‘s 2005 
Economic Report, p255). The numbers studying in the private university (Islamic 
Azad University) totalled 806,639, 904,869, 968,206, 1,098,491 and 1,197,521 
respectively (Islamic Azad University, taken from Foagh, p256). As we can see there 
were 2,388,569 university students in Iran in 2005 which is a substantial number. It is 
worth mentioning that state universities are free; no fees have to be paid. The 
government has been also trying to raise the research budget to 3% of the GDP by the 
end of the Fourth Economic Social and Cultural Development Plan in 2009.  
c) Oil and Gas: Oil and Gas are a mixed blessing as their contribution to economic 
development depends on the quality of their use by government. If they are used for 
capital investment in productive projects which improve the scientific and 
technological capacity of the country, they would be considered as accelerators of 
economic growth. However, if they are in the hands of a government which uses oil 
and gas revenues to finance current costs and consumption goods, this would cause 
inefficiency in resource allocation and management. For example, when a major part 
of the budget is financed by oil and gas income, governments do not pay enough 
attention to economic efficiency and also inefficiency of managers. One reason is that 
they do not have to finance their budget through taxes which usually decrease in an 
inefficiency situation. When government revenue comes from tax, they have to try 
hard to increase efficiency and profitability by selecting proper economic policy. 
Unfortunately, despite the effort taking place by the government to reduce the 
dependence of the budget on the oil income, about 60% of the budget still comes from 
oil revenues. Of course it is worth mentioning that this is lower than the 90% level of 
the 1970s.  
As energy is a necessary factor in the production process today (its availability and its 
price) there is an opportunity for every country which has oil to use cheaper energy 
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without being concerned about access to this important factor. However this point 
creates some problems for these nations, such as intervention of world powers in their 
internal affairs. 
5.3 ECONOMIC PLANNING IN IRAN 
Iran has a long history of economic and social development plans which can be 
divided into two periods. 
5.3.1 Before the Islamic Revolution 
As this research does not cover this period we will just look at it briefly.  The First 
Seven Year Plan, which was started in 1949, was soon abandoned due to oil 
nationalization. After the defeat of the national movement, the Second Seven Year 
Plan was supported financially and technically by the U.S between 1955 and 1962. 
This plan was based on an expansionary fiscal policy and import substitution to 
rebuild Iran‘s economy. However, by the end of 1960 the government had to stop its 
expansionary policy for stability purposes as this policy had led to stagnation. 
The Third and Fourth Plans were executed between 1962 and 1972. The focus of 
these plans was on industry and manufacturing, thus agriculture was neglected. As a 
result of this policy, only eight percent of the development budget was allocated to 
agriculture and about seventy two percent to industry (including transport, water, 
electricity and building) which led to stagnation in the agricultural sector. Despite 
acceptable growth in the economy overall, the poor did not benefit from the plans and 
unemployment increased. During this time the unemployment rate increased from 7% 
to 9% and the share of the 40% of the poorest people in consumption decreased from 
16% to 14% and the share of the 20% of the richest people increased from 50% to 
52%.  
The Fifth Plan started in 1973. In 1974 the oil price increased sharply and the 
government‘s oil income increased from $US 2.4 billion in 1972 to $US 18.5 billion 
in 1974, therefore the execution of the Fifth Plan was stopped in that year. A new plan 
was designed, the budget of which was three times more than the previous plan; 
however that led to a high inflation rate. ―The sharp rise in domestic inflation and the 
need by late 1975 to supplement oil revenues by borrowing in international capital 
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markets are only two instances of the Iranian economic crisis that began in mid-1975‖ 
(Looney, 1977, p 8). Execution of this plan was stopped by the government in 1976. 
The Sixth Plan was approved with a higher budget than the previous one but in 1978, 
the Shah announced that the country no longer needed to plan and stopped its 
implementation. The decision was based on the naive belief that Iran could import 
everything using its oil income. Consequently, due to a high increase in demand, the 
inflation rate increased from 4% in 1972 to 25% in 1977. As the government 
struggled with inflation via imports, the price of imported goods such as industrial, 
consumption and agricultural goods increased more than others. As a result, capital 
moved from these sectors to other sectors with higher profitability, such as building 
and services. Due to this policy, the agricultural and traditional industrial sectors were 
weakened and because of their importance to employment and income distribution, 
despite economic growth, unemployment and inequality increased. For example, the 
unemployment rate increased to 10% in 1976 and the inequality coefficient increased 
from 0.47 in 1972 to 0.52 in 1976 as the share of the richest 20% of the population 
increased from 52% in 1973 to 57% in 1976. Meanwhile, the share of the poorest 40% 
of the population decreased from 14% to 11%. It is worth mentioning that during the 
1973-1978 period import increased about 412%.
27
  
5.3.2 After the Islamic Revolution  
Before the Islamic Revolution the Shah‘s regime stopped the plans and the country 
was managed through annual budgets, but after the Revolution the Government 
decided to manage the country using Five-Year Plans. Due to the imposed war against 
Iran by Saddam Hossein, they were unable to execute the First Plan, so they had to 
wait until after the war. 
5.3.2.1 First plan 
This Plan had been designed for 1983 but, due to the war, it was implemented from 
1368-1372 (1989-1993). As it was the first plan after the Islamic Revolution, which 
should have led to the implementation of Islamic law both socially and economically, 
and because, according to Islamic thought social justice is very important, in fact the 
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most important goal taught by the prophets after the worship of God, the principle 
objectives of the plan were set out as follows: 
The ultimate objectives of the Islamic society are man‘s development and 
elevation towards freedom from any thing but God, and his movement towards 
Allah. Economic and social development must constitute an effort to remove 
any obstacles impeding Man‘s and the Islamic nation‘s development and 
elevation. General objectives and orientation of economic and social 
development in the Islamic Republic must be drawn up on the basis of Islamic 
law and principles. The aim was establish Islamic relations in society, which is 
the objective of Divine instructions. Hence, policies and plans must be drawn 
up and accepted in this light. (PBO, 1982, p 5 cited by Mofid, p206). 
Furthermore, some general objectives were defined as follows: 
a) Expansion of education and culture 
b) Securing the interest of the mostadhafin (the down trodden people) 
c) Securing economic independence (but not economic isolation) 
d) The realisation of social security, health care and medical care 
e) Provision of food and clothing 
f) Provision of housing 
g) Elimination of unemployment   
The Plan‘s priorities in order to achieve the said objectives were as follows: 
a) Prevention of consumerism and emphasis on investment 
b) Agriculture as the axis of development 
c) Utilisation of current spare capacity in industry and increase in productivity 
d) Development of the intermediate machine tool industry 
e) Expansion of non-oil exports 
f) The integration of the oil industry more closely into the activities of the domestic 
economy as a whole 
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g) Preventing the expansion of large cities and implementing settlement 
policies. (PBO, 1982, p 5 cited by Mofid, p206) 
As we can see, the plan focused on social and economic justice by securing basic 
needs for all people and expanding free education.  Although in this plan the focus 
was on rebuilding following the war damages, the planners tried to increase the 
capital stocks by increasing investment According to the plan, during the five years 
investment should have been about 26,452 billion Iranian Rials at the fixed price of 
1367 (1988) and investment growth was predicted to average 11.6 percent. The 
growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at the fixed prices of 1367 (1988) was 
predicted as 8.1 percent and the per capita product was predicted to increase by 4.9 
percent on average. 
One problem in countries which have oil is their reliance on the oil income and their 
tendency to neglect other sources of income, especially tax. In this plan they would 
try to increase the proportion of tax income to total income from 47% in 1367 (1988) 
to 49.4% in 1372 (1993) and its share in GDP from 4.3% to 8.4% in those years. Also, 
the percentage of tax income in current expenses increased from 28.8% in 1988 to 
76.6% in 1993. One aim was to create 394,000 new jobs annually in order to decrease 
the unemployment rate from 15.9% to 13.4%.  
In practice, at the end of the First Plan the unemployment rate decreased to 10.82% in 
1993 which shows a considerable improvement in the fight against unemployment. 
The results also show improvement in terms of income distribution and the struggle 
against poverty. For example, the inequality coefficient decreased from 0.4092 in 
1989 to 0.3976 in 1993 and the ratio of the richest 10% of the population to the 
poorest 10% of population decreased from 17.6 in 1989 to 16 in 1993.
28
 
5.3.2.2 Second plan 
This plan was implemented over the 1373-1377 (1994-1998) period. The plan‘s focus 
was on social and economic justice by securing the basic needs of all people, free 
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education, even at university level and rural development. Although in the previous 
plan most of the war damages were rebuilt, there was still a lot of work to be done. 
The increase of  capital stocks by investment was stressed and, according to the plan, 
during the five years investment should have had a growth rate equal to 6.2 percent on 
average and increase from 2262.7 billion Iranian Rials to 3,055.5 billion Rials at the 
fixed prices of 1361 (1982). The growth rate of GDP at the fixed prices of 1361 
(1982) should have been 1.5 percent. So it would have increased from 13,766.3 Rials 
to 17,635.3 billion Iranian Rials and per capita product should have increased to 
256,000 Rials. As we can see the growth rate of both GDP and investment decreased 
significantly in comparison with the First Plan. 
In this plan total government income was projected as about 237,311 billion Iranian 
Rials with 50% coming from oil, 26% from tax and 24% from other incomes. One 
aim was to create 2,019,000 new jobs during the plan period.  
The results for the two important factors, employment and income distribution, are as 
follows: Regarding employment this plan was not successful and the unemployment 
rate increased from 10.85% in 1993to 15.41% in 1998. However, data on income 
distribution show a little improvement. For instance, the inequality coefficient 
decreased from 0.3976 in 1993 to 0.3965 in 1998 and the ratio of the richest 10% of 
the population to the poorest 10% of the population decreased from 16 in 1993 to 14.2 
in 1998.
29
 
5.3.2.3 Third plan 
The Third Plan covered the period 1378-1382 (1999-2003).The plan focused on social 
and economic justice by securing the basic needs of all people, but the most important 
aim was privatization. According to Article 4 of the Law of Third Economic, Social 
and Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran, governmental 
benefitable companies should be transferred to the private or cooperative sectors. 
During this plan a law was passed on 12/01/1379 (10/04/2000) that allowed the 
establishment of private banks.  
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Also, the results for the two important factors, employment and income distribution, 
are as follows: In contrast with previous plan regarding employment this plan was 
successful but regarding income distribution it was not successful. In this plan the 
unemployment rate decreased from 15.41% in 1998 to 10.30% in 2004 and the 
inequality coefficient increased from 0.3965 in 1998 to 0.3996 in 2004 and the ratio 
of the richest 10% of the population to the poorest 10% of the population increased 
from 14.2 in 1998 to 14.6 in 2004.
30
  
5.3.2.4 Fourth plan 
The Fourth Economic, Social and Cultural  Development Plan of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran 1384-1388 (2005-2009) was passed on September 1, 2004 and was 
implemented in 2005. This plan had many similarities to the Third Plan and many of 
the Third Plan‘s articles were revalidated in the Fourth Plan. An aim which seems an 
overreaching, but probably unattainable target was the elimination of oil revenue from 
the government‘s income. Article 2 states that:  
In order to bring about financial and budgetary discipline during the years of the 
plan, Government is required to increase the share of expense credits provided 
through the government non-oil revenues in such a way which enables the 
government to meet its expenses entirely through tax and other non-oil incomes‖ 
[The Fourth Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 1384-1388 (2005-2009)] 
One important aspect of this plan was to encourage direct foreign investment and 
increase its ratio to GDP from 0.6% to 3%. Other quantitative goals in the plan 
included: 
- Increasing the ratio of investment to GDP from 28.7% to 31.3%. 
- Increasing the ratio of non oil export to GDP from 6.3% to 10%. 
- Decreasing the inflation rate from 17% to 8.6% (on average 9.9% during the plan)  
- Decreasing the unemployment rate to 8.4% in 1388 (2009) 
- GDP growth rate 8% 
- Investment growth rate 12.2% 
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- Agriculture growth rate 6.5%  
- Oil revenue growth rate 3% 
- Industry growth rate 11.2% 
- Services growth rate 12.2%. 
Although, the results for this plan had not yet been published, the data presented show 
some negative results in both unemployment and income distribution. For example, 
the unemployment rate increased from 10.3% in 2004 to 10.5% in 2007, the 
inequality coefficient increased from 0.399 in 2004 to 0.40 in 2006 and the ratio of the 
richest 10% of the population to the poorest 10% of the population increased from 
14.60 in 2004 to 14.90 in 2006. 
In conclusion, the data show that during the four plans which have been carried out in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, both employment and income distribution have 
improved. For example, the unemployment rate decreased from 12.509% in 1989 to 
10.5% in 2007, the inequality coefficient decreased from 0.4092 in 1989 to 0.4004 in 
2006 and the ratio of the richest 10% of the population to the poorest 10% of the 
population decreased from 17.60 in 1989 to 14.90 in 2006.
31
 It is worth mentioning 
that the inequality coefficient and the ratio of the richest 10% of the population to the 
poorest 10% of the population was 0.4584 and 24.70 in 1978 respectively. So, it can 
be concluded that an acceptable improvement has taken place since the Islamic 
Revolution in both areas. 
5.4 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE IN IRAN 
Economic structure has an important role in facilitating or blocking economic 
development. It would therefore be useful to look at it briefly. 
5.4.1 The Banking System 
Modern banking has a long history in Iran.  
The first bank founded in Iran in 1850 was "New East Bank", an originally 
British owned bank. The "Kingdom Bank" founded in 1872 by a British man 
named Powell Juluos Reuyter, was among the first banks starting banking 
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operations in Iran, up to 1942. Another bank was the "Loan Bank" founded in 
1890 by a Russian Jacque Polia Koof which carried out banking operations for 
over 75 years. "Bank Sepah" was the first Iranian bank established with Iranian 
capital in 1925 under the name of Bank Pahlavi Qoshun, in order to handle the 
financial affairs of the military personnel and set up their retirement fund, with 
primary capital of 388,395 toomans. In 1960, a plan for providing a 
comprehensive monetary and banking constitution was considered by economic 
authorities in order to preserve Iranian currency‘s validity and to enforce 
monetary policies. It was at this point bank refah was established, in accordance 
with Note 39 of the previous year‘s Budget Law ( Bankrefah, September 20, 
2007). 
5.4.1.1 Nationalization and merger of banks 
―Iran nationalized all its banks in order to protect the rights of depositors and national 
funds, to increase industrial production of the country and to guarantee the refunding 
of deposits‖ ( Bankrefah, September 20, 2007). Another reason for nationalization was 
the banks‘ debts, due to their ownership by people who were close to the Shah and 
their influence upon the bank authorities in terms of patronage. When they had to 
leave the country, before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, they took a lot of 
money out of the country. 
After nationalization of the banks in 1979, 37 banks were merged into six 
commercial banks including Bank Refah, Bank Melli Iran, Bank Saderat, Bank 
Tejarat, Bank Mellat, and Bank Sepah and three special banks including Bank 
Keshavarzi, Bank Maskan, and Bank Sanat va Maadan (Mining and Industry) ( 
Bankrefah, September 20, 2007). 
Tejarat Bank (Trade Bank) was formed from a merger of 12 banks, Mellat Bank 
(Nation Bank) from ten banks; Sanat and Maadan (Industry and Mining) Bank from 
six banks, and Keshavarzi (Agriculture) Bank from three banks plus all credit 
institutions dependent on the Agriculture Ministry. In recent years some structural 
reforms have been carried out, including the establishment of an allowance for private 
credit institutes and banks, in order to improve competition and efficiency of the 
banking system. For example, the Credit and Money Assembly endorsed the 
allowance and regulation of non banking credit institutes on 13/4/1371 (4/7/1992) and 
private banks on 20/9/1379 (11/12/2000). Also, foreign banks have recently been 
allowed to open some branches in Iran. 
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5.4.1.2 Quantity and size of banks in Iran 
At present there are eleven state-owned banks, six private banks and several credit 
institutions. Some of them are among the largest Islamic banks in the world. As Table 
5.1 shows, the National Bank (Bank Melli) is the largest Islamic bank in the world 
The Export Bank (Bank Saderat), the Nation Bank (Bank Mellat), the Trade Bank 
(Bank Tejarat), the Sepah Bank, the Parsiyan Bank and the Agriculture Bank (Bank 
Keshavarzi) are among the ten largest Islamic banks in the world. This means that of 
the ten largest Islamic banks in the world seven of them are Iranian.  
Table 5.1: The Ten Largest Islamic Banks in the World 
 
Ranking Country  Date of result Institution Type of institution Total assets US  
$ million latest previous 
1 1 Iran 20-Mar-2008 Bank Melli, Iran Government-owned  59621.7 
2 2 Saudi Arabia 31-Dec-2008 Al Rajhi Bank Commercial & Investment 
Bank 
43981.2 
3 3 Iran 20-Mar-2008 Bank Saderat Iran Government-owned  43067 
4 4 Iran 20-Mar-2008 Bank Mellat Iran Government-owned  41650.6 
5 5 Kuwait 31-Mar-2008 Kuwait Finance House  Commercial 40002.6 
6 6 Iran 20-Mar-2008 Bank Tejarat Iran Government-owned  31807.6 
7 7 Iran 20-Mar-2008 Bank Sepah Iran Government-owned  26378 
8 8 UAE 30-June-2009 Dubai Islamic Bank Commercial& Retail 
Banking 
23941.4 
9 9 Iran 19-Mar-2008 Parsyian Bank Iran Commercial 18319 
10 10 Iran 20-Mar-2008 Bank Keshavarzi  Government-owned  16675 
Source: The Banker 2009, Nov. 
As can be seen in Table 5.2 in 2006 the National Bank (Bank Melli), the Export Bank 
(Bank Saderat) and the Nation Bank (Bank Mellat) are respectively the largest banks 
in Iran. Bank Melli‘s assets would reach more than $US 129 billion if calculated 
according to the PPP (purchasing power parity) exchange rate and more than $US 41 
billion according to the official and nominal exchange rate. Also, the value of Export 
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Bank and Nation Bank‘s assets are more than $US 113 billion and $US 100 billion 
respectively in PPP exchange rates and more than $US 36 billion and $US 32 billion 
in official exchange rates for 2006) respectively. 
 
Table 5.2:  Size of Banks in Iran (2006)                                     (Iranian Rial Billion) 
 
Row N B & In Establishment Branch  B N A Staff  N F Cap  Assets   Ownership 
1 B M 1307 (1928) 3350 11 43478 20342 387027 Government 
2 B S 1331(1952) 3263 20 29609 19680 339216 Government 
3 B Mel 1358(1979) 1964 4 25019 13158 300109 Government 
4 B T 1358(1979) 1964 4 20908 12088 232569 Government 
5 B Se 1304(1925) 1696 3 17239 8255 216251 Government 
6 B K 1312 (1933) 1847 0 15705 7055 152920 Government 
7 B Mas 1358 (1979) 973 0 9188 3825 1336804 Government 
8 B Pars 1380(2001) 135 0 2756 1777 117420 Private 
9 B R 1339 (1960) 1105 0 9744 1195 52332 Government 
10 B E N 1380 (2001) 122 0 1240 1121 40882 Private 
11 BS  M 1358(1979) 38 0 0775 1097 38391 Government 
12 B Pas 1384 (2005) 76 0 882 876 31294 Private 
13 B T S 1370 (1991) 28 0 911 864 18765 Government 
14 P B 1374(1995) 404 0 2269 647 4330 Government 
15 B Sarm 1384(2005) 22 0 301 612 5877 Private 
16 B K A 1380 (2001) 45 0 842 380 18472 Private 
17 B Sam 1381(2002) 54 0 890 341 24731 Private 
18 M C B 1364 (1985) 260 0 1833 287 19294 Private 
19 M E T 1376 (1997) 11 0 201 117 7297 Private 
Source: Iranian Banking System Report (2006)                 B & In= Banks or institute 
B N A= Branches number abroad                                       F Cap = Fixed capital 
B M = Bank Melli (National Bank)                                    B S = Bank Saderat (Export Bank) 
B Mela = Bank Mellat (Nation Bank)                                B T = Bank Tejarat (Trade Bank) 
B Se = Bank Sepah                                                             B K = Bank Keshavarsi (Agricultural Bank) 
B Mas = Bank Maskan (Construction or House Bank)      B Par = Bank Parsiyan (Persians Bank) 
B R = Bank Refah (Welfare Bank)                       
 B E N = Bank Eghtesad Navin (New Economy Bank) 
B S M = Bank Sanat va Maadan (Industry and Mining Bank)    
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B Pas = Bank Pasarghad                                                 B K A = Bank kar Afarin (Work Creator Bank) 
 B T S = Bank Tawseeh Saderat (Export Development Bank)     
B Sarm = Bank Sarmayeh (Capital Bank)                     P B = Post Bank   
B Sam = Bank Saman 
M E B = Moasseseh Mali va Etebari Bonyad (Bonyad Finance and Credit Institute) 
M E T = Moasseseh Etebari Tawseah (Development Credit Institute) 
5.4.2 Capital Market 
Both the size and quality of the capital market are important for economic 
development through the capital base of a country. So, in order to have a more 
complete picture of Iran‘s economic structure, it is worth introducing it briefly. 
5.4.2.1 Historical background 
The Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) was established in 1966. The organization of the 
exchange was structured in accordance with proposals by two consultants from the 
Brussels Stock Exchange and was formalized in the Law on Establishment of the 
Stock Exchange, approved by the Majles in May 1966. Today the TSE still operates 
under this original law. 
During its first year of activity, only six companies were listed. The number of 
companies increased to 43 by early 1974. After the first oil price boom and along 
with the increase in foreign exchange revenues of the country, the activities of 
the TSE expanded considerably. As a result, the number of firms listed at the 
TSE reached 102 by early 1978, which 24 were commercial and specialized 
banks (Albrecht Frischenschlager, 2003).  
After the Islamic Revolution, due to the nationalization of banks and insurance 
companies, the war and the elimination of interest from the financial system of Iran, 
activity in the capital market reduced for a while.  
On the eve of the Islamic Revolution, in 1978/1979, trade slowed down. Only 
three new members were added in 1979, and in the following two years many 
companies were either confiscated or nationalized, which reduced the number of 
listed firms to only 55. Because all banks and insurance companies were 
nationalized in 1979 they stopped trading on the stock market. Bond trading 
ended in 1983. It is notable, however, that despite being portrayed in the early 
days of the Revolution as a capital profiteering tool, the TSE was never closed 
down. Finally after a decade of reduced activities the stock market picked up 
again in 1990 and today 335 companies are listed on the TSE (Albrecht 
Frischenschlager, 2003). 
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The TSE has started a modernization program aimed at preparing the market for the 
21st century by drawing up a New Capital Market Law and a New Trading System 
which allows the entry of foreign investment. TSE is now the one of the biggest and 
the most active capital markets in the Middle East and continues its expansion. During 
1383 (2004-2005) the TSE established 11 new floors in various regions. This aimed at 
expanding its activities to enhance market access and investment opportunities for the 
public‖ [Central Bank of Iran, 2006, Economic Report and Balance Sheet]. However, 
several branches have recently been established in other major cities, including 
Shiraz, Kerman, Yazd, Rasht, Zahedan, Karaj, Sari, Ahwaz, Zanjan, Ardebil, and 
Orumiyeh stock exchanges in 1383, the number of active provincial stock exchanges 
increased to 14 [Central Bank of Iran, 2006, Economic Report and Balance Sheet]. 
5.4.2.2 TSE size 
Although, there has been significant progress in the Capital Market in Iran, it is still 
far from being an effective and efficient market. In recent years there have been many 
fluctuations in stock prices and indexes. 
The Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) activities in 1383 (2004-2005) witnessed two 
distinguished periods of boom and bust. In the first half of the year, the market 
was under the influence of the previous year‘s conditions and TSE indices had an 
upward trend. Therefore, the volume of trading and share price index rose to their 
record high. As a matter of fact, the factors responsible for this boom period of 
1383 (2004-2005) could be attributed to the rise in demand over supply of shares 
for trading of some listed companies in 1382 (2003-2004) (Central Bank of Iran, 
2006, Economic Report and Balance Sheet). 
Due to the boom period in 2003 and 2004, the number of shares and rights trading and 
the number of buyers increased significantly.  
In 1383, (2004-2005) the number of shares and rights trading was 2.3 million 
times, up by 85.2 percent. The number of buyers came to 1,570,492 persons. This 
figure posted a rise of 80.9 percent in 1383 (2004-2005) as compared with the 
noticeable rise of 141.3 percent in 1382 (2003-2004) (Central Bank of Iran, 2006, 
Economic Report and Balance Sheet). 
The number of listed companies reached 460 in 1383 (2004-2005) [Source: TSE, 
monthly report].  In 1383 (2004-2005) 3,033 million shares and rights valued at 
Iranian Rials 18,949.6 billion were traded on provincial stock exchanges, constituting 
21.4 and 18.3 percent respectively of the total number and value of shares and rights 
traded on the TSE. 
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By the end of 1383 (2004-2005), market capitalization, with a growth of 25.1 percent 
compared to the previous year, reached Iranian Rials 387,547.2 billion, due to the 
listing of 40 new companies on the TSE and the capital increase of the previously 
listed ones, albeit a slight rise of price index in this period. At the same time, based on 
the average interbank exchange rate (1), market capitalization in terms of dollar 
reached $43.7 billion (Central Bank of Iran, 2006, Economic Report and Balance 
Sheet) and according to the PPP reached about $US 130 billion. Also in 1383 (2004-
2005) the ratio of market capitalization to GDP reached 28 percent by the year-end. 
5.4.2.3 Metal exchange 
The Metal Exchange was inaugurated in Shahrivar 1382 (August-September 2003). 
Aluminium, copper, steel and zinc were traded for cash and forward transactions on 
the Metal Exchange. In that year, a total of 5,223.7 thousand tons of steel, copper, 
aluminium, and zinc worth Rials. 25,117.8 billion were traded on the Metal Exchange 
(Central Bank of Iran, 2006, Economic Report and Balance Sheet). 
5.4.2.4 Agricultural products exchange 
Iran‘s Agricultural Products Exchange was inaugurated in Shahrivar, 1383 (August-
September 2004). By the end of 1383 (2003-2004) about 95 thousand tons of corn, 
barley, different types of seed remained, sugar, rice, peas, lentils, pistachio, and 
saffron valued at Iranian Rials. 162.2 billion were traded on this market (Central 
Bank of Iran, 2006, Economic Report and Balance Sheet).  
5.4.2.5 Participation papers 
Instead of debt papers which are prohibited in Islam, participation papers are issued 
by the Government and some companies.  
In 1383 (2004-2005) a total of Iranian Rials, 41,349.6 billion participation papers 
were issued by the Government, Central Bank, and companies. Of this amount 
93.9 percent, Iranian Rials. 38,840.3 billion, were sold, up by 36.5 percent as 
compared with Iranian Rials. 28,445.7. billion papers sold in the previous year. 
The approved figure for total papers was Iranian Rials. 50,349.6 billion in 1383 
(2004-2005). The profit rate of the participation papers was on a daily basis and 
redeemable at any time. The provisional profit rate for all types of participation 
papers was 17 percent and it was tax-exempted (Central Bank of Iran, 2006, 
Economic Report and Balance Sheet). 
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These papers should be issued for special projects such as automobile manufacture or 
such like, in order that people can become partners and shareholders. For example, if 
the government, or even the private sector, decided to build a large factory and did not 
have enough money they could issue partnership papers the holders of these papers 
would actually be the owners of the factory. After that these shares would become like 
all bonds which can be sold in the secondary market. Sometimes the issuer of the 
papers buys the shares from the shareholders. The profit of the shareholders is 
actually from real profit of the project, but a second party, such as the central bank or 
the government, guarantees the nominal value of the shares and even sometimes a 
minimum profit for them.   
5.4.3 Agriculture Sector 
The agriculture sector is important not only for economic development but also for the 
guarantee of food of every country and, for this reason, countries usually take special 
notice of this sector and it is often protected. In Iran after the Islamic Revolution, 
especially in the early years, this sector was given priority following years of neglect 
under the Shah‘s rule 
5.4.3.1 Size 
Because of the variety in its weather, Iran has potential for agricultural activity 
especially in terms of variety of products. Four seasons can be seen in every season in 
Iran, in the sense that in one season some parts of Iran are warm and others are cold. 
In general:  
one-third of Iran's total surface area is suited for farmland, but because of poor 
soil and lack of adequate water distribution in many areas, most of it is not under 
cultivation. Only 12% of the total land area is under cultivation (arable land, 
orchards and vineyards) but less than one-third of the cultivated area is irrigated. 
About one third of the total land area (35%) is used for grazing and small fodder 
production. Most of the grazing is done on mostly semi-dry rangeland in 
mountain areas and on areas surrounding the large deserts ("Dashts") of Central 
Iran. 
The non-agricultural surface represents 53% of the total area of Iran, as follows: 35% 
of the country is covered by deserts, salt flats (kavirs) and barren rock. Also 11% of 
Iran‘s total surface is covered by woodland and 7% is covered by cities, towns, 
villages, industrial areas and roads. 
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One problem for the complete modernization of agriculture in Iran is the small size of 
the agricultural lands and people‘s preference for working on their own land. Despite 
this problem, the government and farmers have done their best to modernise 
agriculture and improve productivity. Consequently, production of agricultural goods 
especially, those considered as strategic goods such as wheat, has increased sharply 
and Iran has recently become one of the world‘s wheat exporters with production 
valued at 175,891bilion Iranian Rials (about $US 58.63 billion according to PPP). The 
share of the agriculture in the GDP was about 10% in (2005-2006) (Central Bank of 
Iran, Economic Account Office ―Iran‘s economic changes report in real sector‖, first 
three months of 1385 [2006]). 
5.4.3.2 Subsidy 
One important issue in the agricultural sector is subsidy. Governments in many 
countries, even in developed countries, try to support their farmers. The Iranian 
government has paid a considerable amount of subsidy to encourage farmers to invest 
and produce more.  
In 1383(2004-2005), the amount of subsidy paid on major agricultural products 
grew by 40.9 percent to reach Rials. 21,443.1 billion ($US 7.1477 billion in 
PPP). The share of this subsidy out of total government subsidy payments 
declined by 0.9 percentage point from 78.7 percent in 1382 (2004-2005) to 77.8 
percent in the review year. (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, 
Economic Report and Balance Sheet). 
5.4.3.3 Guaranteed purchasing price of agricultural crops 
There are usually many fluctuations in the price of agricultural crops and farmers 
suffer because of this. In addition, in order to encourage farmers to cultivate special 
crops, the government started to buy them at a guaranteed price. 
To encourage farmers to produce basic agricultural crops, to establish 
equilibrium in the production system, and to maintain farmers‘ income level, the 
policy of guaranteed purchase of agricultural crops, which was started in 1368 
(1989-1990), continued in the review year. In 1383 (2004-2005) the guaranteed 
purchasing price increased within the range of 5.9 to 23.8 percent (except for 
green leaf tea), which was less than the rate of inflation (15.2 percent) for this 
year. (Central Bank of Iran, 2006, Economic Report and Balance Sheet) 
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5.4.4 Manufacturing, Mining and Oil-Related Activities 
Although Iran is considered a developing country, it has made rapid progress in recent 
years in industry and the share of industry in the GDP has increased regularly, 
reaching 45.3%. There is a centre in Iran called the University Jihad (Jihade 
Daneshghahi)
32
 which was established after the Islamic Revolution for research in 
new scientific areas. In the past little research was carried out in Iranian universities in 
Iran and there was no relationship between universities and industry. However, now 
the government encourages researchers and a revolution in software development has 
increased the research budget and promoted a closer relationship between researchers 
and the industry sector. All of this is being carried out to compensate past 
backwardness and to bring about technological and industrial modernisation. 
As Iran is an oil producing country, the oil industry plays an important role in its 
economic development. Of course, the authorities try to substitute the export of raw 
petroleum by exporting petrochemical output. Hence, there is a long-term plan to 
increase investment in the petrochemical industry.  
Petrochemical products grew by 7.9 percent to 15.1 million tons in 2004-2005 
when compared with the previous year. About 82.6 percent of the nominal 
capacity of petrochemical units was utilized in the review year. In terms of 
production growth Bou Ali Sina Petrochemical Complex enjoyed the highest 
growth of 54.2 percent, followed by HD Unit of Amir Kabir Complex (with 17.0 
percent), Razi Complex (with 10.8 percent), Isfahan Complex (with 8.7 percent), 
and Tabriz and Orumiyeh complexes (with 8.1 percent). The Fanavaran 
Petrochemical Unit, with a nominal capacity of one million tons, was put into 
operation, producing 447.7 thousand tons. In 1383 (2004-2005) the 
petrochemical units of Arak, Isfahan, and Khark were privatized. The total 
capacity of these three units is 2.5 million tons per annum (13.4 percent of the 
country's total capacity). In 1383, petrochemical complexes produced 1,872.7 
thousand tons of various types of chemical fertilizers, showing a decrease of 1.7 
percent compared to the previous year. The major share of chemical fertilizer 
production belongs to Urea fertilizer with 79.4 and Di-Ammonium Phosphate 
with 14.0 percent. In this year, petrochemical exports, with 14.3 percent increase 
over the previous year, amounted to 5.2 million tons valuing at $1.7 billion. The 
highest share of 46.5 percent in petrochemical exports went to Bandar Imam 
Petrochemical Complex (Central Bank of Iran, 2006, Economic Report and 
Balance Sheet). 
Other important industries in Iran are car assembly and car production which has 
made rapid progress (starting in 1994) both quantitatively and qualitatively. For 
example, in 2004-2005,  
                                                 
32
 Terminologically jehad means hard effort but from  the religious point of view, it means a holy effort 
for holy purpose  
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the auto industries raised their production. The production of various types of 
trucks and vans, minibuses, passenger cars, road construction machineries, and 
pick-ups increased by respectively 112.4, 88.5, 19.8, 9.5, and 6.9 percent, 
compared to last year. Moreover, with the participation of foreign companies, in 
this year, production of the new automobiles was put into the agenda of 
automobile manufacturers to diversify auto manufacturing industry in Iran 
(Central Bank of Iran, 2006, Economic Report and Balance Sheet) 
 
Table 5.3: Manufacturing and Mining Products in Iran 
 
                                                               2002             2003                2004 Percentage change 
 
2003-4         2004-5     
 
Motor vehicles (1)   unit                       531461.0     752387.0     903193.0                                    41.5               20.1 
Cement                   Thousand tons      28433.1        29872.7       32199.0                                      4.7                1.8 
Raw steel                Thousand tons        7477.1          7991.0         8989.6                                      6.9                12.5 
Aluminium bars       Thousand tons          158.3            180.9           212.2                                     14.3               17.3 
Copper (cathode)    Thousand tons          142.9            145.7           152.5                                       2.0                4.7 
Source: Ministry of Industries and Mining 
(1) Includes different types of trucks, vans, passenger cars, pick-ups, buses, minibuses, and 
double-differential cars. 
As we can see in Table 5.3 the most progress among selected industries has been in 
the motor vehicle industry with a growth rate in 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 of 41.5% 
and 20.1% respectively.  
5.4.5 Energy 
Iran has the world's second biggest proven oil reserves after Saudi Arabia and the 
second biggest gas reserves after Russia. Iran‘s proven oil reserves was 132.5 billion 
barrels and its proven natural gas reserves was 27.5 trillion cubic meters in 2004. As 
of 2006 it was producing an estimated 3.8 million barrels per day (bbl/d), equal to five 
percent of global production. At 2006 rates of production, Iran's oil reserves would 
last 98 years if no new oil is found. 
Iran's geo-strategic position and its already-existing network of pipelines also make it 
a key player in the energy world. This situation is both an opportunity and a threat for 
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Iran, both nationally and internationally. The development of oil and gas caused the 
government to rely heavily on energy revenues which in turn caused inefficiency in 
the economy. Another negative effect of oil is the waste of energy. 
Table 5.4: OPEC Primary Energy Consumption in 2004  
                                                                                     (Million tons oil equivalent) 
 
 Oil    Natural gas     Coal     Natural energy   Hydro electricity  Total 
Middle East members    185.5      193.9             1.1             0                           2.7             383.2 
Saudi Arabia  79.6 57.6                0              0  0 137.2 
Iran                                    73.3 78.4        1.1 0 2.7            155.5 
Kuwait                               13.7 8.7        0 0  0               22.4 
United Arab Emirates        15.6 35.6                0   0  0               51.2 
Qatar   3.3 13.6        0 0  0               16.9 
Other members  91.7 74.7               23.1 0 18.6           208.1 
Total                                  77.2        268.6           24.2           0                            21.3           591.3 
Source: BP Statistical Bulletin, 2005      (1) Excludes Iraq, Libya and Nigeria. 
As Table 5-4- shows, Iran‘s primary energy consumption is more than other Middle 
East members. Iran‘s oil consumption is very high, reaching 1.55 mb/d which 
accounted for 26.3 percent of total OPEC consumption. [Central Bank of Iran, 2006, 
Economic Report and Balance Sheet] 
Of course, oil can be seen as a source of capital for the country and can be used as 
capital for investing in economic development. However, unfortunately many oil–
producing countries use it for their current costs and to expand consumption of luxury 
products instead of investing. 
In 1383 (2004-2005), generation of electricity grew by 8.1 percent and amounted to 
162 billion kw.  Of total generated electricity, 159 billion kw (98.3 percent) was 
generated by power plants affiliated to the Ministry of Energy and 2.8 billion kw (1.7 
percent) by other institutions [Central Bank of Iran, 2006, Economic Report and 
Balance Sheet]. In this year Iran‘s total energy consumption was 125.5 billion kw. 
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5.4.6 Construction and Housing 
Construction is an important sector in most economies. On the one hand it plays an 
important role in social welfare and on the other hand it plays a considerable role in 
economic growth by horizontally affecting many sectors in the society. Despite the 
business cycle in this sector and the long-term depressed conditions in Iran, it is 
beneficial to invest in this sector in the long run. Hence, the private sector is usually 
eager to invest in this sector. For example, in 2004-2005 private sector investment in 
new buildings in urban areas (Tehran, other large cities and other urban areas was 
Rials 15,625.7 billion, Rials 2,9987.0 billion and Rials 28,483.7 billion respectively. 
That means that in that year investment in all urban areas was Rials 74,099.4 billion 
(about US$ 24.7 billion) excluding the cost of land. 
5.4.7 Transport 
Iran is a relatively large country with scattered cities and villages, so a widespread 
transport system is vital for its economic development. For this reason the government 
has paid special attention to this sector.  
The year 1383 (2004-2005) experienced a rise of investment in transportation 
sector, in a way that gross fixed capital formation grew by 19.7 percent (at 
constant 1376 prices) as compared with the previous year. A large portion of this 
investment was used for machinery, which accounted for 86.5 percent [Central 
Bank of Iran, 2006, Economic Report and Balance Sheet] 
Some efforts have also been made to prepare conditions which increase private and 
foreign investment in this section recently, including:  
Utilization of external finance to provide machinery and railway equipment, 
encouragement of the private sector participation for the construction of freeways 
in the northern area of Mashhad, approval of Articles of Agreement and bilateral 
and multilateral memorandums of understanding in international transportation, 
and introduction of new special economic zones to perform external transit 
operations, are among the measures taken by the government in this sector during 
the review year. These initiatives are expected to promote service rendering and 
create new opportunities for investment in this sector [Central Bank of Iran, 
2006, Economic Report and Balance Sheet] 
Due to these efforts, especially over the last twenty years, Iran now has a relatively 
widespread network of roads and railways which are a step toward rapid economic 
development. 
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5.4.8 GDP by sector 
In traditional economies agriculture usually has a high rate of contribution in GDP, 
while in developed economies services have a high rate of contribution. For example, 
in the United Kingdom GDP was distributed between agriculture, industry and 
services respectively as 1%, 26% and 73% in 2006. Of course, sometimes the share of 
services leads to mistakes. In some developing countries, because of lack of 
equilibrium between different economic sectors and because of people‘s desire to be 
involved in speculative activities rather than production activities, the share of 
services in the GDP is high. One should note that this is not a sign of progress but of a 
weak economic structure. In an inflationary economy, especially when people expect 
that inflation will continue for a long time, they invest in services, especially in trade 
and speculative subjects, rather than production projects as this is more profitable. As 
Table 5.5 shows, in 1383 (2004-5) the share of agriculture in the GDP decreased to 
10% compared with the previous year when it was 11%, the share of oil and industry 
increased from about 42% to 44% and the share of service industries decreased from 
48% to 47%. A decrease in the share of services is a good signal with regard to 
economic development, because the expansion of service industries at this stage of 
development would not benefit economic development. At this stage Iran needs to 
increase investment in the industrial sector, especially in new technologies. Of course 
in the future Iran will need to increase the share of service industries. 
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Table 5.5: Gross Domestic Product in Terms of Economic Activities  
                                                                                                     (Iranian Rials Billion) 
  
 
Market price 
               1383(2004-5)               1384(2005-6) 
    Amount Share of GDP           Amount   Share of GDP      
Agriculture group       155471        11%       175891        10% 
Oil group       346673        25%       471520        27% 
Industry and mining        245139        17%    283097    17% 
Mining       8114        10375  
Industry       156076        181343  
Electricity, Gas & water       20211        22160  
Construction       60739        69220  
Service industries       667252         48%       800916          47% 
Trade, Hotels & Restaurants       160862        188552  
Transport, storage & communication       101195        121804  
Financial intermediation       49419        66230  
Real estate and technical services        174145        206305  
General services       143809        173242  
Personal and Social services       37821         44782  
Deduction              
Karmozde ehtesabi       29716        39610  
Gross domestic product       1384819        1691814  
Sources: Central Bank of IROI, Economic Accounts Office, Iran‘s Economic Changes Report in the 
Real Sector, first three months of 1385 (2006-7) 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this chapter has been to consider the structure of the economic 
system in Iran by focusing on the financial system, especially the banking system. 
One problem is that despite the attempts made by the government regarding the 
country‘s relative independence of the economy of oil, oil still plays an important role 
in the economy. Another concern is the duality in Iran‘s economy. The agricultural 
sector is representative of the traditional sector and industry is representative of the 
modern sector of the economy. However, in general the modern sector is predominant 
in Iran‘s economy. 
The first bank founded in Iran in 1850 was New East Bank, originally a British-owned 
bank. Before the Islamic Revolution there were many banks in Iran. After the 
Revolution, all 37 banks were nationalized and were merged into six commercial 
banks and three special banks. However, in recent years some structural reforms have 
been made in the banking system, such as the establishment of an allowance for 
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private credit institutes and banks. There are eleven state-owned banks and eight 
private banks in Iran today and the TSE is one of the most active exchanges in the 
Middle East. 
Regarding the share of economic sectors in the economy, this chapter has shown that 
the strongest sector in Iran is the service sector which was 47% in 2005-2006. Second 
is oil which occupies 25% of the economy, third and fourth are industry and the 
mining and agriculture sector which have a share of 17% and 11% respectively. 
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Chapter Six:  
THE CONTRIBUTION OF ISLAMIC BANKING TO THE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN 
(QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS) 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is generally accepted that finance, especially banking, plays an important role in 
economic development, while in developing countries, shortage of finance is regarded 
as a major constraint on development.  
There is often insufficient money available to finance worthwhile projects and 
the price of loanable funds is usually high, reflecting the shortage of savings. In 
low income countries, it is not surprising that saving rates are low, because most 
disposable income has to be used to purchase necessities for everyday living, and 
many families simply cannot afford to make financial provision for the future, 
even though this leaves them insecure and vulnerable.(Wilson, 1995:76)  
Although oil exporting countries are different from other developing countries due to 
oil revenues, individual savings, deposits and capital accumulation are also important 
to them for economic development. It is a fact that oil revenues play a dual role in oil 
producing countries. On the one hand they create a facility for investment by 
governments, which is useful for economic development, but on the other hand they 
encourage consumerism and inflation. For example, average consumption in Iran is 
very high in comparison with other developing countries; it is said that it is near to 
that of developed countries. An increase in oil revenue usually leads to an increase in 
liquidity which leads to inflation. As, due to outbreak of speculation during the time 
of inflation, high inflation rates usually work against economic development, it would 
be more effective and more sustainable if financing the economy and investment 
relied on national savings rather than oil revenues,. 
Principally Islamic banking, like conventional banking, can affect economic 
development in two ways: First, by increasing the productivity of the existing capital; 
second, by increasing the quantities of savings and deposits and allocating them to the 
most efficient projects. One of the most important roles of banks is to encourage 
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people to decrease their consumption and increase their savings by giving them a 
proper reward for saving. Another important role for banks is to allocate deposits to 
the most efficient projects. Since this chapter discusses the effect of banking on 
economic development, it is necessary that the trend of economic development is 
considered. This chapter, therefore, will contain two sections. Economic growth 
trends in Iran will be discussed in Section One and mobilization and allocation of 
resources to more efficient projects through banking system will be discussed in 
Section Two.  
In this regard the questions are:  
1- What has been the growth rate of GDP in Iran? 
2- What has been the trend of savings and investment in Iran? 
3- Were the Islamic banks in Iran able to create a regular growth rate in mobilization 
of savings? 
4- What has been the trend of ratio of deposits to GDP and liquidity (M2)? 
5- Are the deposits short-term or long-term? 
6- How were deposits allocated to the different economic sectors?  
6.2 THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN 
In this section we will first look at the trend of overall growth in GDP, with and 
without oil, in general and then in the different economic sectors. 
 6.2.1 The Growth of Oil and Non-Oil GDP  
When discussing an economic subject in oil-producing countries such as Iran, it is 
important to pay attention to variables because some variables are a function of world 
oil prices. Oil prices can affect GDP in two ways. The first is indirectly, which means 
by creating facilities for investment both in the oil sector and in other economic 
sectors. The second is directly by increasing the absolute amount of GDP when oil 
prices are high and decreasing it when oil prices are low, as a part of GDP. In general, 
oil is a valuable raw material which does not count in a nation‘s manufacturing 
capacity, but instead shows the riches of the country from a natural resources point of 
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view. For this reason it would be useful, if not essential, to calculate GDP without oil, 
to show the country‘s production capacity.  
Table 6.1: Oil and Non-Oil GDPs at the Current and Constant 1376 (1997) Prices 
and their Growth Rate                                                       (Iranian Rials Billion) 
 
Year GDP  
(cur)          
GR 
% 
GDP 
(cons)    
GR 
% 
GDP- 
oil (cur)      
GR 
% 
GDP- oil  
(cons)          
GR 
% 
1989 25079.00 24.2 191503 5.9 23261 21.1 160255 5.7 
1990 34506.00 37.6 218539 14.1 30857 32.7 181171 13.1 
1991 48428.00 40.3 245036 12.1 44329 43.7 202426 11.7 
1992 64502.00 32.2 254822 4 58703 32.4 212200 4.8 
1993 100124.00 55.2 258601 1.5 79028 34.6 213844 .8 
1994 131771.00 31.66 259876 0.5 105105 33 217760 1.8 
1995 188184.00 42.8 267534 2.9 156758 49.1 224805 3.2 
1996 248972.00 32.3 283807 6.1 207166 32.2 240762 7.1 
1997 291769.00 17.2 291769 2.8 251005 21.2 251005 4.3 
1998 328522.00 12.6 300140 2.9 300255 19.6 258404 2.9 
1999 434385.00 32.2 304941 1.6 371092 23.6 265426 2.7 
2000 576493.00 32.7 320069 5 474788 27.9 277274 4.5 
2001 664620.00 15.2 330565 3.3 564229 18.8 292512 5.5 
2002 917035.00 38 355554 7.6 707349 25.4 316149 8.1 
2003 1095303.0 19.4 379838 6.8 944130 19.3 335144 6 
2004 1384819.0 26.4 398234 4.8 1038146 23 352363 5.1 
2005 1691814.0 21.9 420928 5.7 1216385 17.2 374784 6.4 
2006 2038432.0 20.8 446880 6.2 1498341 23.2 399334 6.6 
Ave ________ 29.59 _______ 5.2 ________ 27.66 ________ 5.6 
Sources: 1- Economic Statistic Office of Central Bank  
2- Reports and balance sheets of Iranian Central Bank (Bank Markazi) for different years  
GDP (Cur) =Gross domestic product at the base prices (current prices)  
GDP (cons) =Gross domestic product at the base prices (constant 1997 prices) 
GDP- oil (Cur) =Gross domestic product without oil at the base prices (current prices)           
GDP- oil (cons) =Gross domestic product without oil at the base prices (constant 1997 prices) 
GR=growth rate 
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1, depict trends in oil- and non-oil GDP at current and constant 
1376 (1997) prices and their growth rate. As the table shows, oil- and non-oil GDP at 
the current price has demonstrated a high growth rate. The minimum growth rate in 
the 1989-2005 periods for GDP with oil and without oil were 12.6% and 17.2% , the 
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maximum growth rate for these periods were 55.2% and 49.1% and average growth 
rates were 29.59% and 27.66% respectively. It is worth mentioning that fluctuation in 
GDP with oil is more than in non-oil GDP, reflecting the effect of oil on the 
fluctuation of Iran‘s economy. As can be seen in Table 6.1, the difference between the 
minimum and maximum in GDP growth rate at the current price with oil is 42.6 %, 
while for non-oil GDP is 31.9%.  
GDP at the constant 1376 (1997) price, i.e. real GDP, shows the real growth rate 
which is adjusted for the inflation rate. We can see fluctuation in real GDP too, but it 
is a little less than nominal GDP, which shows the existence of inflation. In 1989 
which was the first year of the First Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the growth rate was 5.9% but in 1990 and 1991, it 
jumped to 14.1% and 12.1% respectively and then decreased to 4%, 1.5% and 0.5% 
for 1990, 1991, and 1992 respectively. The point is that the reason for the high growth 
rate in the first three years, especially in 1990 and 1991 was the existence of free 
capacity in the economy. During the war between Iran and Iraq, due to a shortage of 
raw materials and the destruction of factories, firms did not work to their full capacity. 
One interesting point is that while the growth rate in nominal GDP was at its highest 
rate (52.2%) in 1993, the real growth rate was relatively very low (1.5%) which shows 
the existence of a high inflation rate in that year. Minimum and maximum growth rate 
in real GDP between 1989 and 2006 was 0.5% and 14.1% respectively. The average 
growth rate during that time was 5.2%. Although this average is relatively acceptable 
the country needs a higher growth rate to generate employment and get through the 
developing period. The situation regarding real GDP without oil is a little better than 
the previous one, but the trend is relatively similar.  The minimum and maximum 
growth rates in real GDP without oil were 0.8% and 13.05% respectively which is 
similar to the growth of that with oil. It is interesting that the average growth rate in 
GDP without oil is a little more than that with oil. The gap between the real growth 
rate and the nominal growth rate shown in figure 6.2 reflects the inflation rate for 
those years which was very high, especially, for 1993 when the growth rate for 
nominal GDP with oil and real GDP with oil was 52.2% and just 1.5% respectively. 
This high inflation rate was due to President Hashemi Rafsanjani‘s expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy which tried to rebuild the war damages. The data in this 
year also can confirm a negative relationship between inflation and economic growth. 
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Figure 6.1. GDP with and without oil during 1989-2006 
 
Source: Table 6.1 
GDP CU P = GDP with oil at the current prices. 
GDP CO P = GDP with oil at the constant 1997 prices. 
GDP-OIL CUR P = GDP without oil at the current prices. 
GDP-oil CO P = GDP without oil at the constant 1997 prices. 
6.2.2 The Process of Growth in GDP by Economic Sector  
A change in the share of economic sectors in GDP can be used as an indicator of 
economic development. Whenever the share of industry is more than that of 
agriculture the level of development is higher. Nevertheless, there are some 
differences between developing countries and developed countries regarding the 
service sector. In developed countries the service sector share usually increases but 
that is not necessarily a sign of improvement in the economic development in all 
countries; instead it may be a sign of economic disease in developing countries. This 
is because, in developed countries, industries were saturated and the extra resources 
were employed in the service sector to increase the people‘s welfare. However, in 
developing countries, where there is usually shortage of capital, the expansion of the 
service sector leads to intensification of the shortage and usually comes from 
disequilibrium in the economy. Therefore, in some developing countries such as Iran, 
a decrease in the service sector may be a mark of improvement in the economic 
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development process, especially toward equilibrium. Now we will consider the share 
of each sector. 
Figure 6.2. Growth Rate of GDP with and without Oil During 1989-2006  
 
Source: Table 6.1 
GDP cu p g r = Growth rate of GDP with oil at the current prices. 
GDP co p g r = Growth rate of GDP with oil at the constant 1997 prices. 
GDP-OIL cu p g r = Growth rate of GDP without oil at the current prices. 
GDP-OIL co p g r = Growth rate of GDP without oil at the constant 1997 prices. 
a) Agriculture  
Agriculture is a necessary sector in any country because it meets the food needs of the 
population of the country but, from the economic development point of view, it 
should not occupy a large proportion of the GDP. The best idea is to produce for the 
basic needs of the population. In developed countries a small proportion of the labour 
force and capital is usually used for the agricultural sector. Of course a large amount 
of agricultural goods can be produced by increasing productivity. 
As Table 6.2 shows, during the development process the share of agriculture in GDP 
decreased regularly in Iran. Despite an increase in the production of agricultural goods 
during 1989-2006, its share in the GDP decreased. During this period the production 
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of agricultural good increased from 5,893 billion rials in 1989 to 211,275 billion rials 
at the current price in 2006 which is an increase of about 36 times and from 
93,391.4422 billion rials in 1989 to 171,142.1682 billion rials at the constant 2004 
price in 2006 which shows an approximately twofold increase. However, its share in 
the GDP decreased from 23.498% in 1989 to 10.365% in 2006 which shows a 
decrease of about 55.9%. On average, the share of agriculture in the GDP during these 
years was 15.039%. These data reflect improvement in both quantitative and 
qualitative indexes.  
b) Oil and Gas  
Oil and gas have played an important role for several decades in the Iranian economy. 
The share of oil and gas in Iran‘s economy is usually subject to its price which is 
determined on the world market. Fluctuation in the world price of oil creates some 
difficulties for the economy of oil-producing countries, so governments have tried to 
reduce the share of oil in their budget. 
Table 6.2 shows that the share of oil and gas in the GDP increased during 1989-2006. 
Of course there were many fluctuations during this period. Three distinct periods can 
be seen during 1989-2006. First, in 1989-1993 the share of oil went from 7.253% in 
1989 to 21.07% in 1993. Second, in 1994-1998 it decreased to 8.604% in 1998.  
Third, in 1999-2006 the share started to increase regularly and reached 26.495% in 
2006. The average share of oil and gas in the GDP over the whole18-year period was 
16.949%. The process of the share can be seen in figure 6.4 more clearly. In 
conclusion, it can be said that this increase in their share in the GDP is not a good 
thing because this result was achieved despite all the governments claiming to have 
decreased the share of this sector in GDP. It is also important that we differentiate 
between selling crude oil and petrochemical products.   
c) Mining and Manufacturing 
The mining and manufacturing sector is very important in the economic development 
process as industrialization can facilitate economic development because other sectors 
can benefit if there is an initial industrial base. For example, one important step 
regarding the development of agriculture is its potential for industrialization which 
increases productivity and releases extra workers for the expansion of industry. 
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Furthermore, the oil and services sectors need industry for improvement and oil can 
add value through industrial projects such as petrochemical projects. 
As Table 6.2 shows, during the development process the value added of both mining 
and manufacturing and their share in the GDP increased in Iran. During this period, 
the value added of mining and manufacturing increased from 2,515 billion Rials in 
1989 to 261,039 billion Rials at the current price in 2006 which reflects an increase of 
about 104 times and from 40,499.195 billion Rials in 1989 to 211,453.22 billion Rials 
at the constant 2004 (1383) price in 2006 which shows an increase of about 5.22 
times. 
Table 6.2: GDP at the Base and Current Prices by Economic Sector  
                                                                                                       (Iranian Rials Billion) 
                                                                                                          
Year GDP AG Share* 
% 
O&G Share* 
% 
I&M Share*
% 
H&B Share*
% 
Servic
e 
Share* 
% 
1989 25079.00 5893.00 23.498 1819.00 7.253 2515 10.028 1188.00 4.737 13739 54.783 
1990 34506.00 6591.00 16.493 3649.00 10.575 4589 13.299 1666.00 4.828 18204 52.756 
1991 48428.00 8977.00 18.537 4098.00 8.462 7171 14.807 2643.00 5.458 26057 53.806 
1992 64502.00 12033.00 18.655 5798.00 8.989 9565 14.829 3446.00 5.342 34238 53.08 
1993 100124.00 15331.00 15.312 21096.00 21.07 11953 11.579 5208.00 5.201 47455 47.396 
1994 131771.00 20482.00 15.544 26666.00 20.237 17959 13.629 6191.00 4.698 61931 46.999 
1995 188184.00 34575.00 18.373 31426.0 16.7 24863 13.212 8146.0 4.329 90497 48.09 
1996 248972.00 38868.00 15.611 41806.0 16.791 36646 14.719 13394. 5.38 120508 48.402 
1997 291769.00 43162.00 14.793 40763.00 13.971 45186 15.487 13262.00 4.545 152761 52.357 
1998 328522.00 56751.00 17.275 28267.00 8.604 49025 14.923 13291.00 4.046 185237 56.385 
1999 434385.00 65421.00 15.061 63293.00 14.472 63338 14.481 17885.00 4.117 231028 53.185 
2000 576493.00 79121.00 12.724 101705.0 17.642 87489 15.176 22616.00 3.923 295101 51.19 
2001 664620.00 85238.00 12.825 100391.0 15.105 104710 15.755 30104.00 4.529 353591 53.202 
2002 917035.00 110373.00 12.036 209687.0 22.866 123841 13.472 46016.00 5.018 442831 48.286 
2003 1095303.0 131134.00 11.972 251174.0 22.932 146740 13.397 50616.00 4.621 535112 48.855 
2004 1384819.0 155471.00 11.227 346673.0 25.034 184700 13.337 60739.00 4.386 667251 48.183 
2005 1691814.0 175891.00 10.397 471520.0 27.891 213878 12.642 69220.00 4.091 800916 47.341 
2006 2038432.0 211275 10.365 540091 26.495 261039 12.806 88408 4.337 994631 48.794 
Aver
age 
________ _________ 15.0388 ______- 16.949 ______ 13.754 _____ 4.644 ______ 50.727 
 
Sources: Economic Statistics Office of Central Bank 
AG = Agriculture 
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O&G= Oil and gas 
M & I = Mining and industry (Manufacturing) 
H & B = Housing and building 
*Calculated by researcher 
 
In addition, its share in the GDP increased from 10.028% in 1989 to 12.806% in 2006 
which shows an increase of about 27.7%. However, on average the share of mining 
and industry in the GDP during the period under review was 13.7543%. Although, 
these data reflect an improvement in their development process and share, this 
improvement is not enough and the country needs to invest more in all aspects of 
industrial development. 
d) Housing and Construction  
Housing and construction play an important role in both economic development and 
people‘s welfare, because construction triggers expansion in all sectors. Housing in 
Iran has been a big problem for all governments during recent decades, both before 
and after the Islamic Revolution. In the big cities rent prices are very high now and 
people who do not own their own homes usually have to pay about half of their salary 
or more on rent. The reason for high rents is that there is a wide gap between supply 
and demand which is caused by several factors. First of all is the shortage of financial 
facilities in the construction sector. The second factor is the high price of land and 
building materials. The third factor is a bad consumption sample for building in Iran. 
In Iran, houses are very large compared with many other countries, which causes them 
to be expensive.  These factors affect the supply side. The fourth factor is the high 
population growth rate in the initial years after the Islamic Revolution. The fifth factor 
is migration from villages to cities and from small cities to big cities. These two 
factors affect the demand side. Consequently, despite the government‘s attempts to 
build houses and encourage people to invest in this sector, and consequently, their 
relative success in this regard, the problem has remained unsolved.  
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Figure 6.3. Share of Economic Sectors in GDP During 1989- 
2006
 
 
Source: Table 6.2 
AG SHARE = share of agricultural sector in GDP.  O&G SHARE = share of oil and gas sector in GDP 
I&M SHARE = share of manufacture and mining in GDP 
H&B SHARE = share of housing and construction sector in GDP 
SER SHARE = share of services sector in GDP 
Moreover, many people look at a house as a capital commodity not as a consumption 
commodity and this also leads to high house prices. This means that the rich usually 
own more than one house and because of their wealth they are able to pay more. In 
addition, last but not least is the speculation of some people on building and 
increasing prices unrealistically. Of course, as will be discussed later, Islamic banking 
has played a satisfactory role in this sector but, due to an accumulation of problems 
over several years before and after Islamic revolution, it has not been enough.  
The share of housing and building in the GDP during the period under review has 
been relatively constant with little fluctuation. It was 4.737% in 1989 and reached 
4.337 in 2006. The value added, which was 1188 billion rials in 1989, reached 88408 
billion rials in 2006. This shows a growth of about 74.4175 times at the current price. 
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In terms of constant 2004 price, it increased about 3.7 times. This seems satisfactory 
but the country needs more investment to solve its accommodation problem. It is 
worth mentioning that there is a strong desire in families to own their own house 
instead of renting. 
e) Services  
As mentioned before, the share of services in the GDP varies in different economies. 
While it is counted as a sign of welfare in developed countries, in contrast, in 
developing countries it may be seen as a sign of disequilibrium, anti-development and 
anti-welfare. The reason is that, despite the need of productive sectors for capital; 
resources are spent in non product sectors and are often used in brokerage activities.  
 
Figure 6.4. Share of economic sectors trend in GDP during 1989-
2006
 
Source: Table 6.2 
AG share = share of agricultural sector in GDP 
O&G share = share of oil and gas sector in GDP 
I&M share = share of manufacture and mining sector in GDP 
H&B share = share of housing and building sector in GDP 
SER share = share of services sector in GDP 
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The service sector has had a considerable share in the GDP since oil incomes 
increased. Oil revenues usually cause an increase in foreign trade, especially import 
activities and hence they also encourage internal trade activities. As trade activities 
are a substitute for productive activities, instead of being complementary in Iran they 
are usually viewed negatively by the Iranian people and even by some economists. 
Thus, every government has tried to decrease the share of the service sector in the 
GDP. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.4, there is a huge gap between the share of the service 
sector in the GDP and that of other sectors. Its share was 54.783% in 1989 but started 
to decrease slowly until 1996 when it reached 48.402%. In 1997 and 1998 it increased 
considerably to 52.357% and 56.385% respectively and then started to decrease. This 
coincided with the election of Sayyed Mohammad Khatami as President of Iran. 
During this time the government neglected economic policy and concentrated on 
political issues. Consequently, the GDP growth rate decreased and some capital went 
to the service sector. However, the share of this sector in the GDP decreased to 
48.974% in 2006.   
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Figure 6.5. Average Share of Economic Sectors in GDP During 1989-2006 
 
 
Source: Table 6.2 
AG share = average share of agricultural sector in GDP during 1989-2006 
O&G share = average share of oil and gas sector in GDP during 1989-2006 
I&M share = average share of manufacture and mining in GDP during 1989-2006 
H&B share = average share of housing and building sector in GDP during 1989-2006 
SER share = average share of services sector in GDP during 1989-2006 
6.3 GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS AND CAPITAL FORMATION 
As mentioned before lack of saving is one of the most important problems with which 
developing countries have been faced (Wilson, 1995) and, despite the shortage of 
extra revenue in these countries to be saved, the banking system can play an important 
role in encouraging saving and guiding savings toward investment. So, it will be 
useful to discuss the process of these two effective variables in economic 
development.  
According to Table 6.3, and Figure 6.6., the Gross National Saving at current price 
was 3,720 billion Rials in 1989, but jumped sharply to 10,055 billion Rials in 1990, 
which shows a growth rate of 170.3%. The situation at the constant price was similar, 
increasing from 59,903.38 billion Rials in 1989 to 148,522.89 billion Rials in 1990 
which shows a considerable growth rate of 147.94%. The reason is clear; during the 
war the growth rate of Gross National Savings was very low, so a high growth rate 
would be expected after the war. This trend continued until 1994 when the country 
faced a reduction in oil price and also a high inflation rate.  
 
AG share 
O&G share  
I&M share 
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Table 6.3: Saving and Capital Formation at the Current and Constant 1383                                                                       
(2004) Prices and their Growth Rate (1989-2006)            (Iranian Rials Billion)  
 
Sources: 1- Economic Statistic Office of Central Bank  
2- Economic Research and Policy Department, Central bank of Islamic Republic of Iran. 
GNS (cur) = Gross National Saving at the current prices. 
GNS (con) = Gross National Saving at the constant 2004 (1383) prices. 
GFCF (cur) = Gross Fixed Capital Formation at the current prices. 
GFCF (con) = Gross Fixed Capital Formation at the constant 2004 (1383) prices 
G R = Growth Rare 
*Calculated by researcher                                                  
The inflation rate in the years 1994 and 1995 was 37% and 49% respectively, 
therefore, despite a continuing growth rate at the current price in those years, they 
were at a constant price negative. It is clear from Table 6.3 and Figure 6.7 that the 
growth rates in those years were -6.22% and -7.79% respectively. In 1996, the growth 
rate at both prices again became positive (20.15%).  
  Year   GNS(cur) G R* GNS(con)* G R* GFCF(cur) G R* GFCF(con)* G R* 
1989 3720 ____ 59903.38 ____ 5135 _____ 82689.21 _____ 
1990 10055 170.3 148522.89 147.94 8127 58.27 120044.31 43.97 
1991 15564 54.79 190501.84 28.26 15423 89.77 188776.01 57.26 
1992 22839 46.72 224572.27 17.88 19396 25.76 190717.8 1.03 
1993 39475 72.84 316006.09 40.71 24858 28.16 199182.69 4.44 
1994 50026 26.73 296362.56 -6.22 28819 15.93 170728.67 -14.28 
1995 68913 37.75 273355.81 -7.76 38954 35.17 154518.05 -9.49 
1996 102048 48.08 328445.45 20.15 65626 68.47 211219.83 36.7 
1997 110408 8.19 302985.73 -7.75 83765 27.64 229871.02 8.83 
1998 101765 -7.83 236497.79 -21.94 96051 14.67 223218.68 -2.89 
1999 157918 55.18 305568.88 29.21 124202 29.31 240328.95 7.66 
2000 222318 40.78 381989.69 20.01 153462 23.56 263680.41 9.72 
2001 233720 5.13 360512.11 -5.62 187999 22.5 289987.66 9.98 
2002 344539 47.41 459018.12 27.32 262588 39.67 349837.46 20.64 
2003 397811 15.46 458360.41 -0.14 318820 21.41 367346.47 5 
2004 525350 32.06 525350 14.61 401765 26.02 401765 9.37 
2005 675801 28.64 612415.95 16.57 464532 15.62 420962.39 4.78 
2006 796856 17.92 645488.86 5.4 538720 15.97 436387.2 3.66 
Average 215507 41.19 340325.44 18.74 157680.11 32.82 252308.99 11.55 
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Figure 6.6. Gross National Savings and Investment at the Current and Constant 
2004 Prices During 1989 – 2006. 
 
 
Source: Table 6.3 
GNS CU P = The Gross National Saving at the current prices. 
GNS CO P = The Gross National Saving at the constant 2004 (1383) prices. 
GFCF CU P = The Gross Fixed Capital Formation at the current prices. 
GFCF CO P = The Gross Fixed Capital Formation at the constant 2004 (1383) prices. 
Due to the change of government in 1997, a negative growth rate was observed again 
in GNS at constant 2004 price for two years.  Inflation rates for 1997 and 1998 were 
17% and 18.08% and growth rates were -7.76% and -21.94% respectively. The only 
year that Gross National Savings at current price was negative was 1998. In that year 
the growth rate was -7.83%. During 1999-2006 the growth rates of GNS at constant 
price were positive, except in 2001 and 2003 when they were -5.62% and -0.14% 
respectively. The average GNS at current and constant price were Iranian rials 
215,507 billion and 340,325.44 billion respectively. Of course, it is worth mentioning 
that the oil price in this period was below $US 10. Gross Fixed Capital Formation had 
relatively the same process as Gross National Savings except that 
 
 
 
0 
100000 
200000 
300000 
400000 
500000 
600000 
700000 
800000 
900000 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Year 
Ir
a
n
ia
n
 R
ia
ls
 B
il
li
o
n
 
GNS CU P 
GNS CO P 
GFCF CU P 
GFCF CO P 
  
141 
Figure 6.7. growth rate of saving and gross fixed capital formation at current and constant 2004 
prices during 1989-2006  
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Source: Table 6.3 
GNS CU g r = The growth rate of Gross National Savings at the current prices. 
GNS CO g r = The growth rate of Gross National Savings at the constant 2004 (1383) prices. 
GFCF CU g r = The growth rate of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation at the current prices. 
GFCF CO g r = The growth rate of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation at the constant 2004 (1383) 
prices. 
fluctuation was a little less than in the previous year. As Table 6.3 and Figure 6.7 
show the GFCF at current price had a high growth rate during the period under 
review, especially in the first years. For example, the growth rate in 1990 was 58.27% 
followed by 89.77% the following year. The GFCF at the constant price had the same 
trend except in 1994, 1995 and 1998 when it had a negative growth rate. Their growth 
rate was -14.28%, -9.49% and -2.89% respectively. The reason for this was the high 
rate of inflation caused by the expansionary monetary policy carried out by President 
Hashemi Rafsanjani. On average, GFCF at the current and constant price was Iranian 
rials 157680.11and 252308.99 billion and their growth rate was 32.28% and 11.55% 
respectively.  
6.4 MOBILISATION AND ALLOCATION OF MONETARY RESOURCES 
Before the Islamic Revolution in Iran, despite the existence of many foreign 
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conventional banks, many people did not like to deposit in these banks because of 
riba. It was expected that after the elimination of riba, these people would use the 
banks and consequently increase the activities of the banking system. Of course the 
banking system had to attract the people‘s trust. Another factor after the Islamic 
Revolution regarding the banks‘ activities was that their branches extended to the 
under-developed and rural areas where they had previously not existed. Today, a 
considerable number of bank branches, especially agricultural banks, serve these 
areas, and this can have a positive effect on their development. Although our research 
period does not include the time before the Islamic Revolution, in order to make some 
comparisons the years just before the Revolution will be reviewed briefly.  
6.4.1 Deposit and Credit Trends before the Islamic Revolution  
6.4.1.1 Deposit and credit trends 
Although the research does not include the period before the Islamic Revolution, for a 
brief comparison it would be useful to look at the deposit and credit trends in this era. 
So, in Table 6.4, the trend of deposits and credits has been shown both in current and 
constant 2004 (1383) prices for 1961-1979 (1340-1357). 
As we can see in Table 6.4, although the amount of deposits and credits are not 
considerable, their growth rate is relatively acceptable. This could be because of 
relatively small amounts of deposits and credits in that period in a situation where a 
little increase in absolute value of deposits and credits led to high growth rate. This 
growth rate is different from a growth rate in a banking system with huge amounts of 
deposits and credits. For example, in an economy such as the United States or China 
or other economies where the economy is very large, a growth rate of 2% is not just 
acceptable but excellent. However, this rate for developing countries is not 
acceptable. Therefore the growth rate in these countries is usually higher than that in 
developed countries but that does not mean that their economy is more efficient than 
those of developed or more developed countries. It is worth mentioning that there is a 
positive relationship between oil price and the amount of deposits and credits. In 1974 
when the oil price increased about four times and reached US$ 12 per barrel, the 
deposit growth rate increased to 58% and 38% for current price and constant price 
respectively and after a one year lag, credit facilities‘ growth rate increased 55% and 
41.91% for current price and constant price respectively. 
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Table 6.4: Deposit and Credit Facilities at the Current and Constant 2004 prices 
and their Growth Rate (percent) of Private Sector (1961-1978) (Iranian Rials 
Billion) 
 
Year C P I D CU P G R* % 
 
D CO P*  G R* % 
 
C CU P G R* % 
 
C CO P* G R* % 
 
1961 0.32 39 --------- 12187.5 --------- 50.7 --------- 15843.75 -------- 
1962 0.33 48.8 25 14787.88 19 61.5 21 18636.36 18 
1963 0.33 58.9 21 17848.48 21 72.9 18.5 22090.91 18.5 
1964 0.35 68.2 16 19485.71 9 88.1 20.8 25171.43 13.9 
1965 0.35 80.1 17 22885.71 17 102.2 16 29200 16 
1966 0.35 93.3 17 26657.14 16 121.2 18.6 34628.57 18.59 
1967 0.35 113.5 22 32428.57 22 142.3 17.4 40657.14 17.41 
1968 0.36 141.2 24 39222.22 21 167.2 17.5 46444.44 14.23 
1969 0.37 168.6 19 45567.57 16 198.6 18.8 53675.67 15.57 
1970 0.38 194.8 15 51263.16 12 230.2 15.9 60578.94 12.86 
1971 0.40 246.8 27 61700 20 278.4 20.9 69600 14.89 
1972 0.42 333 35 79258.71 28 364.7 31 86833.33 24.76 
1973 0.47 429.4 29 91361.7 15 494.2 35.5 105148.94 21.09 
1974 0.54 678.9 58 125722.22 38 704.6 42.6 130481.48 24.09 
1975 0.59 963.3 42 163271.19 30 1092.5 55 185169.49 41.91 
1976 0.69 1344.3 39 194826.09 19 1516.6 38.8 219797.1 18.7 
1977 0.86 1771.5 32 205988.37 6 1868.8 23.2 217302.32 -1.13 
1978 0.95 1775.1 0.002 186852.63 -9 2199 17.7 231473.68 6.52 
average -------- 474.91 25.76 77300.32 17.65 540.37 25.78 88485.2 17.4 
Source: Economic Statistic Office of Central Bank and its Reports and Balance Sheets. 
CPI=customer price index  
D CU P = Deposits at the current Prices. 
D CO P = Deposits at the constant Prices. 
C CU P = Credit at the current Prices. 
C CO P = Credit at the constant Prices. 
G R = Growth rate 
* Calculated by researcher 
6.4.1.2 Trend of ratio of deposits to GDP and liquidity 
One important factor in the analysis of success of the banking system in mobilising 
monetary resources is to consider what ratio of GDP and liquidity has been attracted 
by banking system as deposits. Tables 6.5, 6.7 and 6.9 show these trends. As Table 
6.5 shows, the ratio of deposits to GDP was very low in the early years at just 14.24% 
but had a relatively positive trend. Despite the variances in growth rate, for example, 
negative growth rate in years 1965, and 1973-74, the overall trend is positive and this 
ratio reached 35.59% in 1978, and its average during the years 1962-1978 was 
24.53%. Also, the average growth rate was 5.83%. It is worth mentioning that the 
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sharp decrease in 1965, and 1973-74 was not due to a decrease in deposits but instead 
was due to a sharp increase in GDP or liquidity. For instance, GDP increased from 
1,169 billion rials in 1972 to 1,707 billion rials and 2963 billion rials in 1973 and 
1974 respectively. Also, liquidity increased from 400 billion rials in 1972 to 515.8 
billion rials and 810.1 billion rials in 1973 and 1974 respectively. This increase was 
due to a sharp increase in oil prices and the government‘s injection of a lot of oil 
dollars into the economy, which led to an increase in these two items. 
Column 7 shows the ratio of the deposits to liquidity at the current price. This ratio 
was much better than in the early years. As we can see in Table 6.5 this ratio was 
71.14% and continued to grow during the years 1962-1978, reaching 98% in 1976, 
but it decreased to 68.84% in 1978. This reduction was due to demonstrations in 
support of the Islamic Revolution. At that time banks, as examples of non Islamic 
institutes, were attacked by people who did not believe in them. The growth rate 
during this period was very slow and with fluctuation. The average growth rate was 
1.55% during the years 1962-1978.  
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Table 6.5: Deposits and GDP at the Current Prices, Liquidity, the Ratio of 
Deposits to the GDP and Liquidity and their Growth Rates during 1962-1978.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
.                                                               (Iranian Rials Billion and Percentage ) 
 
Year D CU P 
 
   GDP 
      
     M2 
      
D CU P/ 
  GDP 
 
GR*  % 
 
D CU P/ 
 M2 
 
G R* % 
 
1962 48.8 342.00 68.6 14.27 --------- 71.14 ---------- 
1963 58.9 356.00 81.5 16.54 15.9 72.27 1.59 
1964 68.2 388.00 92.3 19.21 15.76 73.89 2.24 
1965 80.1 441.00 105.5 18.16 -5.02 75.92 2.75 
1966 93.3 476.00 120.7 19.6 5.94 76.47 0.72 
1967 113.5 528.00 144.3 21.5 9.69 78.66 2.86 
1968 141.2 599.00 175.3 23.57 5.1 80.55 2.4 
1969 168.6 672.00 205.7 25.09 6.45 81.96 1.75 
1970 194.8 751.00 235.7 25.94 3.39 82.65 0.82 
1971 246.8 941.00 269.3 26.23 1.12 91.64 10.86 
1972 333 1169.00 400 28.49 8.62 83.25 13.61 
1973 429.4 1707.00 515.8 25.15 -13.16 83.25 0.0 
1974 678.9 2962.00 810.1 22.92 -8.87 83.8 0.66 
1975 963.3 3268.00 1145.5 29.48 28.62 84.09 0.35 
1976 1344.3 4391.00 1371.7 30.61 3.83 98 16.54 
1977 1771.5 5111.00 2097 34.66 13.23 84.48 -13.82 
1978 1775.1 4987.00 2578.6 35.59 2.68 68.84 -18.51 
average ---------- --------- ---------- 24.53 5.83 80.64 1.55 
Sources: 1- Economic Statistic Office of Central Bank and its Reports and Balance Sheets for years 
1989-2002. 
D CU P = Deposits at the current Prices.      GDP = Gross Domestic product.       M2 = Liquidity 
G R =Growth Rate.      *Calculated by researcher 
6.4.2 Deposits and Credits Trend after the Islamic Revolution (1979-88) 
6.4.2.1 Deposits and credits trend 
The first decade after the Islamic revolution was extremely difficult because of a lack 
of discipline and some tribal and ethnic intrigues in some parts of the country such as 
Kordestan, Azarbaijan, Torkamanistan and so on during the first two years and the 
eight-year war which was started by Saddam Hussein against the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. So in those ten years the economy was a war economy and the situation was 
unusual. Therefore, this period requires special analysis which is not related to our 
subject, although a brief review of the trend of deposit and credit facilities for this 
period would be useful. Table 6.5 illustrates the trends. 
As Table 6.6 shows, in the first year after the Islamic Revolution deposits increased 
significantly at both current and constant prices. Deposits at the current price 
increased from Iranian Rials 1,771.5 billion in 1978 to Iranian Rials 2,622.1 billion in 
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1979 which shows a growth rate of 47.1%. Also deposits in the constant 2004 price 
increased from Iranian Rials 186852.63 billion in 1978 to Iranian Rials 247367.92 
billion in 1979 which shows a growth rate of 32.39%. When one considers that people 
were very hostile toward banks during their struggle against the Shah‘s Regime in 
1977-8 and attacked them during their demonstrations, this increase becomes more 
meaningful. It could mean that there were a lot of people who did not believe in 
interest-based banks, but after the Islamic Revolution and the elimination of riba by 
the Revolutionary Council, the people began to trust the banks and to deposit their 
savings in them.   
Table 6.6: Deposits and Credit Facilities at the Current and Constant 2004 
Prices and their Growth Rate (percent) of Private Sector    (Iranian Rials Billion) 
year CPI D CU P G R* 
% 
D CO P* G R* 
% 
C CU P G R* 
% 
C CO P* G R* 
% 
1979 1.06 2622.1 47.6 247367.92 32.39 2577.4 17.2 243150.94 5 
1980 1.31 3276.9 25 250145.04 1.12 3060.4 18.7 233618.32 -3.92 
1981 1.61 3828 16.8 237763.97 -4.95 3219.5 5.2 199968.94 -14.4 
1982 1.92 4733.1 23.6 246515.62 3.68 3484.9 8.2 181505.21 -9.23 
1983 2.20 5600.6 18.3 254572.72 3.27 4256.6 22.1 193481.81 6.6 
1984 2.43 5918.3 5.7 243551.44 -4.33 4500.7 5.7 185213.99 -4.27 
1985 2.60 6825.8 15.3 262530.77 7.79 5081.9 12.9 195457.69 5.53 
1986 3.21 8080.2 18.4 251719.63 -4.12 5578.4 9.8 173781.93 -11.09 
1987 4.10 9685.6 19.9 236234.15 -6.15 6348.5 13.8 154841.46 -10.9 
1988 5.29 12242 26.4 231417.77 -2.04 7479.2 17.8 141383.74 -8.7 
average ------ 6281.3 21.7 246182.5 2.67 4558.75 13.14 190240.4 -4.54 
Source: Economic Statistic Office of Central Bank and its Reports and Balance Sheets. 
CPI=customer price index.                    D CU P = Deposits at the current Prices. 
D CO P = Deposits at the constant Prices.   C CU P = Credit at the current Prices. 
C CO P = Credit at the constant Prices.        G R = Growth rate.   * Calculated by researcher 
Although, credits increased after the Revolution, their increase was not as much as 
deposits. Credit at the current price increased from Iranian Rials 2,199 billion in 1978 
to Iranian Rials 2,577.4 billion in 1979 which shows a growth rate of 17.5%. At the 
constant 2004 price, the credit increased from Iranian Rials 231,473.68 billion in 1978 
to Iranian Rials 243,150.94 billion in 1979 which shows a growth rate of just 5%. In 
that decade there was a negative growth rate in credit at the constant 2004 price for 
most years (-3.92%, -14.4% , -9.23%, -4.27%, -11.09%, -10.9% and -8.7% for 1980, 
1981, 1982, 1984, 1986,1987, and 1988 respectively). This could be due to several 
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factors which could have affected the demand for credit or could have limited credit.  
The first was the war between Iran and Iraq.  
During the war the country faced stagflation which is stagnation with inflation. 
Stagnation causes a decrease in investment which leads to a decease in demand for 
credit on the one hand and inflation causes decreasing real value of credits which, 
despite an increase in nominal amounts, in terms of real value shows a decrease. 
Another reason which is related to the war is government expenditure with regard to 
war expenses. A lot of credit was allocated to war expenditure by the government 
which was covered by bank borrowing. Secondly, there was a kind of fluctuation and 
uncertainty which is usually seen in revolutions. 
6.4.2.2 Ratio of deposits to GDP and liquidity 
Table 6.7 shows the ratio of deposits to GDP and liquidity and their growth rates 
during 1979-1988. This period is an important part of Iran‘s history in recent centuries 
when its political system completely changed. In addition, as mentioned before, a lot 
of unsuccessful armed movement revolt took place and less than two years after the 
Islamic Revolution a destructive war was started by Saddam Hussein against the 
Islamic Republic of Iran which lasted about eight years.  So despite the importance of 
this part of Iran‘s history, the country‘s economic performance was not satisfactory. 
Of course, regarding banking activities the situation is different because, after the 
Islamic Revolution religious people, who did not accept conventional banks, started to 
work with banks when riba was eliminated. As we can see in Table 6.8 a considerable 
increase occurred in the growth rate of the ratio of deposits to GDP in the year after 
the victory of the Islamic Revolution and went from -2.02% in 1979 to 41.53% in 
1980. Of course, it is worth mentioning that all of this increase in growth rate is not 
only due to an increase in deposits, but also to a decrease in GDP in that year. GDP 
decreased from Iranian Rials 7,521 billion in 1979 to Iranian Rials 6,641 billion in 
1980.  After the war there were some fluctuations regarding the process of the ratio, 
but in overall the movement was increasing. At the end of this period the ratio reached 
from 34.864% in 1979 to 62.478% in 1988 and its average during those years was 
49.055%.                   
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The trend of the ratio of deposits to liquidity was not as much as the ratio of deposits 
to GDP. The reason mainly was increase in liquidity. During these years, the 
government continually increased liquidity in order to cover the war expenses. For 
example, in 1980, 1984 and 1986, despite an increase in deposits, the growth rate of 
ratio of deposits to liquidity was negative. In these years the growth rates were -
1.588%, -0.329% and -0.617% respectively. However, the trend was positive and the 
ratio went from 73.9% in 1979 to 78% in 1988. 
Table 6.7: Deposits and GDP at the Current Prices, Liquidity, the Ratio of 
Deposits to the GDP and Liquidity and their Growth Rates during 1979-1988.                                                                                         
.                                                                                    (Iranian Rials Billion) 
 
Year D CU P    GDP      M2 (D CU P/ 
GDP)% * 
GR*  
% 
(D CU P/ 
M2)   %* 
G R* 
% 
1979 2622.1 7521 3550 34.864 -2.04 73.861972 7.295 
1980 3276.9 6641 4508.1 49.343 41.53 72.68916 -1.588 
1981 3828 7396 5236.1 51.758 4.894 73.107847 0.576 
1982 4733.1 10807 6430.7 43.797 -15.381 73.60163 0.675 
1983 5600.6 13075 7514.4 42.834 2.199 74.531566 1.263 
1984 5918.3 13675 7966.9 43 1.037 74.286109 -0.329 
1985 6825.8 13838 9002.1 49.326 13.975 75.82453 2.071 
1986 8080.2 14468 10722.6 55.849 13.224 75.356723 -0.617 
1987 9685.6 16902 12668.2 57.304 2.605 76.456008 1.459 
1988 12242 19594 15687.6 62.478 9.029 78.036 2.066 
Average ---------- ---------- ----------- 49.055 7.107 74.775 1.287 
Sources: 1- Economic Statistic Office of Central Bank and its Reports and Balance Sheets for  years 
1989-2002. 
D CU P = Deposits at the current Prices.               M2 = Liquidity. 
GDP = Gross Domestic product.                    G R =Growth Rate. 
*Calculated by researcher. 
6.4.3 Deposit and Credit Trends following the Islamic Revolution (1989-2006) 
6.4.3.1 Deposit trends 
In 1989, the war between Iran and Iraq officially ended and Iran started to be rebuilt, 
especially the cities which had been damaged or destroyed by the Iraqi army. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, the First Economic, Social and Cultural Development 
Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran started in that year, President Hashemi 
Rafsanjani‘s cabinet, started a vast range of rebuilding in all parts of the country. For 
this purpose, an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy was put in place. In this new 
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situation the banking system was able to play an important role in economic 
development, so this period is the main period discussed in this research. 
As Table 6.8 shows, in 1989 the banking system was able to mobilise 15,108.5 billion 
Iranian Rials at the current price and 243,290.08 billion Rials at the constant 2004 
price. The growth rate of deposits in that year was 23.4% and 5.13% at the current 
price and constant price respectively. It is worth mentioning that there was a relatively 
high fluctuation in constant price deposits. For example, while there was a positive 
trend in the growth rate of current price deposits, the growth rate of constant price 
deposits was negative in several years and very low in some years. 
Table 6.8: Deposits and Credit Facilities at the Current and Constant 2004 
Prices and their Growth Rate (percent) of Private Sector.            (Iranian Rials 
Billion) 
 
Year CPI D CU P G R*% D CO P* G R*% C CU P G R*% C CO P* G R*% 
1989  6.21 15108.5 23.4 243290.08 5.13      9696.5 29.7 156143.32 10.44 
1990 6.77 18850.2 24.8 278437.22 14.45     13156.9 35.7 194341.21 24.46 
1991 8.17 24148.5 28 295575.27 6.16     18297.3 39.1 223957.16 30.68 
1992 10.17 30506.7 23 299967.55 1.49     23589.8 28.9 231954.77 3.57 
1993 12.48 41303 35.4 330953.53 1.03     30775.6  30.5  246599.36 6.31 
1994 16.88 53148.2 28.7 314859 -4.86     36447.2  18.4 215919.43 -12.44 
1995 25.21 74339.2 39.9 294879.81 -6.34     38779.9  6.4 183827.45 -14.86 
1996 31.07 103336.5 39 332592.53 12.79     50312.6  29.7 161933.05 -11.91 
1997 36.44 118906 15.1 326306.26 -1.89     59362.3  18 162904.23 0.6 
1998 43.03 141628.4 19.1 329138.74 0.87     76353.2  28.6 177441.76 8.92 
1999 51.68 170569.9 20.4 330050.12 0.27    108123.9  41.6 209218.07 17.91 
2000 58.20 223952 31.3 384797.77 16.59    142909.9 32.17 245550 17.37 
2001 64.83 291769 30.28 450051.67 16.96    192710.7 34.85 297255 21.1 
2002 75.06 382744 31.18 509917.4 13.3    265070.3 37.55 353145 18.8 
2003 86.79 487864 27.46 562120.1 10.24    372868.2 40.68 429621 21.66 
2004 100 641095 31.41 641095 14.05    515287.9 38.2 515288 19.94 
2005 110.35 870344 35.76 788712.28 23.03    722046.7 40.12 654324 26.98 
2006 123.45 1222748 40.49 990480.36 25.58    1023029 41.68 828699 26.65 
Average ------- 272908.94 29.15 427956.93 8.45    205489.88 31.77 304895.7 12.01 
 
Sources: 1- Economic Statistics Office of Central Bank and its Reports and Balance Sheets for years 
1989-2002. 
2- Performance of Iran‘s banking system during years 2005 and 2006 for 2003-2006. 
CPI= Customer Price Index  
D CU P = Deposits at the current prices.                    D CO P = Deposits at the constant prices. 
C CU P = Credit at the current prices.                        C CO P = Credit at the constant prices. 
G R = Growth rate                                             * Calculation of the researcher 
As can be seen in Table 6.8 the growth rates in 1998 and 1999 were just 0.87% and 
0.27% respectively and were negative in 1994, 1995 and 1997. From 2000 until 2006 
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an acceptable increase in both current and constant price deposits took place. The 
main reason for the low or negative growth rate in 1992-1995 was the high inflation 
rate which caused the constant price figures to fall. For instance, the inflation rate in 
those years was 24.5%, 22.71%, 35.26% and 49.35% respectively. For 1997-1999, the 
reason was different. In that period, in addition to the inflation rate, there was a 
reduction in the growth rate of current price deposits. As Table 6.3 indicates their 
growth rate decreased from 39% to 15.1% in 1997. Consequently, the growth rate of 
constant price deposits decreased from 12.79% in 1996 to -1.89% in 1997 and 
increased to 0.87% and 0.27% in 1998 and 1999 respectively.  
President Hashemi Rafsanjani‘s economic team (especially Dr Noor Bakhsh and Dr 
Adeli) believed in liberalization of the economy and Kuznets theory which suggests 
that in the first stages of economic development increased inequality should be 
accepted because in the following stages inequality will automatically decrease. 
Despite the rejection of this theory in Iran by several research projects which were 
carried out in Iranian universities during President Hashemi Rafsanjani‘s era, this 
thought was dominant in Iran‘s economy. As a consequence, Iran‘s economy faced a 
high inflation rate which led to economic pressure on the poor.  
President Rafsanjani thought his most important duty was to rebuild that which had 
been damaged during the war and also erase the backwardness of the other parts of the 
country. Despite his belief in economic and social justice, he said that it was a time 
not to think about justice but about our duty to the future. He and his economic team 
believed that thinking about income distribution meant thinking about poverty 
distribution. He believed we should create wealth first and then think about its 
distribution, so he started rebuilding and executing expansionary policies. The main 
problem was twofold. First, he did not determine how many years would be needed to 
redistribute income and decrease inequality. Second, he did not consider carefully the 
endurance of the people. Contrary to so much of the work done by President 
Rafsanjani, like the rebuilding of many cities and villages and the strengthening of the 
economy, the consequence was that the majority of people were dissatisfied by the 
end of his time. 
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Figure 6.8 Deposits and Credits at the Current and Constant Prices 2004 during 
1961-2006 
 
 
Source: Tables 6.4, 6.6 and 6.8. 
D CU P = Deposits at the current Prices.     D CO P = Deposits at the constant Prices.  
C CU P = Credit at the current Prices.       C CO P = Credit at the constant Prices. 
There were some economists who believed that Kuznetz‘s hypothesis was not suitable 
for Iran. They argued about human capital and its role and contribution to the 
economic development which suffered from inequality and poverty. Also, some 
Islamic scholars disagreed with President Rafsanjani‘s economic and cultural policies. 
They articulated the idea of economic justice, especially with regard to the Islamic 
point of view which emphasizes justice. President Rafsanjani was very strong in 
speaking and rationalising, so he usually convinced criticisers that there was no other 
way to build the country quickly. During these discussions Ayatollah Khamenei 
intervened and asked President Rafsanjani to modify the Second and Third Economic, 
Social and Cultural Development Plans in favour of justice and the poor. In this 
regard a working party, including some ministers and members of parliament was 
formed to try to modify the two plans. Due to these adjustments, despite huge 
investment in that period in the economic substructures (such as electricity, ports, 
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highways, railways, etc) and the existence of high inflation which was caused by 
expansionary policies and increase of liquidity having a negative effect on the poor, 
those living below the poverty line decreased from 47% in 1979 to 21% in 1997. 
There was one important political change in Iran in 1997 which strongly affected the 
economy. In that year president Sayyed Mohammad Khatami was selected as 
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. His team, who were known as reformists, 
did not believe that economic activities were a priority for the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. They concentrated on political development much more than economic 
development. Some of them even openly stated that Iran‘s problems were not 
economic but political. Despite economic problems, such as inflation and 
unemployment, they really neglected economic problems for the first three years. The 
consequence of their policy in mobilisation of monetary resources which led to a 
decrease in the deposit growth rate can be seen in Table 6.6. The growth rate of 
deposits at the constant prices for years 1997-1999 was -1.89%, 0.84% and 0.24% 
respectively. However, during1989-2006, average deposits were 272,908.94 billion 
Rials and 427,956.93 billion Rials at current and constant prices respectively.  
In comparison with the 1961-1978 period Tables 6.4 and 6.6 show that, on average, 
yearly nominal deposits after the Islamic Revolution and the implementation of the 
Islamic banking system in Iran (between 1989-2006) were 575 times more than those 
of the 1961-1978 periods. Even in terms of real value the average deposits mobilised 
at the constant price during 1989-2006 were 5.54 times more than the 1961-1978 
period. Thus, in terms of mobilization of resources, Iran moved toward becoming a 
modern economy. The difference can be clearly seen in Figures 6.8 and 6.9. 
In conclusion, in a comparative discussion, it could be said that the interest-free 
banking system was more successful than the interest-based banking system in 
mobilising and allocating monetary resources and consequently in the contribution to 
economic development. Of course, to be more accurate it is necessary to consider 
some effective factors which are assumed to be constant but which are not, such as 
GDP and liquidity. 
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Figure 6.9. Trend of Deposits and Credits at the Current and Constant 2004 
Prices during 1961-2006  
 
Source: Tables 6.4, 6.6 and 6.8. 
d cu p = Deposits at the current Price.            d co p = Deposits at the constant Price. 
c cu p = Credit at the current Price.                c co p = Credit at the constant Price. 
6.4.3.2 Ratio of deposits to GDP and liquidity 
Table 6.9 shows the trend of the ratio of deposits to GDP and liquidity at the current 
prices during the 1989-2006. As this table shows, the ratio of deposits to GDP at the 
current prices went from 35.59% in 1978 to 60.24% in 1989. This means that during 
the years 1979-1988 on average this ratio grew 2.5% per year but after that there were 
several years of negative growth rate. For instance, during the years 1990-1995 the 
growth rate of ratio of deposits to GDP was negative. Of course, the reason may be 
the relatively sharp increase in nominal GDP and inflation. During these years 
deposits experienced a relatively high growth rate. In 1990-1995, the deposit growth 
rate was 25.77%, 28.11%, 26.33%, 35.39%, 28.38% and 39.89% respectively. During 
the same period nominal GDP growth rate was 37.59%, 45.35%, 33.19%, 55.23%, 
31.61% and 42.82% respectively. 
It is worth mentioning here that in those years the country experienced its highest 
inflation rate which was not related to the Islamic banking policy or its nature, but 
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instead was related to the expansionary monetary and fiscal policies made by the 
government for rebuilding war damaged and under-developed areas which was one of 
the Islamic Revolution‘s goals. However, the inflation rate during the years 1990-
1997 was: 9%, 20.68%, 24.48%, 22.71%, 37%, 49%, 23% and 17% respectively and 
increased from 9% in 1990 to 49% in 1995
33
. 
 
Table 6.9: Deposits and GDP at the Current Prices, Liquidity, the Ratio of 
Deposits to GDP and Liquidity and their Growth Rates (1989-2006)    
                                                                  (Iranian Rials Billion)  
                                                                                   
year D CU P 
 
GDP      
 
     M2 
 
(D CUP/ 
GDP)%* 
G R* 
% 
(D CUP/ 
M2) %* 
G R* 
% 
1989 15108.5 25079 18753.3 60.24 ---------- 80.56 ---------- 
1990 18850.2 34506 22969.5 54.63 -9.31 82.07 1.87 
1991 24148.5 48428 28628.4 49.87 -8.71 84.35 2.78 
1992 30506.7 64502 35866 47.3 -5.15 85.06 0.84 
1993 41303 100124 48135 41.25 -12.79 85.81 0.88 
1994 53148.2 131771 61843.9 40.33 -2.23 85.94 0.15 
1995 74339.2 188184 85072.2 39.5 -2.06 87.38 1.67 
1996 103337 248972 116552.5 41.5 5.06 88.66 1.46 
1997 118906 291769 134286.3 40.75 1.81 85.89 -3.12 
1998 141628 328522 160401.5 43.11 5.79 88.3 1.2 
1999 170570 434385 192689.2 39.27 -8.91 88.52 0.25 
2000 223952 576493 249110.7 38.85 -1.07 89.9 1.56 
2001 291769 664620 320957.2 43.9 13 90.91 1.12 
2002 382744 917035 417524 41.74 4.92 91.67 0.84 
2003 487864 1095303 526596.4 44.54 6.71 92.64 1.06 
2004 641095 1384819 685867.2 46.29 3.93 93.47 0.09 
2005 870344 1691814 921019.4 51.44 11.13 94.5 1.1 
2006 1222748 2038432 1284199.4 59.98 16.6 95.21 0.75 
Average --------- --------- ---------- 45.805 1.1 88.84 0.85 
 
Sources: 1- Economic Statistic Office of Central Bank and its Reports and Balance Sheets for years 
1989-2002.                                 
2- Performance of Iran‘s banking system during years 2005 - 2006 for years 2003-2006. 
D CU P = Deposits at the current Prices.                
* Calculated by researcher    
In comparison with the 1962-1978 period, as we can see in Tables 6.5, 6.7, and 6.9, 
and also in Figure 6.10, the performance of the banking system during the years 1979-
1988 and 1989-2006 was relatively satisfactory because, despite there being 35 
                                                 
33
 Calculated from Table 6.8. 
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domestic and foreign banks at that time, the average ratio of deposits to GDP was 
24.53%, while during years 1979-1988 and 1989-2006 it was 49% and 45.8% 
respectively which shows an increase of about 100%. However, regarding the ratio of 
deposits to liquidity the average ratio for 1962-1978, 1979-1988 and 1989-2006 was 
1.55%, 1.287% and 0.88%. The reason for the low ratio during those years, especially 
the 1989-2006 period was probably a high growth rate of liquidity and depositing 
behaviour of people which is somewhere steady and do not respond to shocks rapidly. 
In addition, encouragement of consumerism culture even by government can be 
counted as one reason. 
Figure 6.10. Ratio of deposits to GDP and liquidity
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Source: Tables 6.5, 6.7 and 6.9. 
6.4.3.3 Sight deposits (current accounts) 
Sight deposits (current accounts) are used mainly for facilitating exchange activities 
and usually no interest rate is charged. The account holders do not think about 
revenue in these accounts so they are highly profitable for the banks which are able to 
use the deposits for profitable projects. From an economic development perspective 
they are similar to short-term investment deposits which depositors can withdraw in 
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the short term. So the banking system should be careful in their usage of long-term 
credit facilities. 
Long term investment deposits in the Iranian banking system, range from one year 
investment deposits to five years. These deposits are more suitable for financing long-
term projects and therefore are more useful for economic development. The 
profitability of these deposits differs according to the duration. There are two reasons 
for this difference. First: the ability of the bank to allocate these deposits to long term 
projects which may be more profitable. Second: discount given by banks on their 
lawyer‘s fee for these deposits. In Islamic banking in Iran, the bank is the agent of the 
depositor therefore they get a lawyer‘s fee from the depositor. The amount is 
determined in their contract. In order to encourage people to make long-term deposits, 
the banks are able to discount their lawyer‘s fee for this type of deposit. 
Qardh-Al-Hasanah deposits are like sight deposits without profit, but are different in 
the motives of depositors. As mentioned before, while the motive of depositors in 
sight deposits is to facilitate exchange activities, it is benevolence and charity in 
Qardh-Al-Hasanah in that the interest does not go to the account holder.  
As Table 6.10 shows, in 1989 the share of sight deposits was greater than that of total 
deposits, followed by short term investment deposits, long term investment deposits 
and Qardh-Al-Hasanah, but the trend was to the benefit of long term investment 
Deposits which are very effective for increasing economic growth. The amount of 
sight deposits, short term investment deposits, long term investment deposits and 
Qardh-Al-Hasanah  was 5,342.4, 5,245.2, 2761.6 and 1,280.6 billion rials 
respectively in 1989, but this amount reached 353,093.3, 353,666.8, 353433.7 and 
133,522.4 billion rials respectively in 2006. This shows that short term investment 
deposits occupied first place and then long term investment deposits, sight deposits 
and Qardh-Al-Hasanah respectively. The average amount and growth rate of long 
term investment deposits was more than other deposits during the period under 
review. This change is to the benefit of economic development. 
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Table 6.10: Sight Deposits and Non-Sight Deposits at the Current Prices and 
their Growth Rate (1989-2006)                                           (Iranian Rials Billion) 
 
Year Sight 
Deposit 
G R* S I D G R* L I D G R* Q H         G R* 
Other D 
G R* N P b & 
N B C I 
G R* 
1989 5342.40 _____ 5245.20 _____ 2761.60 _____ 1280.60 _____ 478.70 _____ _____ ____ 
1990 7075.90 32.45 5945.10 13.34 3749.60 35.78 1392.30 8.72 687.30 43.58 _____ ____ 
1991 9060.90 28.05 6809.90 14.55 4929.70 31.47 1868.60 34.21 1379.40 100.70 _____ ____ 
1002 11009.30 21.5 8115.80 19.18 6530.90 32.48 2441.00 30.63 2409.70 74.69 ______ ____ 
1993 15580.70 41.52 10303.90 26.96 8748.80 33.96 2683.10 9.92 3986.50 65.43 ______ ____ 
1994 21731.20 39.47 12084.30 17.28 10432.60 19.25 3494.70 30.25 5400.50 35.47 ______ ____ 
1995 30294.30 39.4 15033.30 24.40 13383.60 32.29 4616.30 32.09 11071.70 105.01 ______ ____ 
1996 43055.80 42.12 19051.10 26.73 16796.00 25.5 6039.10 30.82 18394.50 66.14 ______ ____ 
1997 47923.50 11.3 24289.70 27.50 22814.10 35.83 8693.20 43.95 15185.60 -17.44 ______ ____ 
1998 56011.30 16.88 32046.00 31.93 30383.10 33.18 12420.00 42.87 10768.00 -29.09 ______ ____ 
1999 64631.70 15.39 39564.00 23.46 39968.00 31.55 16296.00 31.20 10110.20 -6.12 206.0 ____ 
2000 89262.20 38.11 50442.80 27.50 52920.80 32.41 22014.40 35.09 9312.20 -7.89 437.1 112.18 
2001 113768.0 27.44 66983.00 32.79 74083.50 39.99 29847.50 35.58 7086.60 -56.88 1093.3 150.13 
2002 147872.6 29.98 88452.60 32.05 97409.80 31.49 38108.00 27.67 10900.90 53.82 3990.5 265  
2003 178624.3 20.74 119809.0 34.45 131929.2 35.44 45706.00 19.94 11795.40 8.20 17175.5 330.41 
2004 208043.1 16.47 159867.9 33.43 189281.4 43.47 69806.20 52.73 14096.60 19.51 48607.8 183.01 
2005 267243.8 28.45 223291.6 39.67 266401.6 40.74 93230.10 33.55 20176.70 43.13 104086.3 114.13 
2006 353093.3 32.12 353666.8 58.39 353433.7 32.67 133522.4 43.22 29031.60 43.89 163946.1 57.51 
Average* 19616.29 28.32 68944.56 28.45 73664.33 33.38 27414.42 31.91 10126.23 31.89 42442.83 173.2 
Sources: 1- Economic Statistics Office of Central Bank  
2- Reports and balance sheets Iranian Central Bank (Bank Markazi) for different  years  
S I D = Short Term Investment Deposits 
L I D = Long Term Investment Deposits 
Q H = Qardh-Al-Hasanah    
Other D = other Deposits 
N P b & N B C I = Non public banks and Non- bank credit institutions  
* Calculated by researcher 
It should be noted that one change in the Iranian Banking system took place in 1999. 
In that year, private banks and non-bank credit institutions were established. As can 
be seen in Table 6.10, these banks received just 206 billion Iranian Rials in deposits in 
1999, but their growth rate was very fast. For instance, their deposits reached 
163,946.1 billion Iranian Rials in 2006 and their average growth rate was 173.2% 
during 1999-2006. However, private banks can play an important role in economic 
development. 
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Private banks in the Islamic Republic of Iran brought with them a new culture of 
behaviour with clients. They respected their customers more than state-owned banks 
and also paid more profit to depositors because they did not face some of the 
restrictions faced by state-owned banks. In general there are several factors which can 
affect the success of private banks in Iran compared with state-owned banks which 
can lead to the expansion of private banks including: 
a) Being New: Because they are new, they can employ more educated and efficient 
staff and they are also able to employ according to their needs. They do not have 
many branches because that would increase their costs. For example, the numbers of 
their branches are between 80 and 90. Pasargahad, Eqtesade Noawin and Parsiyan 
have 210,225 and 200 branches respectively. 
b) Freedom of Managers in Decision Making: While private banks are free to use 
their sources wherever they want, in contrast, state-owned banks cannot do that. There 
are two kinds of contract in Islamic banking: Barter or exchange contracts and 
partnership contracts. In barter contracts, such as joaalah, salam and ijarah, the profit 
rate can be determined in advance. In contrast, in partnership contracts this rate cannot 
be determined in advance, only the expected minimum profit rate can be determined.   
The Iranian Money and Credit Council usually determines a minimum and maximum 
range of profit rate for state-owned banks but recommends that  private banks do not 
exceed these rates by more than 2%. It is worth mentioning that these rates are fixed 
for barter contracts and expectable minimum profit rate for partnership contracts. 
During periods of inflation, when the inflation rate is, for example, 25% a financial 
facility with 12% is not only free but is also subsidized. Furthermore, in this situation, 
people should not be expected to repay their debts, because even after paying a 
penalty the rate becomes 18% which is lower than the rate of inflation.  
Consequently, private banks have shifted from barter contracts to partnership 
contracts for which the rate of profit depends on the real profit in the economy. In 
contrast, state-owned banks have not been allowed to do that so their profit rate is 
much lower than that of private banks on one hand and their delayed claims are higher 
than private banks on the other hand.  
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c) Motivation: Motivation among private bank staff, especially in high-level 
management, is much higher than in government-owned banks because they are 
encouraged by high profits. Also, salaries in private banks are higher than in state-
owned banks.  
d) Evaluation: Evaluation in government-owned banks is very slow. It takes a long 
time to recognize that special banks or banking systems in general have not been 
successful or have weaknesses. In contrast, in private banks, this is discovered very 
quickly because private banks have an annual general meeting at which they have to 
report their financial operations, including profit and loss. Moreover, in some banks 
such as: Eqtesade Noawin (New Economy), Kar Afarin (Work Creator), Saman, 
Parsiyan (Persians) and Sarmayeh (Capital), their major shareholders are members of 
the directorate so they are made aware of the financial operations on a weekly basis. 
According to this information they are able to control operations very quickly and 
easily. 
e)  Progressiveness: Private banks are frontrunners in many aspects, especially in 
electronic banking; and due to their efficiency they have better opportunities to grow. 
f) Quickness in decision making: Private banks are speedier than state-owned banks. 
For example, decision making for a purchase may take two days in private banks, 
while, it may take more than one month in state-owned banks, due to heavy 
bureaucracy. 
6.4.3.4 Trend of credit facilities 
The allocation of resources to all economic sectors was 9,697.5 billion Rials at the 
current price and 156,143.32 billion Rials at the constant 2004 price in 1989. It 
reached 1,023,026 billion Rials at the current price and 828,699.1 billion Rials at the 
constant price in 2006. The average at the current and constant prices during 1989-
2006 were 205,489.88 billion Rials and 304,895.66 billion Rials respectively. The 
maximum increase at the current price was in 2006 when it reached 41.68% and the 
minimum was in 1995 when the growth rate was just 6.4%. In terms of constant 
prices, the maximum and minimum were in 1991 and1995 which amounted to 
30.68% and -14.86% respectively. 
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In comparison with the 1961-1978 periods, the average amount of allocated resources 
at the current and constant prices during the 1979-2006 period was 247.48 times and 
2.98 times more than those of the 1961-1978 period respectively. By combining 
Tables 6.6 and 6.8 it can be seen that, the growth rate of resource allocation at the 
constant prices during 1994-1997 was negative or very small (0.6%). The reason 
could be the high inflation rate which would affect the values at the constant prices on 
one hand and decrease of nominal credit growth rate on the other hand. As can be 
calculated from the second column, the inflation rates for 1994-1997 were 37%, 49%, 
23% and 17% respectively. 
 
 Table 6.11: Allocation of Resources to the Economic Sectors (Services and 
Agriculture) by Banking System (1989-2006)                    (Iranian Rials Billion)                                                                                         
Year T F Serv Share* G R* % AG Share* G R*% 
1989 9697.5 1971.8 20.3331 ----------- 1691.2 17.4395 ------------ 
1990 13156.9 2557.9 19.4415 -4.385 2133.8 16.2181 -7.0036 
1991 18183.3 3234.5 17.7872 -8.5348 2949.1 16.21873 0.0039 
1992 23465.7 3983.9 16.97538 -4.5372 3656.8 15.5816 -2.51 
1993 30574.8 5108.9 16.70951 -1.5662 4862.9 15.90493 2.0751 
1994 37719.8 6395.2 16.95449 1.4661 6041.5 16.01679 0.7033 
1995 38779.9 6735.4 17.36828 2.4406 7286.4 18.78911 17.3088 
1996 50312.6 8938.9 17.76672 2.2941 9586.8 19.05447 1.4123 
1997 59362.3 10839.6 18.26007 2.7768 12066 20.32603 6.6733 
1998 76353.2 14376.4 18.82881 3.1147 15157.2 19.85143 -2.3349 
1999 108123.9 22422.4 20.73862 10.1430 22621.9 20.9222 5.3939 
2000 142910 30765.3 21.52774 3.8195 29653.5 20.74977 -0.8241 
2001 192710.7 42438 22.02161 2.2941 37468 19.44262 -6.2996 
2002 265070.3 60893.9 23.97274 8.8601 50243.4 18.95475 -2.5093 
2003 372868.2 92758.6 24.9 3.8680 63061.7 16.9 -10.8403 
2004 515287.9 138805.3 26.9374 8.1715 82763.8 16.0617 -4.96 
2005 722046.7 212952.1 29.4928 9.4864 112203.8 15.5397 -3.25 
2006 1023029 332426 32.4943 10.177 160192.4 15.6586 0.7651 
Average ------------ 55422.45 21.2506 2.9346 34646.68 17.7572 -0.3645 
Sources: 1- Economic Statistics Office of Central Bank  
2- Reports and balance sheets Iranian Central Bank (Bank Markazi) for different years  
T F = Total facilities          Serv= Services including trade      AG = Agriculture   G R = Growth rate 
*Calculated by writer                     Note: All shares and growth rates are in percent 
Although allocation of resources to all economic sectors positively affects economic 
development, some sectors are more important than others. This means that the 
banking system can play an important role in economic development through the 
allocation of resources to productive sectors rather than consumption sectors and also 
to more efficient projects rather than less efficient one. Tables 6.11 and 6.12 
demonstrate the quality of financing different economic sectors.  
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a) Services (including trade) 
From 1989 to 1996 allocation of resources to the service sector was showing a 
decreasing trend. As can be seen in Table 6.11 and Figure 6.11 the share of the 
facilities allocated to the services from total facilities was 20.33% in 1989 but it 
decreased to 17.7667% in 1996. In 1997 it increased to 18. 26% and continued to 
grow until it reached 32.49% in 2006. 
As Figure 6.12 shows, the growth rate in the share of services from allocation of 
resources in 1990-1993 was negative but in 1994 it became positive and this trend 
continued until the end of the period. The maximum share and growth rate was in 
2006 when it reached 32.4943% and 10.177% respectively and the minimum share 
and growth rate was in 1993 and 1991 respectively when the former was 16.70951% 
and the latter was –8.5348%. The average share and growth rate of total credit 
facilities allocated to service activities were, 55422.45 billion Rials, 21.25% and 
2.9346% respectively (Table 6.11).  
b) Agriculture  
After the Islamic Revolution in Iran agriculture was the main priority as it provided 
the population‘s basic needs and also the country did not have an industrial base. For 
this reason it would be expected to occupy a relatively considerable share of credit 
facilities for at least several years. In 1989 about 1691.2 billion Rials was allocated by 
the banking system to the agricultural sector which was 17.4395% of all credit 
facilities allocated to the economic sectors in that year. Despite a regular increase in 
the amount of credit allocated to this sector, its share in total credit facilities fluctuated 
and decreased from 17.4395% in 1989 to 15.6586% in 2006. The growth rate of its 
share in most years was negative. The average amount, share, and growth rate during 
the period under review was 34,646.68 billion Rials, 17.76% and -0.3645% 
respectively. However, this shows the orientation of the economy toward economic 
development.   
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c) Manufacturing and Mining 
Industry and manufacturing is a joint goal, not only for developing economies but also 
for developed ones. However, it is more important for developing countries to pay 
special attention to it so allocation of resources to this sector can play an important 
role in economic development. As Table 6.13 shows, the Islamic banking system in 
Iran allocated 2,027.6 billion Rials to this sector in 1989. It is worth mentioning that 
that was the first year of the Islamic Republic of Iran‘s Economic, Social and Cultural 
Plan which emphasized achieving a high growth rate. As industry is a vital factor in 
economic development and the banking system in Iran is largely owned and managed 
by the government, the financing of this sector would be expected to have a special 
place in the banking system. 
In the First Plan the attention paid to this sector by the banking system was more than 
other sectors. For example, the growth rate of credit facilities allocated for 1990, 1991 
and 1992 was 11.9554%, 13.70225% and 11.8206% respectively, This shows the 
highest rate, not only between other sectors during the period under consideration but 
also in its sector compared with other years. Of course one should note that these 
years were exceptional because after the end of the war between Iran and Iraq there 
were free capacities on the one hand and there was a strong national will to rebuild the 
war damages on the other hand. Even President Hashemi Rafsanjani‘s motto was that 
buildings demolished by the war had to be repaired. 
The growth rate of resources allocated to this sector decreased to 0.7917% in 1993 
and to -1.0367 in 1994. For the two years after this decrease, in the remaining two 
years President Rafsanjani was in power, the growth rate increased to 13.38% and 
4.6454%.  In 1997, a big change took place politically. In that year President Khatami 
was selected as Iran‘s President. In the first three years of his presidency, most 
economic indexes decreased, including GDP growth rate and growth rate of monetary 
resources allocated to the manufacturing and mining sectors. For instance, the growth 
rate of the share of credit facilities allocated to this sector was -8.5304%, -5.341%, 
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Table 6.12: Allocation of Resources to Economic Sectors (Mining & Industry and 
Housing & Building) by Banking System (1989-2006)           (Iranian Rials Billion) 
  
Year T F M&I Share* G R* H&B Share* G R* 
1989 9697.5 2027.6 20.9085 --------- 3219.6 33.2003 -------- 
1990 13156.9 3079.8 23.4082 11.9554 4036.8 30.682 -7.5852 
1991 18183.3 4839.6 26.61563 13.7022 5572.6 30.6468 -0.1147 
1992 23465.7 6984.7 29.76177 11.8206 6952.2 29.62329 -2.7683 
1993 30574.8 9171.4 29.9966 0.7917 8831.9 28.88621 -2.4885 
1994 37719.8 11197.7 29.68653 -1.0367 11590.6 30.72816 6.3766 
1995 38779.9 13052.7 33.65842 13.3794 11705.4 30.18419 -1.7703 
1996 50312.6 17721.1 35.22199 4.6454 14065.8 27.95681 -7.2793 
1997 59362.3 19125 32.21742 -8.5304 17331.7 29.19648 4.4372 
1998 76353.2 32385.2 30.49669 -5.341 23534.6 30.82333 5.5721 
1999 108123.9 30259.2 27.98567 -8.2337 32819.4 30.35251 -1.5275 
2000 142910 39913.9 27.93 -0.2 42266.9 29.58 -2.54 
2001 192710.7 58191.8 30.19646 8.11 54612.9 28.23932 -4.35 
2002 265070.3 81470.6 30.73547 1.785 72462.4 27.33705 -3.1951 
2003 372868.2 121267.4 32.52 5.81 94641.9 25.38 -7.16 
2004 515287.9 172642.3 33.504 -24.52 121082.5 23.498 -32.165 
2005 722046.7 228132.2 31.5952 -5.6972 168757.6 23.3721 -0.5358 
2006 1023029 291302.5 28.4745 -9.8771 239108.1 23.3726 0.0021 
Average --------- 63486.9 29.72 0.5 51810.7 28.5 -3.36 
Sources: 1- Economic Statistics Office of Central Bank  
2- Reports and balance sheets Iranian Central Bank (Bank Markazi) for different years  
T F = Total facilities 
AG = Agriculture 
M & I = Mining and Industry (manufacturing) 
H & B = Housing and Building 
G R = Growth rate 
Note: All shares and growth rates are in percent 
*Calculated by researcher 
-8.2337% and -19.4133% in 1997-2000 respectively and then it increased to 8.11% in 
2001. After this jump it again decreased and fell to 5.81% in 2003. This decrease 
continued relatively in the first year of President Ahmadi Nejad‘s period too and was 
1.5273%, -5.6972% and-9.877% for 2004-2006 respectively. The maximum share 
was in Rafsanjani‘s period, in 1996, when it was 35.22199%. It should be noted that 
every president who came to power made considerable changes. As mentioned before 
President Khatami‘s aides believed in political rather than economic change in the 
early years. President Ahmadi Nejad was concerned with economic justice and 
redistribution of asset and did not actually believe in economic mechanism. The main 
problem in Iran is a lack of strong parties with special plans to solve the economic, 
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Figure 6.11. Share of Economic Sectors from Financial Facilities during  
1989-2006 
 
Source: Tables 6.11 and 6.12 
S AG S F = Share of agricultural sector from financial facilities. 
S M& I S F = Share of manufacturing (industry) and mining sector from financial facilities. 
S H& B S F = Share of housing and construction sector from financial facilities. 
S SER S F = Share of service sector from financial facilities. 
social and cultural problems. Despite the democracy and regular elections in Iran, 
unfortunately, people have not been able to benefit much, because presidents are not 
usually members of a party which has studied the country‘s problems and their 
solutions before coming to power. Therefore, because of lack of experience, in the 
early years the new presidents caused some confusion and uncertainty in economic 
activities. 
d) Housing and Construction 
Housing and construction are relatively profitable productive activities in Iran. 
Therefore, there are some motives in banking system for financing this sector, but 
there are some fluctuations in this sector which sometimes lead to depreciation and 
also government policies which create some limitations upon the allocation of the 
resources to this sector by banking system.  
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Figure 6.12. Process of Share of Economic Sectors from Financial Facilities 
during 1989-2006 
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Source: Tables 6.11 and 6.12 
S AG S F = Share of agricultural sector from financial facilities 
S M& I S F = Share of manufacturing (industry) and mining sector from financial facilities 
S H& B S F = Share of housing and construction sector from financial facilities 
S SER S F = Share of service sector from financial facilities 
In the early years of the period under review the share of this sector from total credit 
facilities allocated to different economic sectors was the highest, but during that 
period it was reduced. As Table 6.12 shows, in 1989 its share was 33.2% but despite a 
regular increase in the absolute amount of facilities allocated to this sector, its share 
decreased fairly regularly and fell to 23.4% at the end of the period. The largest fall in 
growth rate among sectors was in this sector. In 13 years of the period the growth rate 
was negative. However, as mentioned before, the absolute amount of credit facilities 
allocated to this sector increased from 3,219.6 billion Rials in 1989 to 239,108.1 
billion Rials at the current price and from 51,845.41 billion Rials in 1989 to 
193,688.214 billion Rials at constant 2004 price. This means that the amount of credit 
facilities allocated to this sector at the current price in 2006 was 42 times more than 
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that in 1989. In constant terms, the amount of credit facilities allocated to this sector 
in 2006 was 3.74 times more than that in 1989.  
6.5. DIRECT INVESTMENT 
One important aspect of the contribution of the banking system in Iran to economic 
development is direct investment. The Islamic banking system in Iran has carried out 
thousands of projects directly. If not all, at least the vast majority of them were so 
huge that the private sector was not able to undertake them. They included: highways, 
railways,
34
 petrochemical industries, wood and paper industries, industrial farming 
and animal husbandry, automobile manufacture, the cement industry and so on. For 
example some of the projects are as follows:  
1- Tehran – Saveh highway, 113 Kilometres. 
2- Qazvin – Zanjan  highway, 189 Kilometres. 
3- Kashan- Natanz- Isfahan highway, 161 Kilometres. 
4- Zanjan-Bostan Abad highway, 255 Kilometres. 
5- Zanjan – Tabriz highway, 285 Kilometres. 
6- North – Mashhad , 70 Kilometres. 
7- Tabriz- Oroumieh and Esfahan- Shiraz highway, 340 Kilometres. 
8- Esfahan – Shiraz railway. 
9- Kerman cement 
10- Ardabil cement 
11-Sepahan cement 
12- Khazar cement 
13- Sharq (east) cement 
                                                 
34
 Banks achieve profit from their investment in public-sponsored projects such as highways and 
railways by getting charges from drivers who use them for several predetermined years. 
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14- Mazandaran wood and paper industry which created jobs for 6500 people directly 
and indirectly. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the aim of this chapter has been to discuss the contribution of Islamic 
banking to economic development in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard 
firstly the growth rate process of GDP, with and without oil, has been discussed and it 
has been shown that fluctuation in GDP with oil is more than it is without oil, 
reflecting the effect of oil on the fluctuation and instability of Iran‘s economy. The 
most important issue in the contribution of Islamic banking to economic development 
is the ability of the banking system to encourage people to save, to attract savings as 
deposits, and also to allocate deposits mainly to productive sectors. 
As the entire banking system in the Islamic Republic of Iran works according to the 
Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran and there are no branches of conventional banks 
in Iran to compare with, I had to compare the banking system in Iran after the Islamic 
Revolution as representative of Islamic banking with the banking system in Iran 
before the Islamic Revolution as representative of conventional banking. To make it 
fairer the ratio of deposits and financial facilities to GDP and liquidity has been 
considered. 
In comparison it could be said that the interest free banking system has been more 
successful than interest-based banking in the mobilisation and allocation of monetary 
resources in Iran. Despite there having been 35 domestic and foreign banks at that 
time, the average ratio of deposits to GDP was 24.53%, while during the years 1989-
2006 it was 45.8% which shows an increase of about 100%.  Also, the average 
amount of allocated resources at the current and constant prices during the 1979-2006 
period was 274.48 times and 2.98 times more than those of the 1961-1978 period 
respectively. In addition, the banking system injected a considerable amount into 
different sectors of the economy as credit, especially the manufacturing and mining 
sectors. These data show that the Islamic banking system in Iran has created 
opportunities for the major economic sectors to be developed. Furthermore, Islamic 
banking in the Islamic republic of Iran has financed directly a lot of huge projects in 
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all over the country and in different industries having an important role in both 
regional and overall economic development. 
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Chapter Seven: 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS (SHARIAH ASPECTS) 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Islamic banking in Iran was introduced in Chapter Three where we showed that all 
contracts which are used in banking activities are correct from the shariah point of 
view. In this chapter assurance of shariah-compliance from interviewees‘ point of 
view will be examined.  We should note that when we are talking about shariah- 
compliance, not only should contracts be appropriate for the projects but there are also 
many other factors to be considered. According to the Law of Usury-Free Banking in 
Iran, banks are the agents of the depositor and depositors allow banks to utilize their 
deposits for profitable projects. Furthermore, according to Islamic jurisprudence, an 
agent must be honest and do his/her best to protect his/her client‘s wealth. Hence, the 
banks are not only responsible for utilizing deposits for profitable projects but also for 
considering the honesty, capacity and ability of customers who apply for facilities. 
Therefore, we should note that considering these factors is also a condition of 
shariah-compliance. 
This chapter will provide a qualitative analysis of the interview questions regarding 
the aspect of shariah-compliance. The semi-structured interview has been chosen for 
the interview survey. Twelve managers and advisors from the Central Bank and 
commercial banks of the Islamic Republic of Iran were selected for face-to-face 
interviews. I was also fortunate enough to be able to interview a grand Ayatollah 
(Ayatollah Rezvani) who is known as ―the father of Islamic Banking in Iran‖. He was 
the representative of the late Imam Khomeini at the Central Bank of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran at the time of the planning and approval of the law of Usury-Free 
Banking in Iran. He is now a member of the Guardian Council in Iran. I needed a 
complementary interview to augment the data collection; therefore I went to Iran to 
conduct the interview. The collected data was analysed using thematic analysis and 
coding. 
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7.2 ENSURING THAT BANKING ACTIVITIES IN IRAN ARE SHARIAH-
COMPLIANT   
Table 7.1 shows the factors which are considered regarding ensuring Shariah- 
compliance according to the opinions of the interviewees 
 
Table 7.1: Results for Question 1 (Overview of Types of Subjects which should 
be Considered for Shariah-Compliance) 
 
Question1  How do banks ensure that the deposit and financing facilities they offer are 
shariah-compliant? 
Focused coding 
1 By considering and deliberating on the contract. 
2 By considering and deliberating on the speciality and experience of the client. 
3 By considering and deliberating on the clients honesty 
4 By considering and deliberating on the project profitability 
5 By supervising the process of the project execution to the end. 
6 By proper training of their staff. 
Theme Shariah-compliance is ensured in the Iranian Islamic banking system through 
considering and deliberating on the contract, speciality of the client, client‘s experience 
and honesty, project profitability, client‘s financial credit and supervising the process of 
the project execution to the end and proper training of their staff. 
The way in which banks ensure their activities are shariah-compliant was questioned 
and opinions of interviewees were coded. 
Table 7.2 shows the opinions of interviewees with regard to quality of ensuring that 
banking activities are shariah-compliant and considering and deliberating on the 
contract. 
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Table 7.2: Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 1 (Ways of Ensuring that 
Banking Activities are Shariah-Compliant) 
 
Considering and deliberating on the contract. 
Interviewee 1 By Central Bank through supervision bureau and inspectors  
Interviewee 2 Trusting in the Law of Interest-Free Banking in Iran and administration 
sector of the bank and random inspection by the Central Bank.  
Interviewee 3 Trusting in the Law of Interest-Free Banking in Iran, executive guide 
direction and instruction and bylaw and approval of the Guardian Council 
and banks‘ disciplinary boards. 
Interviewee 4 Trusting in the Law of Interest-Free Banking in Iran and approval of the 
law by the parliament and the Guardian Council and its approval by the 
late Imam Khomeini and the late Ayatollah Gholpayeghani and general 
supervision by people and the head of parliament. 
 
Interviewee 5 Checking by pillars of the credit of the banks and asking clients to bring 
documents after buying commodities. 
Interviewee 6 Some banks are not sensitive to this issue; they are just interested in 
making profit.  
Interviewee 7 Banks do not have enough authority, Central Bank makes their decisions 
for them and a supervision instrument is not clearly apparent and they 
looked at it optimistically. 
Interviewee 8 Branches administer projects and contracts directly and with skilled 
sectors, namely technical, financial and civil sectors. They have their 
specific duty regarding administering the project. 
Interviewee 9 By trusting clients and staff. 
Interviewee 10 By guiding in the direction which is in accordance with the Shariah. 
Interviewee 11 By defining a clear relationship between depositors and banks in the law 
and even determining the format which should be used for contracts. 
 
Interviewee 12 Yes, according to the law they have to consider them, and a few branches 
may not consider them. 
As can be seen in Table 7.2, the majority of interviewees believe that the authorities 
of the banking system in the Islamic Republic of Iran are able to make sure that 
banking activities are shariah-compliant by considering and deliberating on contracts. 
Only interviewee number six stated that some banks are not sensitive to this issue and 
they are only interested in making profit, interviewee number seven believes that 
banks do not have enough authority, the Central Bank makes decisions for them. In 
addition, there is no clear supervision instrument apparent in the law and banks 
looked at it optimistically. Interviewee number nine said that the banking system does 
not make any special effort to control contracts regarding shariah-compliant contracts 
and just depends on the clients and staff. Other interviewees refer to the following 
aspects:  
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First, regarding the contracts themselves they believe that contracts are shariah-
compliant because the Law of Interest-Free Banking in Iran was unanimously 
approved by Parliament and the Guardian Council. It was also confirmed by the late 
Imam Khomeini and the late Ayatollah Gholpayeghani, therefore there is no doubt 
regarding this matter.  
Second, according to the law all new contracts or executive guide directions or 
instructions and bylaws should be approved by the Guardian Council. In order to 
make the process easier, the Guardian Council appointed Ayatollah Rezvani as its 
representative, so banks check all new instruments with him. If he does not approve 
them they send them to the Guardian Council for deliberation. Furthermore, according 
to one important interviewee, the head of parliament is legally responsible for them. If 
he/she notes that they are not shariah-compliant, he/she is responsible for sending 
them to the Guardian Council for approval. According to Iranian law even if just one 
person recognises that one guide direction or instruction is not shariah-compliant, 
he/she can issue a complaint to the Administrative Justice Court. They inspect the 
matter and if they see any problem they send it to the Guardian Council for 
consideration. 
Third, regarding the execution of the law according to the executive guide direction or 
instructions and bylaw, interviewees mentioned several factors which are necessary to 
ensure and check the conditions regarding the law of Interest-Free banking in Iran 
which are as follows: 
a) Determining the contracts and even the format to be used for them and defining a 
clear relationship between depositors and banks in the law: This, together with the 
training which banks give to their staff can ensure that Islamic banking will be 
followed by the banking system in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
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Table 7.3: Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 1 (Ways of Ensuring that 
Banking Activities are Shariah-Compliant) 
 
Considering and deliberating on speciality and experience of clients 
Interviewee 1 Demanding some proof of their speciality and their experience and 
sending our inspectors.  
Interviewee 2 Having some personal knowledge about them, because each branch 
works in a specific area and knows its customers and demanding some 
proof of their speciality and their experience and sending our 
inspectors. 
Interviewee 3 Yes they do. It can be done in several ways, depending on the branch. 
Interviewee 4 No answer 
Interviewee 5 Asking for documents and sending inspectors to their work place. 
Interviewee 6 Asking for documents and sending inspectors to their work place in 
state-owned banks and reports from external corporations in private 
banks. 
Interviewee 7 Speciality no but experience yes.  
Interviewee 8 Technical, financial and civil expert sectors and bureau of plan 
evaluation for big projects. 
Interviewee 9 Not exactly, just considering the client‘s previous record and their 
credit.   
Interviewee 10 Depends on the branches. 
Interviewee 11 By checking client‘s credit. 
Interviewee 12 By documents such as job licence, indult and other licences. 
b) Supervision by the Central Bank: The Central Bank has two kinds of supervision: 
First, ―on site supervision”, which means supervision at the bank. In this case, Central 
Bank inspectors usually select some branches randomly and go there to scrutinize 
contracts. They scrutinize all contracts at the chosen branches, both from the technical 
and the shariah point of view. Second, ―off site supervision” which means inspection 
at the Central Bank. In this case, they scrutinize some contracts which have been sent 
to them for this purpose. Furthermore, there is a board called the Disciplinary Board 
of Banks. All violations are reported to them for consideration and they are 
responsible for deliberating on them carefully and precisely. In addition, directorates 
are very sensitive to any infractions, especially from the shariah point of view. For 
example, in a situation where the partnership is going to be harmed, the bank 
directorate reacts to this and solves the problem. Also, some big projects go to the 
Central Bank for deliberation. They consider them carefully and then approve them.  
c) Supervision by commercial banks themselves:  Branches administer the projects 
and contracts directly. They have specialist sectors, namely technical, financial and 
civil sectors. These sectors have their own specific duties regarding the administration 
of projects.  
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Table 7.3, shows the quality of ensuring that banking activities are shariah-compliant 
by considering and deliberating on the speciality and experience of their clients. As 
mentioned before, banks are the agents of the depositor and depositors allow them to 
utilize their deposits for profitable projects and profitability depends strongly on the 
speciality and experience of the client. Therefore, making sure that clients have 
enough speciality and experience is not only a technical issue, but a religious one.  
As can be seen in Table 7.3, from the interviewees‘ point of view banks check 
speciality and experience by:  (1) demanding proof of their speciality and their 
experience, (2) sending inspectors, (3) having some personal knowledge of them, 
because every branch works in a specific area and knows its customers, (4) reports 
from external corporations in private banks. As banks, especially state-owned banks, 
have several branches in different areas which cover them for all kinds of financial 
services they usually have enough knowledge about their customers, except for new 
customers about whom their knowledge may not be sufficient for this purpose. For 
these customers they should be more careful and use other ways (5) checking job 
licences and client‘s credit. In conclusion, the vast majority of interviewees believe 
that enough care is taken by banks to ensure that their clients who are selected to 
receive financial facilities have enough experience and speciality regarding their 
activity. Just one interviewee did not answer this question. Also, interviewee number 
seven believes that speciality is not considered but experience is. Of course, he 
explained that there is not a special form on which speciality is questioned. It could be 
said that this does not actually mean that speciality is not considered. 
Table 7.4, shows the opinions of interviewees regarding the ways of making sure that 
banking activities are shariah-compliant by considering the client‘s honesty. Honesty 
is very important in Islamic banking, not only because Islamic banking as part of an 
Islamic economic system is a moral system, but also because of its civil effects. In 
partnership contracts, for instance the modharabah contract, the banking system 
should trust the agent‘s word. In other words, if the agent claims a loss, the capital 
owner – in this case the bank - must accept their claim without asking for proof. In 
fact it would be the duty of the bank to provide proof against their claim if they 
disagree with the agent‘s claim. Therefore, because banks are agents of depositors and 
are responsible not only for protecting their deposits but also for obtaining profit for 
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them, it is their religious responsibility to do their best to make sure that those who 
apply for financial facilities are honest. So, this condition becomes a condition which 
should be shariah-compliant. 
 
Table 7.4: Focused Coding Number 3 for Question 1 (Ways of Ensuring that 
Banking Activities are Shariah-Compliant)   
 
considering and deliberating on the client’s honesty 
Interviewee 1 Inquiry from Bureau of the Banking information regarding their delays in 
payment, deliberation on their past behaviour and understanding of the 
branch manager. 
Interviewee 2  By reports of our staff who go to their business place and check the 
details given by them and reports of our staff about their credit. 
Interviewee 3 By inquiring about their background and their credit. 
Interviewee 5 By inquiring about their current account and their credit. 
Interviewee 6 By their own reports in state-owned banks and by external reports in 
private banks. 
Interviewee 7 By enquiring about their current account and their credit. 
Interviewee 8 We check their honesty ourselves. 
Interviewee 9 Not exactly, just considering the client‘s previous record and their credit.   
Interviewee 11 By branches themselves and by credit information system of the Central 
Bank. 
Interviewee 12 By local enquiry. 
As can be seen in Table 7.4, only interviewees four and ten did not answer and 
interviewee number nine believed that honesty was not carefully considered. Other 
interviewees believed that this issue was considered carefully using several factors as 
follows: (i) Enquiry from Bureau of Banking information regarding late payments, (ii) 
Consideration of their past behaviour, (iii) Understanding of the branch chairman. The 
knowledge of the bank manager plays an important role in this issue (iv) Report by 
bank staff who go to their place of work and verify their claims, (v) Enquiry about 
their background, (vi) Enquiry about their current account and their credit, (vii) 
Through the credit information system of the Central Bank. 
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Table 7.5: Focused Coding Number 4 for Question 1 (Ways of Ensuring that 
Banking Activities are Shariah-Compliant) 
 
Considering and deliberating on project profitability and ways of calculating 
and receiving profit. 
Interviewee 1 Their project is evaluated regarding profit. Predicted profit should be at 
least equal to expected profit which is determined by the Central Bank 
Interviewee 2 Their project is evaluated regarding profit. Expected profit should be at 
least equal to expected profit which is determined by the Central Bank. 
Interviewee 3 Profitability of projects is definitely considered carefully.  
Interviewee 4 They should consider profitability.  
Interviewee 5 Banks evaluate profitability by their specialist and client‘s claims. 
Interviewee 6 Yes, we evaluate the project regarding profitability. 
Interviewee 7 Consideration is not deep; we just rely on the information which is 
provided by clients. 
Interviewee 8 
 
Banks evaluate profitability by their specialist. 
Interviewee 11 In partnership contracts profitability is considered and expected; profit 
should be predictable. 
Interviewee 12 In order to protect deposits from the risk of loss or unprofitability, banks 
consider profitability of the contracts except in obligatory facilities. 
All economic activities, including banking system activities, usually aim not only to 
obtain profit but also to maximise their profit. In Islamic banking, obtaining profit is 
not only the economic goal but is also a shariah responsibility because, while 
conventional banks take a fixed amount or percentage as interest regardless of real 
profit which investors receive, in Islamic banking profit depends on actual profit and, 
as mentioned before, in Islamic banking banks are agents of the depositors and 
promise to utilise their deposits for profitable projects. So, considering the 
profitability of a project is both an economic and Islamic duty of the banking system.  
In order to understand whether banks in the Islamic Republic of Iran consider this 
issue or not we asked interviewees the question for which their answers can be seen in 
Table 7.5. As can be seen in this table, all interviewees who answered the question 
believe that in the banking system of the Islamic Republic of Iran all partnership 
contracts, except obligatory contracts, are deliberated on regarding profitability.  
Also as can be seen in Table 7.5, only interviewee number seven believes that 
consideration is not very deep. However, he also believes that consideration of 
profitability exists but for this banks rely on the client‘s documents and their word. 
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Table 7.6: Focused Coding Number 5 for Question 1 (Ways of Ensuring that 
Banking Activities are Shariah-Compliant) 
 
Supervising the process of the project until the end 
Interviewee 1 Yes, our payment to the client is step by step.  
Interviewee 2 Yes, We control the activity of the client until the end of the contract. 
Interviewee 3 Yes, It is one of the most important principles in partnership contracts. 
Interviewee 4 Yes, it is necessary to supervise the project until the end. 
Interviewee 5 Yes, definitely. 
Interviewee 6 Yes. 
Interviewee 7 No, they usually agree on part payment profit rate. 
Interviewee 8 Yes. 
Interviewee 9 Precise supervision is not possible, because their numbers are very high. 
Of course, in large projects we pay step by step. 
Interviewee 10 No answer.  
Interviewee 11 According to the executive byelaw and Address Instruction, supervision 
should be until the end, but practically in the early stages, especially 
during the time of paying partnership share supervision is more intense. 
Also, changes in the partnership situation are important.                                                                     
Interviewee 12 Generally, supervision should exist; for this reason banks pay financial 
facilities step by step.  
As the relationship between Islamic banks and those applying for facilities is usually a 
partnership, it is necessary for banks to supervise the process of the project until the 
end of the contract. In order to understand what happens in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, a question was asked of interviewees, which is shown in Table 7.6. 
As Table 7.6 shows, one interviewee did not answer this question and another one, 
number seven, believes that there is no supervision and banks and clients usually 
agree on the part-payment profit rate. Other interviewees believe that supervision 
exists. One way to control is to pay financial facilities at each stage. This means that 
they pay one instalment and after confirmation by the bank‘s expert that the 
instalment has been spent on the partnership project, mosharakah, the bank pays the 
next instalment.  
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Table 7.7: Focused Coding Number 6 for Question 1 (Ways of Ensuring that 
Banking Activities are Shariah-Compliant) 
 
Proper training for bank staff 
Interviewee 1 There have been some training courses for staff, especially managers, but 
they need more training because Islamic contracts are a little complicated.                                                                                                                                                                                           
Interviewee 2 There has been training for staff, especially managers but they need more 
training.                                                                                                                                                                                             
Interviewee 3 There has been training for staff, especially managers, but they need more 
training.                                                                                                                                                                                             
Interviewee 4 There have been some training courses for staff especially managers but 
they need more training.                                                                                                                                                                                             
Interviewee 5 There has been training for staff, especially, managers regularly but they 
need more training.                                                                                                                                                                                             
Interviewee 6 We have training courses for our staff twice a week.  
Interviewee 7 There has been training for staff, especially managers, but they need more 
training.                                                                                                                                                                                             
Interviewee 8 There has been training for staff, especially managers, but they need more 
training.                                                                                                                                                                                             
Interviewee 9 There has been training for staff, especially managers, but they need more 
training.                                                                                                                                                                                             
Interviewee 10 There has been training for staff, especially managers, but they need more 
training.                                                                                                                                                                                             
Interviewee 11 There has been training for staff, especially managers, but they need more 
training.                                                                                                                                                                                             
Interviewee 12 There has been training for staff, especially managers, but they need more 
training.                                                                                                                                                                                             
One main pillar of Islamic banking is contracts.  A contract is correct and effective if 
it fulfils specific conditions. The first condition is to know the contract and its aims 
and intentions. Training is an important issue for banking system staff because if they 
are not familiar with Islamic contracts, they will not be able to act according to the 
shariah. The more training they receive the better they will understand and 
consequently provide a more correct contract. To understand what happens in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, interviewees have been questioned on this. Table 7.7, shows 
their answers. 
As can be seen in Table 7.7, all the interviewees believe that previous staff training is 
not enough and they need more training because, firstly, Islamic banking contracts are 
more complicated in comparison with conventional banks and secondly, because they 
are new to them and they need to improve its instruments gradually. Training is vital 
for Islamic banks in order for them to remain Islamic. 
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Table 7.8: Results for Question 2 (Overview of Types of Problems Faced in the 
Implementation of Islamic Contracts) 
 
Question2 What are the problems with which Islamic contracts are faced in 
the implementation stage? 
Focused coding 
          1 Asymmetric information  
          2 Moral hazard 
          3 Adverse selection 
          4 Low flexibility of contracts; all contracts have been defined strictly and all 
banks have to act according to them. 
          5 Impossibility or difficulty of responding to all credit demands, especially, 
from the demand side (according to the  law of Usury-Free Banking in 
Iran‖) 
          6 Lack of updating of laws such as the Monetary and Banking law and the 
style of management in the banking system. 
          7 Overdue financial facilities or loans. 
     Themes The main problems faced in the implementation of Islamic contracts are: 
asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse selection, low flexibility of 
contracts, impossibility or difficulty of responding to all credit demands, 
lack of updating of laws and overdue financial facilities or loans. 
7.3 PROBLEMS WITH WHICH ISLAMIC BANKING CAN BE FACED  
There are some problems that Islamic banking are faced with or have been said to be 
faced with. They were explored with interviewees and results are shown in Table 7.8. 
Asymmetric information exists in all banking systems. This is when one party has 
more information than another. There are different opinions regarding asymmetric 
information in Islamic banking. It may be said that, because of partnership in Islamic 
banking, asymmetric information is more harmful. The reason is that as there is no 
fixed profit rate in partnership contracts; one party is more able to make the contract 
in such a way that can obtain more profit. 
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Table 7.9: Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 2 (Types of Problems Faced 
in the Implementation of Islamic Contracts) 
 
Asymmetric information 
Interviewee 5 Generally, asymmetric information is less of a problem in Islamic banks 
than in conventional banks. 
Interviewee 7 Generally, asymmetric information is less of a problem in Islamic banks 
than in conventional banks. 
Interviewee 8 There is no difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks; it 
depends on the client‘s honesty and the bank staff‘s awareness. 
Interviewee 9 There is no difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks. 
Interviewee 11 As Islamic banks obtain more detailed information, they are more able to 
solve or reduce the problem of asymmetric information. 
Interviewee 12 As Islamic banks are project-oriented instead of individual oriented, and 
applicants are scrutinized regarding their honesty, experience and 
speciality and projects are scrutinized regarding technical and economical 
justifications and rationalization, Islamic banks are more able to solve the 
problem of asymmetric information than conventional banks. 
Also one could say that because of partnership and careful consideration of the 
projects by Islamic banks, asymmetric information is not as hard as conventional 
banks. The opinions of the interviewees regarding asymmetric information in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran are shown in Table 7.9. 
As can be seen in Table 7.9 half of the interviewees did not answer this question. Of 
those who answered the question four interviewees believe that Islamic banks are 
more able to solve or reduce the problem of asymmetric information than 
conventional banks and two interviewees believe that there is no difference between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. 
One thing which can exist in all transactions, including financial contracts is moral 
hazard which occurs when a party to a transaction has not entered into the contract in 
good faith. This can lead to providing misleading information. If moral hazard exists 
it could be more harmful in Islamic banks than conventional banks because in 
conventional banks customers receive a fixed interest rate whereas in Islamic banks, 
which are mainly based on partnership contracts, the profit rate depends on the actual 
profit which is generally declared by the client.  On the other hand, because of Islamic 
bank customers‘ religious  faith, banks‘ careful consideration of  projects  and  clients‘  
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honesty, the probability of moral hazard in Islamic banks is less than that in 
Conventional banks. The opinions of the interviewees have been shown in Table 7.10. 
 
Table 7.10: Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 2 (Types of Problems Faced 
in the Implementation of Islamic Contracts) 
 
Moral Hazard 
Interviewee 7 Generally, in Islamic banks moral hazard is less than in conventional 
banks but in Iran the case differs; in the present banking system of Iran the 
situation is similar to that of conventional banks.  
Interviewee 8 Yes this problem exists in Islamic banks too. 
Interviewee 9 Moral hazard in Islamic banks is less than that in conventional banks. 
Interviewee 11 Moral hazard in Islamic banks is less than in conventional banks 
Interviewee 12 Yes this problem exists in Islamic banks too. 
As can be seen in Table 7.10, the majority of interviewees did not answer this 
question. Only five of them answered; three of them believe that moral hazard in 
Islamic banks is less than that in conventional banks, but one of the three believe that 
Iran‘s banking system has the same problem as conventional banks in this regard. 
Two believe that this problem also exists in Islamic banks and did not compare 
Islamic banks with conventional banks in this regard 
As table 7.11 shows half of the interviewees did not answer the question. Of those 
who answered the question, five believe adverse selection in Islamic banks is less than 
in conventional banks and one believes that this problem also exists in Islamic banks 
and did not compare Islamic banks with conventional banks in this regard. 
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Table 7.11: Focused Coding Number 3 for Question 2 (Types of Problems Faced 
in the Implementation of Islamic Contracts) 
 
Adverse selection
35
 
Interviewee 5 Generally, adverse selection in Islamic banking is less than in 
conventional banking. 
Interviewee 7 Generally, adverse selection in Islamic banking is less than in 
conventional banking but in Iran the case differs; in Iran‘s present banking 
system the situation is similar to conventional banks. 
Interviewee 8 Yes this problem exists in Islamic banks too. 
Interviewee 9 Adverse selection in Islamic banking is less than in conventional banking. 
Interviewee 11 As Islamic banking obtains more detailed information from clients the 
probability of adverse selection in Islamic banking is less than in 
conventional banking. 
Interviewee 12 As Islamic banks are project-oriented, instead of individual oriented, and 
applicants are scrutinized with regard to honesty, experience and 
speciality and projects are scrutinized with regard to technical and 
economic justifications and rationalization, adverse selection in Islamic 
banking is less than in conventional banking.  
As in the previous question some believe that Islamic contracts in Islamic banking in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran do not have enough flexibility because they are pre-
determined. This can cause problems regarding the allocation of monetary resources. 
We asked the interviewees‘ opinions on this and their responses can be seen in Table 
7.12. 
As can be seen in Table 7.12, two interviewees did not answer the question. 
Interviewee number three believes that their flexibility is very low and some believe it 
could be better but is acceptable and others believe the problem is due to the structure 
of the economy. In sum, 33% of interviewees believe that there is enough flexibility, 
about 17% did not answer and 50% believe that there is not enough flexibility in 
Islamic contracts in Islamic banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
 
                                                 
35
 This refers to a market process in general or in a banking system in particular in which "bad" results 
occur when buyers and sellers or banking system and interpreniors have asymmetric information (i.e. 
access to different information): the "bad" products or customers are more likely to be selected. 
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Table 7.12: Focused Coding Number 4 for Question 2 (Types of Problems Faced 
in the Implementation of Islamic Contracts) 
 
Low flexibility of contracts in Islamic banks in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Interviewee 1 There are no problems regarding contracts, the problem is from our 
macroeconomics, which leads to pressure on the some contracts. When 
governments order banks to decrease their expected profit rates, they have 
to shift to partnership contracts for which the interest rate cannot be 
determined in advance. 
Interviewee 2 Yes, there is. 
Interviewee 3 Their flexibility is very low. Everything is determined by law and any 
new instrument has to be approved by parliament and government. 
Interviewee 7 At the moment there is not enough flexibility. 
Interviewee 8 Yes, there is. 
Interviewee 9 Yes, there is but the problem is structure of the economy. 
Interviewee 10 It is not good, so we have started to reform all laws regarding the banking 
system. 
Interviewee 11 Some contracts in Islamic banking, such as partnership contracts, Joaalah 
and sales by instalment have a broad usage and flexibility, but there are 
limitations regarding overdraft, return with flexible rate, float, and 
derivatives instruments.  
Interviewee 12 It seems that, because of the existence of different regulations, the 
banking system is faced with problems regarding the implementation of 
contracts. 
An important issue in the banking system is the ability to respond to all legal demands 
for financial facilities from a theoretical and legal point of view. Some people believe 
that Islamic banking in Iran is not able to respond to all demands. Sometimes this is 
due to a lack of sufficient resources and sometimes it is due to limitations in contracts 
or law. We should differentiate between these two cases. Also, if for any reason the 
government imposes laws on the banking system it does not mean the Islamic banking 
system has problems with regard to answering all demands.  
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Table 7.13: Focused Coding Number 5 for Question 2 (Types of Problems Faced 
in the Implementation of Islamic Contracts) 
 
Impossibility or difficulty of responding positively to all credit demands, 
especially, from demand side. 
Interviewee 1 There is no problem regarding Islamic contracts, problems are from some 
limitations caused by law. 
Interviewee 2 There are some limitations on Islamic banking in Iran which reduce its 
ability to finance some projects. For example, they do not allow providing 
import facilities.    
Interviewee 3 There is much diversity in the contracts which can cover all kinds of 
demand for financial facilities but the government limits their usage to a 
specific area. 
Interviewee 4 It is possible to cover all demands for financial facilities by existing 
contracts. Limitation is due to government policies. 
Interviewee 5 This ability exists in Islamic banking but in our country limitations have 
been imposed from outside the system.  
Interviewee 6 Limitation is not from Islamic contracts themselves. 
Interviewee 7 This ability exists in Islamic banking but in our country, limitations have 
been imposed from outside the system.  
Interviewee 8 There are some problems but they are legal, not related to the nature of 
Islamic banking. 
Interviewee 9 It is not possible to provide facility to all applicants due to a limitation of 
resources and existence of high demand for financial facilities. 
Interviewee 10 There are some weaknesses in this regard but this is due to their 
ownership. The state-owned banks are facing these problems. 
Interviewee 11 The banking system at the moment is not able to provide facilities to all 
applicants due to the structure of economic and monetary policies. 
Interviewee 12 It is not possible to provide facilities to all applicants due to limitation of 
resources and existence of high demand for financial facilities. 
All interviewees were asked this question to provide a better understanding of the 
situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As can be seen in Table 7.13, all 
interviewees believe that there are some problems regarding finance for all applicants, 
not because of the nature of the Islamic contracts but because of government policies 
which state-owned banks have to follow. It is worth explaining that according to these 
policies banks cannot provide facilities for some consumption goods or for buying 
houses (although they do provide facilities for building houses); this policy aims to 
combat high house prices. 
Also, they cannot provide facilities for importing. However, the main problem in the 
banking system is the considerable gap between supply and demand of financial 
resources. 
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One criticism regarding the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran is that it is a little old 
and needs to be brought up to date. Critics have said that this law was good for the 
1980s, but after being in place for about 25 years it is time for its reform. In a trip to 
Tehran in the summer of 2009 I noticed that one group in the Central Bank of Islamic 
Republic of Iran had begun to discuss its reform. Fortunately, the head of the group 
was my friend and he invited me to attend their meeting in the Central Bank and even 
to participate in their discussion group. Hopefully, the new law will soon be ready for 
approval by parliament. However, Table 7.14 shows the opinions of the interviewees 
on this matter.  
 
Table 7.14: Focused Coding Number 6 for Question 2 (Types of Problems Faced 
in the Implementation of Islamic Contracts) 
 
Lack of updating of the law 
Interviewee 1 Yes, but it is being updated now. 
Interviewee 2 Yes, but it is being updated now. 
Interviewee 3 Yes, but it is being updated now. 
Interviewee 4 Yes, but it is being updated now. 
Interviewee 5 Yes, but it is being updated now. 
Interviewee 6 Yes, but it is being updated now. 
Interviewee 7 Yes, but it is being updated now. 
Interviewee 8 Yes, but it is being updated now. 
Interviewee 9 Yes, but it is being updated now. 
Interviewee 10 Yes, We started rewriting the Monetary and Banking law and also the law 
of Usury-Free Banking of Iran as a research project In 2000 a council was 
established of which I was its chairman. We finished twenty articles by 
2007. Up to now 130 articles have been finished and two laws have been 
put together. 
Interviewee 11 Yes, but it is being updated now. 
Interviewee 12 Yes, we are working toward its reform now. 
As Table 7.14 shows all interviewees believe the law needs to be reformed and 
fortunately, it is being implemented now. 
Overdue or late payments are a problem for all kinds of banks. In Islamic banking it 
can be more serious than in conventional banking because, according to Islamic 
thought, whenever debtors cannot pay their debt, it is recommended that borrowers 
give them more time until they become able to pay them. If one corporation receives 
ten billion Iranian Rials credit or other facilities and claims it is not able to pay its 
debt, if the profit rate is 10% it would benefit from delay in payment at one billion 
Iranian Rials per year. This huge amount of money could encourage its staff to claim 
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that they are not able to pay their debt. It would be interesting if we have 
interviewee‘s opinions as a researcher or manager in Iran‘s banking system. 
As Table 7.15, shows, four interviewees (33%) did not answer the question and seven 
interviewees (58.33%) believe that overdue debts are greater than usual and just one 
person (8.3) believes that overdue debts were usual until one year ago and then 
increased. It is worth mentioning that nobody refers to the point which we mentioned 
before regarding giving more time to debtors whose payments are overdue. This may 
be due to the existence of a late payment penalty in Islamic banking in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  
Overdue debts to all financial facilities to the private sector increased from 7.1% in 
2002 to 15% in 2006, while the average ratio world-wide is 5%. This is due to 
political and economic conditions, exchange rate, profit rate and unexpected events. 
 
Table 7.15: Focused Coding Number 7 for Question 2 (Types of Problems Faced 
in Implementing Islamic Contracts) 
 
Overdue financial facilities or loans. 
Interviewee 1 Overdue debts are more than usual because the profit rate in exchange 
contracts and expected profit rate for partnership contracts are very low in 
the banking system and borrowers are afraid that they will not be able to 
receive facilities again at all, or soon. This is more common in obligatory 
facilities. 
Interviewee 3 Overdue debts are more than usual because the banking system has been 
under pressure to provide more facilities than their ability; for example, 
last year they provided facilities about 110% of their ability by overdrafts 
from the Central Banks because of economic depression. 
Interviewee 5 Overdue debts are more than usual, because of the gap between supply 
and demand in the financial market and the existence of demand and the 
existence of obligatory facilities 
Interviewee 7 Overdue debts are more than usual because of the gap between supply and 
demand in the financial market and the existence of demand and the 
existence of obligatory facilities. 
Interviewee 8 Overdue debts are very high due to the economic depression. 
Interviewee 9 Overdue debts are more than usual. 
Interviewee 11 Until one year ago overdue debts were usual, but during the last year due 
to structural issues and economic depression they have gone up. 
Interviewee 12 Overdue debts are more than usual. According to existing data the ratio of 
overdue debts to all financial facilities to the private sector increased from 
7.1% in 2002 to 15% in 2006, while the average ratio for world is 5%. 
This is due to the political and economic conditions, exchange rate, profit 
rate and unexpected events. 
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7.4 SOLUTIONS FOR THE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH ISLAMIC BANKING      
CAN BE FACED  
In the previous section, the problems with which Islamic banking can be faced were 
discussed with the interviewees. In this section, solutions for these problems will be 
discussed according to the responses given by the interviewees. Table 7.16 depicts 
some possible solutions to the above mentioned problems of Islamic banking.  
 
Table 7.16: Results for Question 3 (Overview of Types of Solutions for the 
Problems) 
 
Question 3 What are the solutions for problems mentioned above? 
Focused coding 
            1        Changing the structure of banking system in Islamic Republic of Iran. 
            2 Conditions provided in the contract (condition provided in the contract). 
            3 Late payment penalty. 
            4 Reform of the law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran. Monetary and Banking 
law and Manner of the Banking System Management‖ 
Themes Solutions to the identified problems are: Changing the structure of the 
banking system, Conditions provided in the contract, Late payment penalty, 
Reform of the law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran, Monetary and Banking 
Law and Manner of the Banking System Management. 
Changing the structure of the banking system after defining new responsibilities for it 
could be one acceptable challenge which has existed for some years between Muslim 
economists in Iran. What happened in Iran was not simply the establishment of an 
Islamic banking system; rather, it was a change in the existing conventional banking 
system to an Islamic banking system, or Usury-Free banking system. In fact, the same 
building, the same staff and the same specialities were chosen to establish and 
implement this huge change. Some economists believe that apart from the need for 
training, it was necessary to change the structure too because, in the past the banking 
system was interest-based and banking activities were simple. They collected deposits 
and gave interest to depositors and then provided the deposits to credit applicants and 
received a higher interest rate than that which they gave to the depositors. They did 
not need to evaluate and monitor projects and build or repair buildings and do many 
other things which they do now. In fact, Islamic banks enter the actual economy and 
need a special structure. Of course, some changes have been undertaken in the 
structure of Islamic banks in Iran, but it seems that they are not enough. For more 
information regarding this issue all interviewees were asked about this and their 
answers appear in Table 7.17.  
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Table 7.17: Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 3 (Types of Solutions for the 
Problems) 
 
Changing the structure of the banking system 
Interviewee 1 It is not necessary to change the structure; banks do not need 
dependant corporation, rather they need experts. 
Interviewee 2 It is necessary to change the structure; banks need to establish 
dependent advisory and productive corporation and establish an 
information bank.  
Interviewee 3 It is necessary to change the structure; banks need to establish 
dependent advisory and productive corporation and move from 
state-owned banks to private banks.  
Interviewee 5 The structure must definitely change; it must be compliant with the 
aims and responsibilities of Islamic banking and movement from 
state-owned banks to private banks and the credit section must be 
separated from other sections which can explain contracts to clients.  
Interviewee 6 It is necessary to change the structure; it should exit from pure 
intermediary. 
Interviewee 7 The structure must definitely change; it must be compliant with the 
aims and responsibilities of Islamic banking and supervisors should 
be independent of the banks or at least independent of the branches. 
Interviewee 9 Yes, it is necessary. 
Interviewee 10 Yes, it is necessary. 
Interviewee 11 It should change in a way that leads to the majority of banks 
becoming private banks. 
Interviewee 12 It should change from state-owned banks to private banks and 
competitiveness should increase.  
As can be seen in Table 7.17 two interviewees, 16.6% of interviewees and 20% of 
respondents, did not answer, one interviewee, 8.3% of interviewees and 10% of 
respondents, believes that it is not necessary to change the structure of the banking 
system, ten interviewees, 83.2% of interviewees and 20% of respondents, believe that 
a change of structure is necessary. There are different opinions among those who 
agree with changing the structure which can be seen in the detailed interviews.  
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After completely changing the banking system to an Islamic banking system in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, conditions provided in the contract were used to reduce all 
kinds of financial risks. Some economists believe that these conditions lead to 
misunderstanding or even some times to a departure from the essence of Islamic 
banking. For example, in modharabah, according to the shariah, all losses must be 
paid by the owner of the capital. So, if the modharabah agent claims to have suffered 
a loss, Islamic banks should accept their claims. Some authorities in Iran‘s banking 
system believe that if they did so they would not able to continue their job and would 
face bankruptcy because, there is only one system and that is a Usury-Free system and 
its clients are from all kinds of people - believers and non believers, honest and 
dishonest. In addition, the banking system is the agent of the depositor and, as 
mentioned before, is responsible for protecting depositors from loss. Therefore, they 
use a contract-implicit condition which states that, in the case of loss, the appointed 
modharabah agent should compensate from their own funds. Interviewees were asked 
their opinion on this matter. The question was regarding whether conditions provided 
in the contract have a positive or negative effect on banking system activities and 
whether or not they are shariah-compliant. Table 7.18, contains their responses. 
 
Table 7.18: Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 3 (Types of Solutions for the 
Problems) 
 
Conditions provided in the contract
36
. 
Interviewee 1 They play a positive role in banking activities and facilitate them. 
Interviewee 4 They were a necessity before, but now they can be omitted gradually. 
However, they are Shariah-compliant because conditions provided in the 
contract are allowed in Islam. 
Interviewee 7  They play a negative role, they lead to the client‘s right to be spoiled and 
change the nature of Islamic contracts. 
Interviewee 8 They make contracts very complicated so they have a negative effect. 
Interviewee 9 They play a negative role because they cause the client to pay even in the 
case of loss. 
Interviewee 11 They play a very important role because without them performance of 
Islamic banking in an expanded level such as Iran, is not possible. 
Interviewee 12 I cannot judge their role, but according to the banks they are necessary 
because they decrease risks. On the other hand some of them harm real 
partnership.  
                                                 
36
 These are conditions provided in a contract which engage one party or both parties more than the 
contract itself. They may be made within the contract itself or within another contract. For example, it 
is possible that an agent of Modharabah is engaged to pay all losses by using this condition during the 
Solh contract. 
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As Table 7.18 shows, five respondents, 41.6%, did not answer the question. 
Regarding shariah-compliance only one answered, saying that they are shariah- 
compliant. Of those who answered the question, one person did not give an opinion, 
three interviewees, 25% of interviewees and 42.9% of respondents, believe they play 
a positive role and three more, 25% of interviewees and 42.9% of respondents, said 
they play a negative role.  
Since the banking system in the Islamic Republic of Iran changed to an Islamic 
banking system in 1984, the Central Bank has determined a penalty from those who 
do not pay their debt on time. From the early years of its approval there has been 
some debate regarding its shariah-compliance. Some thought it was a kind of riba 
which is prohibited in Islam but some religious scholars, especially Ayatollah 
Rezvani, representative of the late Imam Khomeini said there was a subtle difference 
between late payment penalty and riba. In short we can say that while in riba, the 
lender is happy to delay payment and for debtors to pay more, here the lender is not 
happy and really wants debtors to pay their debt and, in the case of non payment, not 
only ask a penalty from them but also to blacklist them. Here, we asked two questions 
from interviewees regarding late payment penalty. First we asked whether late 
payment penalty is shariah-compliant and second we asked if late payment penalty 
can solve the problem of overdue payments in the banking system or at least decrease 
it significantly. Table 7.19 shows the answers to both questions. 
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Table 7.19: Focused Coding number 3 for Question 3 (Types of Solutions for the 
Problems)  
Late payment penalty. 
Interviewee 1 Its effectiveness depends on the amount of penalty. If it is higher than the 
gap between the profit rate in the banking system and the black market 
interest rate, it would be effective; otherwise it would not be effective. 
Interviewee 4 It is shariah-compliant, but you should be very careful to understand the 
difference between it and riba.  The only way is to have a late payment 
penalty otherwise the banking system will face loss and bankruptcy. Of 
course, we should gradually omit it after obtaining complete information. 
Interviewee 5 Yes it is useful. 
Interviewee 7 No, late payment penalty is not able to solve the problem of overdue loans 
because they have other reasons. If the banking system observed the 
benefit of facility demanders, they would not face the problem of delay. 
Interviewee 8 Its effectiveness depends on the amount of penalty. The current expected 
profit rate is 12% if we assume that the actual profit rate is the same and 
rate of late payment penalty is 6% it becomes 18% which is less than the 
black market interest rate or profit rate in the open market. So, it would 
not be effective. 
Interviewee 9 At first it was rejected by the Guardian Council, but after its format had 
been changed it was approved. Overall it was useful but now courts do not 
vote in its favour. 
Interviewee 10 Yes it is useful. 
Interviewee 11 Late payment penalty cannot solve the problem of overdue debts alone. 
The main solution would be supervision. Of course, a late payment 
penalty could play a role as a deterrent factor. 
Interviewee 12 It does not work at the moment because in times of inflation debtor do not 
want to pay their debt as it is in their benefit not to even if they incur a late 
payment penalty. 
 
As Table 7.19, shows this issue is controversial. Three interviewees (25%) did not 
answer; two interviewees, 16.6% of interviewees and 22% of respondents, stated that 
the amount of penalty determines its effectiveness. If it is higher than the gap between 
the profit rate in the banking system and the black market interest rate or the open 
market profit rate it would be useful. Four persons, 33% of interviewees and 44% of 
respondents said it is, on the whole, useful. Two interviewees believe that it is not 
useful but one said that because it is less than the gap between the profit rate and the 
inflation rate and another said it is because we have to find the root of the delay and 
omit it. He believed that the root of delay is not considering the benefit of facility 
demanders. One interviewee believed that the main solution for delayed penalty is 
close supervision and the use of the delay penalty as a deterrent. Only two 
respondents commented on shariah-compliance, with one of them, interviewee 
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number four, saying that it is shariah-compliant and the other one, interviewee 
number nine, not giving his opinion; he just said that at first it was rejected by the 
Guardian Council, but after its format had been changed it was approved.  
In conclusion it can be said that a high majority of interviewees believe that it was 
useful but some of them add that it should be more than the gap between the profit 
rate in the banking system and the black market interest rate in order to be able to 
solve or reduce delay penalty. 
When the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran was introduced in 1984, it was a 
temporary, emergency, experimental law. The bank authority said that they would 
review it after a few of years and look at its shortcomings before reconsidering and 
reforming it if necessary. They have now started to review it. We questioned the 
interviewees on this matter and their responses are set out in Table 7.20. As we can 
see in table 7.20 all interviewees agree with the reform of all laws regarding the 
banking system, including the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran. 
 
Table 7.20: Focused Coding Number 5 for Question 3 (Types of Solutions for the 
Problems) 
 
Reform of the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran, Monetary and Banking Law 
and Manner of the Banking System Management Law. 
Interviewee 1 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 2 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 3 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 4 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 5 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 6 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 7 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 8 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 9 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 10 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 11 Yes it is necessary. 
Interviewee 12 Yes it is necessary. 
7.5 DETERMINATION OF FINAL PROFIT RATES FOR DEPOSITORS 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, Islamic banks in Iran are agents of depositors and 
their income comes from honorarium or lawyers‘ fees so in order to increase their 
income they have to encourage people to deposit more. For this reason, they announce 
an in-part-payment rate for term investment deposits, which is in fact a predicted 
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profit rate. So the banks, as a third party, can guarantee the principal of the deposits 
and a minimum profit expected from the previous year‘s experience as in-part- 
payment. Therefore, where actual profit is more than the expected profit, banks have 
to pay actual profit not the profit paid in-part-payment. In a case where actual profit is 
less than in-part-payment profit, depositors must generally be paid less than they have 
been promised but, because of guaranty, banks have to pay the difference between 
actual profit and in-part-payment profit from their sources.  However, there is no 
problem according to shariah law (at least according to the Jafari School of 
jurisprudence). The reason is that in these accounts the bank is not the main party of 
the contract, they are only the agents of the depositors, or middlemen. Some people 
accuse Iran‘s banking system of paying only the in-part-payment37 rate in all cases, 
regardless of the result of a project. In order to clarify this issue in practice 
interviewees have been questioned about it and their responses can be seen in tables 
7.21- 7.23.  
 
Table 7.21: Results for Question 4 (Overview of the Appropriate Ways to Deal 
with In-part-payment Profit) 
 
Question 4 How do you behave with “in-part-payment” profit in order not to 
be in contravention of shariah-compliance? 
Focused coding 
            1        In-part-payment profit is more than actual profit. 
            2 In-part-payment profit is less than actual profit. 
            
Themes 
In order to be shariah-compliant in relation to in-part-payment there are two 
probabilities: In-part-payment profit is more than actual profit and in-part- 
payment profit is less than actual profit. 
The issues which should be considered are shown in Table 7.21 and are: (1) If in-part- 
payment profit is more than actual profit, (2) If in-part-payment profit is less than 
actual profit. 
One probability is that in-part-payment profit is more than actual profit which means 
that the project was not as profitable as expected and predicted. Interviewees‘ answers 
regarding the behaviour of banks in Iran are shown in Table 7.22. 
                                                 
37
 In-part-payment is paid when the amount is not determined. So, some amount is paid until the actual 
amount is determined. For example, because of partnership in Islamic banks, the profit rate which 
depositors will obtain is not predetermined and therefore they cannot receive any fixed profit rate until 
the actual profit rate is cleared. Here banks pay the ―in-part-payment‖ which means that it is not the 
final profit rate and will be adjusted after the real profit rate is determined.  
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As can be seen in Table 7.22, all interviewees answered this question. Eight 
interviewees (66%) said that banks pay in-part-payment profit rate, two interviewees 
(16.6%) said that banks have to pay because they guarantee in-part-payment profit 
rate and one interviewee (8.3%) said that banks donate the difference between in-part- 
payment profit rate and actual profit. Sometimes the amount of in-part-payment profit 
is less than actual profit in which case banks should pay the depositors‘ share from all 
profits. So, it can be seen that some banks announced that this year their profit was 
more than predicted and expected a profit. Table 7.23 shows the interviewees‘ 
answers.   
 
Table 7.22: Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 4 (Appropriate Ways to 
Deal with In-Part-Payment Profit) 
 
In-part-payment profit is more than actual profit 
Interviewee 1 Banks have to pay in-part-payment profit rate because they guarantee that 
rate. 
Interviewee 2 Banks have to pay in-part-payment profit rate because they guarantee that 
rate. 
Interviewee 3 Banks pay in-part-payment profit rate 
Interviewee 4 Banks pay in-part-payment profit rate 
Interviewee 5 Banks pay in-part-payment profit rate. 
Interviewee 6 Banks pay in-part-payment profit rate. 
Interviewee 7 Banks pay in-part-payment profit rate. 
Interviewee 8 Banks pay in-part-payment profit rate. 
Interviewee 9 Banks pay in-part-payment profit rate. 
Interviewee 10 Banks have to pay in-part-payment profit rate because they guarantee that 
rate. 
Interviewee 11 The difference between in-part-payment profit rate and actual payment is 
donated to depositors by banks. 
Interviewee 12 Banks pay in-part-payment profit rate. 
As can be seen in Table 7.23, five interviewees (41.6%) did not answer this question, 
four interviewees (33% of interviewees and 57% of responders) said banks pay 
according to actual profit, one interviewee (8.3% of interviewees and 14% of 
responders) said that banks usually, by using conditions provided in the contract, try 
to pay only the in-part-payment profit rate, one interviewee said it depends on the 
branches and one interviewee believes that banks pay according to the actual profit 
recently. It appears from the last answer that he believes that, at least sometimes in 
previous years, banks did not pay actual profits to depositors. In conclusion, it can be 
said that the majority of responders believe that Islamic banks in the Islamic Republic 
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of Iran in the case that in-part-payment profit is less than actual profit have been 
paying actual profit to their clients. 
 
Table 7.23: Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 4 (Appropriate ways to deal 
with In-Part-Payment Profit) 
 
In-part-payment profit is less than actual profit 
Interviewee 1 Banks pay according to the actual profit. 
Interviewee 2 Banks pay according to the actual profit. 
Interviewee 7 Banks usually, by using conditions provided in the contract, try to pay just 
the in-part-payment profit rate. 
Interviewee 8 Banks pay according to the actual profit. 
Interviewee 10 It depends on branches. Some of them may pay just in-part-payment profit 
rate, but most of them pay actual profit. 
Interviewee 11 Banks pay according to the actual profit. 
Interviewee 12 Banks pay according to the actual profit recently. 
7.6 DETERMINATION OF FINAL PROFIT RATES FOR FACILITIES 
APPLICANTS 
Another aspect of shariah-compliance regarding profit is circumstance of calculation 
of the profit as to whether it is fixed or dependent on actual profit. As mentioned in 
Chapter Three, there are three kinds of contract in Islamic banking in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Qardh-Al-Hasanah contracts, partnership contracts and exchange 
contracts. In partnership contracts, both parties share in the profits and losses. 
According to the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran and its executive byelaw and 
instruction, there is one expected profit rate which is announced by the Central Bank, 
but it is just as an index for project evaluation. This means that according to the 
project evaluation, any project which can give the expected profit rate to the bank is 
approved to receive financial facilities. However, actual profit which banks receive 
depends on the actual profit which firms obtain.   
Islamic banks in Iran are permitted to insure their shares and also to use conditions 
provided in the contract in order to engage their partner in paying any losses from 
their property. Some banks make implicit conditions in the Solh contract which is a 
necessary contract in which they can engage their partners. Table 7.24 shows cases 
which are debateable in this regard. 
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Table 7.24: Results for Question 5 (Overview of the Appropriate Ways to Deal 
with Expected Profit) 
Question 5 How do you (banks) deal with expected profit in order not to be 
in contravention of the shariah-compliance? 
Focused coding 
            1        Expected profit is more than actual profit. 
            2 Expected profit is less than actual profit. 
Themes In ensuring that the expected profit does not violate shariah-compliance, 
there are two probabilities: Expected profit is more than actual profit and 
expected profit is less than actual profit. 
Table 7.25, shows the opinions of the interviewees regarding cases where expected 
profit is more than actual profit. 
As can be seen in Table 7.25, half of the interviewees (50%) did not answer this 
question, two interviewees (16.6%) believe that banks usually ask for expected profit, 
one interviewee (8.3%) believes that, according to the conditions provided in the 
contract, clients have to pay the difference between expected profit and actual profit, 
two interviewees (16.6%) said that. in this case, banks examine the case in order to 
understand what the reason for the abatement of the profit was. If the client is to 
blame, they will ask him to pay the difference between the expected profit and the 
actual profit, and finally one interviewee stated that, according to the condition 
provided in the contract, clients would have to pay the difference between the 
expected profit and the actual profit. However, if the client was not to blame he/she 
should not pay the difference between the expected profit and the actual profit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
198 
 
 
 
Table 7.25: Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 5 (Circumstance of Dealing 
with Expected Profits) 
 
Expected profit is more than actual profit 
Interviewee 1 According to the conditions provided in the contract, clients have to pay 
the difference between the expected profit and the actual profit. 
Interviewee 2 According to the conditions provided in the contract, clients have to pay 
the difference between expected profit and actual profit too. But if the 
client is not to blame he/she should not pay the difference between the 
expected profit and the actual profit. 
Interviewee 7 Banks usually ask for expected profit. 
Interviewee 8 In this case, banks examine the case in order to understand what the 
reason for the abatement of the profit was. If the client is to blame, they 
will ask him to pay the difference between the expected profit and the 
actual profit. 
Interviewee 10 In this case, banks examine the case in order to understand what the 
reason for the abatement of the profit was. If the client is to blame, they 
will ask him to pay the difference between the expected profit and the 
actual profit. 
Interviewee 12 Banks usually ask for expected profit 
Table 7.26, shows opinions of the interviewees about a case where expected profit is 
less than real profit. 
 
Table 7.26: Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 5 (Circumstance of Dealing 
with Expected Profits. 
 
Expected profit is less than actual profit 
Interviewee 1 Banks donate the difference between expected profit and actual profit. 
Interviewee 2 Banks ask for the difference between expected profit and actual profit. 
Interviewee 7 Banks usually ask for expected profit. 
Interviewee 8 Banks ask for the difference between expected profit and actual profit. 
Interviewee 10 Banks ask for difference between expected profit and actual profit. 
Interviewee 12 Banks usually ask for expected profit. 
As in the previous table, in this table six interviewees (50%) did not answer the 
question, three interviewees (25%) of interviewees and 50% of respondents believe 
that banks also ask for the difference between expected profit and actual profit, two 
interviewees (16.6%) of interviewees and 33.2% of respondents believe that banks 
usually ask for expected profit and one interviewee (8.3%) of interviewees and 16.6%  
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of respondents believes that banks donate the difference between expected profit and 
actual profit. In conclusion it can be said that this issue is debatable or there is not 
unified behaviour. Banks‘ behaviour regarding profit depends on the bank or branch 
authorities.  
7.7 SHARIAH BOARD  
In many Islamic banks, there is a shariah board to guide bank staff and also to check 
banks‘ activities regarding to shariah-compliance. Despite the participation of a 
shariah board in the drafting of the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran., it was 
omitted by parliament because, they believed that, due to the complete change in the 
banking system to Islamic banking and the existence of thousands of branches, firstly, 
it was not possible to have a lot of shariah boards and secondly and more importantly, 
a shariah board is not necessary. This is because, they saw it as a system not one bank 
among several banks and there is the Guardian Council that checks all laws regarding 
shariah-compliance. Therefore they are sure that all laws approved by parliament in 
the country are shariah-compliant. 
 
Table 7.27: Results for Question 6 (Overview of the Existence of a Shariah Board 
in Islamic Banking in Iran) 
 
Question 6 What do you think of a shariah board in Iran’s Islamic Banking? 
Focused coding 
            1        Its possibility 
            2 Its usefulness. 
            3 Its necessity. 
       Themes shariah boards should be considered as possible, useful and necessary. 
Moreover, in practice we have several institutions which have a responsibility to 
check circumstances and implementation of laws, including the Law of Usury-Free 
Banking in Iran, in particular the Central Bank of Iran control bank‘s actions. Table 
7.27 shows aspects of the shariah Board which are under discussion. They are: its 
possibility, its usefulness and its necessity. 
Table 7.28, shows the opinions of interviewees with regard to possibility of the 
existence of a shariah board in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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Table 7.28. Focused Coding number 1 for Question 6 (Existence of a Shariah 
Board in Islamic Banking in Iran) 
 
Possibility of a shariah board in Islamic Banking in Iran. 
Interviewee 1 It is possible. 
Interviewee 2 It is possible. 
Interviewee 4 It is possible. 
Interviewee 8 It is possible. 
Interviewee 9 It is possible. 
Interviewee 11 Yes, it is possible. 
Interviewee 12 It is possible. 
As Table 7.28, shows five interviewees (41.6%) did not answer the question. and 
seven interviewees (58, 3%) of interviewees and 100% of respondents believe that it 
is possible. 
Table 7.29, shows the opinions of the interviewees regarding the usefulness of a 
shariah board in Islamic Banking in Iran. As can be seen in this table, as in the 
previous table five interviewees (41.6 %) did not answer this question. Four 
interviewees (33%) of interviewees and 57% of respondents stated that it is definitely 
useful, one interviewee (8.3%) of interviewees and 14% of respondents believes that 
it is useful because the supervisory offices are not sufficient; two interviewees 16.6% 
of interviewees and 28.6% of respondents believe that it is not useful, but their 
reasons were different. The first one said ―it is not useful for our country where the 
whole system is Islamic; rather it is useful for countries with dual systems.‖ The 
second one says, it is not useful in Iran. If contracts were defined well and staff were 
educated well, there would be no need for a shariah board. In conclusion, 71% of 
respondents believe that a shariah board is useful for the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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Table 7.29: Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 6 (Existence of a Shariah 
Board in Islamic Banking in Iran)   
Usefulness of a shariah board in Islamic banking in Iran. 
Interviewee 1 No. It is not useful for our country in which the whole system is Islamic; 
rather it is useful for countries with dual system. 
Interviewee 2 Definitely, it is useful. 
Interviewee 4 Definitely, it is useful. 
Interviewee 8 It is useful. Our supervisory offices are not sufficient.  
Interviewee 9 Yes, it is definitely useful. 
Interviewee 11 No, it is not useful in Iran. If contracts were defined well and staff 
educated well, there would be no need for a shariah board. Of course, just 
one shariah board in central banks may be useful. 
Interviewee 12 Yes, it is definitely useful. 
Table 7.30, shows the opinions of the interviewees regarding the necessity of a 
shariah board in Islamic Banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As can be seen in 
this table, five interviewees (41.6 %) did not answer the question as in the previous 
two tables. It is worth mentioning that the persons who did not answer this question 
are the same ones who did not answer the two previous questions. Three interviewees  
 
Table 7.30: Focused coding number 3 for Question 6 (Existence of the Shariah 
Board in Islamic Banking in Iran) 
 
Necessity of shariah board in Islamic banking in Iran. 
Interviewee 1 No. The Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran performs that function. 
Interviewee 2 It is necessary. 
Interviewee 4 Definitely, it is necessary. 
Interviewee 8 Yes, it is necessary. Our supervisory officers are not sufficient. 
Interviewee 9 Yes, it is definitely necessary. 
Interviewee 11 Yes, but just in the Central Bank. 
Interviewee 12 Yes, it is definitely necessary. 
 (25%) of interviewees and 43% of respondents believe that it is definitely necessary, 
(25%) of interviewees and 43% of respondents believe that it is necessary, and one of 
them explained the reason, saying: ―Our supervisory officers are not sufficient‖. one 
interviewee believes that it is not necessary and he explained that, in fact, the Central 
Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran both supervises and controls new contracts and bank 
activities regarding shariah-compliance.  
In conclusion, the majority of interviewees who answered the question believe that a 
shariah board is possible, useful and necessary for Islamic banking in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
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7.8 PROBLEMS WHICH CAUSED THE ABSENCE OF A SHARIAH BOARD 
IN ISLAMIC BANKING IN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. 
Some economists believe that the existence of a shariah board would create some 
problems in Islamic banking of Iran, such as: (1) Inconsistency in banking activities in 
different branches or banks, especially in Iran where the whole system is Usury-Free, 
(2) Lack of sufficient specialists in both banking affairs and shariah law, (3) Increase 
in bank costs. Table 7.31 shows these problems. 
 
Table 7.31: Results for Question 7 (Overview of the Problems Regarding a 
Shariah Board in Islamic Banking in Iran) 
 
Question 7 What are the problems regarding shariah boards in Islamic 
banking? 
Focused coding 
            1        Inconsistency in banking activities in different branches or banks, especially 
in Iran where the whole system is Usury-Free.  
            2 Shortage of specialists in both banking affairs and shariah law.  
Themes Problems which the shariah board is faced with are inconsistency in 
banking activities in different branches of the banks and shortage of 
specialist.  
Some believe that shariah boards cause inconsistency in banking activities in different 
branches or banks because each shariah board may have its own opinion. So it is 
possible that one contract or project could be approved in one branch or bank and 
rejected in another. This could lead to people not trusting or relying on Islamic 
banking. Table 7.32 shows the opinions of the interviewees regarding inconsistency in 
banking activities between different branches or banks. 
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Table 7.32: Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 7 (Problems Regarding 
Shariah Boards in Islamic Banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran) 
 
Inconsistency in banking activities between different branches or banks. 
Interviewee 1 In Malaysia they designed a central shariah board which led to unified 
methods.  
Interviewee 4 I do not agree. 
Interviewee 5 As this board would be a policy maker it could lead to unified methods. 
Interviewee 7 As this board would be a policy maker it could lead to unified methods. 
Interviewee 8 It depends on the organization. If they are well organised there wouldn‘t 
be any problem in this regard. 
Interviewee 9 If there was a shariah board just in the Central Bank, not only would it 
not lead to inconsistency, it would lead to unified methods. 
Interviewee 11 Yes. 
Interviewee 12 Yes, if every bank has a shariah board. 
As can be seen in Table 7.32, four interviewees did not answer this question. 
Interviewee number one believes that they could create some inconsistency, but the 
existence of one central shariah board could solve the problem, as in Malaysia; 
interviewees numbers five and seven believe that, as this board would be a policy 
maker, it could lead to unified methods, interviewee number eight believes that it 
depends on the organization. If they were well-organised there would be no problem 
in this regard, interviewee number four does not believe there is inconsistency, 
Interviewee number nine believes that, if there was a shariah board just in the Central 
Bank, not only would it not lead to inconsistency, but it would lead to unified 
methods and interviewees numbers eleven and twelve believe that the existence of 
shariah boards leads to inconsistency but interviewee number twelve‘s opinion is 
conditional. In conclusion, it can be said that the majority of interviewees who 
answered the question disagree with the opinion that shariah boards lead to 
inconsistency. 
Some bank managers believe that, because of the huge number of bank branches in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is not possible to have shariah boards in banks 
because members of shariah boards should be specialists both in banking affairs and 
shariah law. Of course, this opinion is based on the existence of a shariah board in 
each branch. Table 7.33 shows the opinions of interviewees regarding lack of enough 
specialists in both banking affairs and shariah law. 
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Table 7.33: Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 7 (Problems Regarding 
Shariah Boards in Islamic Banking in Iran) 
 
Shortage of specialists in both banking affairs and Shariah law is a reason for 
not having shariah boards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Interviewee 1 No, the main issue is lack of necessity for shariah boards. 
Interviewee 2 It cannot be the reason. 
Interviewee 4 It is a problem, but it was not the reason. It can be solved. 
Interviewee 5 No, it cannot be the reason. It is possible to train some staff and even 
students. 
Interviewee 7 No, it cannot be the reason.  
Interviewee 8 No, it cannot be the reason. It is possible to train some staff and even 
students. 
Interviewee 9 If there could be a shariah board in every branch, it would be right. 
Interviewee 11 No. 
Interviewee 12 No, the reason was having Guardian Council instead of shariah board. 
As can be seen in Table 7.33, three interviewees (25%) did not answer the question; 
interviewee number one believes that a shortage of specialists in both banking affairs 
and shariah law is not a reason for not having a shariah board in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran.  The main issue is lack of necessity for a shariah board; interviewees numbers 
two, seven and eleven believe that: a shortage of specialists in both banking affairs 
and shariah law is not a reason for not having a shariah board in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, interviewee number four believes that it is a problem, but it is not the reason 
as it could be solved, interviewees numbers five and eight believe that: it cannot be 
the reason. It is possible to train some staff and even students and interviewee number 
nine believes that if there could be a shariah board in every branch, it would be good. 
In conclusion, it can be said that just one interviewee believes that if there was a 
shariah board in every branch, it would be good so it is accepted from the 
interviewees‘ point of view that a shortage of specialists in both banking affairs and 
shariah law is not a reason for not having a shariah board in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.    
7.9 SOLUTIONS FOR THE PROBLEMS REGARDING THE SHARIAH 
BOARD 
In this section interviewees will be asked about solutions for the problems regarding 
shariah boards in Islamic banking in Iran. Table 7.34, shows these solutions. They 
are: The existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank, the existence of one 
shariah board in the Central Bank and one representative in any province for all 
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banks, the existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank and one representative 
in any province for any bank, the existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank 
and also in any central branches for all banks in the centre of the country (capital) and 
one representative in any province for any bank, the existence of descriptions of their 
duties and the necessity of checking contracts according to the relevant laws, not 
according to their own point of view. 
 
Table 7.34: Results for Question 8 (Overview of Types of Solutions to the 
Problems Regarding Shariah Boards in Islamic Banking in Iran) 
 
Question 8 What are the solutions for above mentioned problems regarding 
shariah boards in Islamic Banking in Iran? 
Focused coding 
1                   Existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank. 
2 Existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank and one representative 
in any province for all banks. 
3 Existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank and one representative 
in any province for any bank. 
4             Existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank and also in any central 
branches for all banks in the centre of the country, and one representative in 
any province for any bank. 
5 Existence of descriptions of duties for them. 
6 The necessity of checking contracts according to the relevant laws, not 
according to their own point of view. 
     Themes The potential solutions for the identified problems with the shariah board 
in Islamic Republic of Iran are: existence of one shariah board in the 
Central Bank, one shariah board in the Central Bank and one 
representative in any province for all banks, one shariah board in the 
Central Bank and one representative in any province for any bank, one 
shariah board in the Central Bank and also in any central branches for all 
banks in the centre of the country and one representative in any province for 
any bank, existence of description of their responsibilities and the necessity 
of checking contracts according to the relevant laws, not according to their 
own point of view. 
As can be seen in Table 7.35, five interviewees did not answer this question, 
interviewee number one (8.3% of interviewees and 14% of responders) believes that : 
―There is no need for a shariah board, because the Central Bank performs the role‖, 
interviewees numbers 2,9 and 12 (25% of interviewees and 42.86% of responders) 
believe in the ―existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank and having one 
representative in any province for all banks‖ but interviewee number nine added that  
―this representative should be just a link, nothing more‖, interviewee number four 
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(8.3% of interviewees and 14% of responders) believes there should be one shariah 
board at least in the Central Bank, interviewee number eight (8.3% of interviewees 
 
Table 7.35: Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 8 (Solutions Regarding 
Shariah Boards in Islamic Banking in Iran) 
 
Existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank or the existence of one 
shariah board in the Central Bank and one representative in any province for all 
banks or the existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank and one 
representative in any province for any bank or the existence of one shariah 
board in the Central Bank and also in any central branch for all banks in the 
centre of the country and one representative in any province for any bank.    
Interviewee 1 There is no need for a shariah board because the Central Bank performs 
this role. 
Interviewee 2 Existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank and one 
representative in any province for all banks. 
Interviewee 4 Existence of one shariah board at least in the Central Bank. 
Interviewee 8 Existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank and also in any 
central branches for all banks in the centre of the country. 
Interviewee 9 Existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank and one 
representative in any province for all banks, but this representative should 
be just a connector, nothing more. 
Interviewee 11 Existence of one shariah board just in the Central Bank. 
Interviewee 12 Existence of one shariah board in the Central Bank and one 
representative in any province for all banks. 
and 14% of responders) believes there should be one shariah board in the Central 
Bank and also in any central branches for all banks in the country centre and 
interviewee number eleven (8.3% of interviewees and 14% of responders) believes 
there should be just one shariah board in the Central Bank. 
As interviewee number four believes there should be ―one shariah board at least in 
the Central Bank‖, it means that he does not disagree with other options. So, it is 
possible to add his opinion to all options. Therefore, the above percentages will 
change to (16.6 % of interviewees and 28% of respondents) and (33% of interviewees 
and 57% of respondents). In conclusion, the majority of responders believe there 
should be one shariah board in the Central Bank and one representative in any 
province for all banks. 
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In addition to above suggestions, another solution to inconsistency could be the 
introduction of a description of the duties of the shariah board. The opinions of the 
interviewees can be seen in Table 7.36. 
 
Table 7.36: Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 8 (Solutions Regarding 
Shariah Boards in Islamic Banking in Iran) 
 
Introduction of a description of duties for shariah boards and necessity of 
checking contracts according to them and other relevant laws, not according to 
their own point of view. 
Interviewee 1 Yes. 
Interviewee 2 Yes. 
Interviewee 3 Yes. 
Interviewee 4 Yes. 
Interviewee 5 Yes. 
Interviewee 7 Yes. 
Interviewee 8 Yes. 
Interviewee 9 There is no need for that. 
Interviewee 10 Yes. 
Interviewee 11 Yes. 
Interviewee 12 Yes. 
As can be seen in Table 7.36, interviewee number six did not answer the question and 
interviewee number nine believes that there is no need for it. Other interviewees agree 
that there should be a description of the duties of shariah boards and that contracts 
should be checked according to it and other related laws, not according to their own 
point of view. 
7.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to examine the assurance of shariah-compliance in Islamic 
banking according to interviewees‘ responses. As mentioned before, by shariah- 
compliance we mean not only using proper contracts for the projects but also 
considering their profitability. Furthermore, we asked for the opinions of the 
interviewees regarding the problems with which Islamic banks are faced and their 
solutions. The vast majority of interviewees believe that banking system authorities in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran are able to make sure that banking activities are shariah -
compliant by careful consideration of each contract, and of the honesty, profitability, 
speciality and experience of their clients and by supervising the process of the project 
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throughout the entire process. In addition, all interviewees believe that previous staff 
training, was not enough and more training was needed. 
Also, regarding the problems with which the Islamic banking system is faced, the 
majority of responders believe that although asymmetric information, moral hazard 
and adverse selection are also problems in Islamic banks, they are more able to solve 
or reduce these problems than conventional banks. Furthermore, the majority of 
respondents believe that, there is not enough flexibility in Islamic contracts in Islamic 
banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran and all interviewees believe that there are 
some problems regarding financing all applicants, not because of the nature of Islamic 
contracts but because of government policies which state-owned banks have followed. 
In addition, all interviewees believe that there should be a reform in the law which, 
fortunately, has being carried out now and 58.33% believe that there is more overdue 
debt than usual. 
Regarding the solutions for these problems, ten interviewees (83.2%) believe that a 
change of structure is necessary. There is no majority for usefulness of conditions 
provided in the contract and late payment penalty. Also, all interviewees agree that 
there should be a reform of all laws regarding the banking system, including the Law 
of Usury-Free Banking in Iran. 
However, where in-part-payment profit is more than actual profit, the majority of 
interviewees (66%) believe that banks pay in-part-payment profit rates to depositors 
and also, it can be said that the majority of respondents believe that, where in-part- 
payment profit is less than actual profit, that Islamic banks in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran have been paying actual profit to their clients. 
Furthermore, regarding shariah boards the majority of interviewees who responded to 
the question believe that it is possible, useful and necessary for Islamic banking in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and that by having limited numbers of shariah boards and a 
description of the duties of those boards, the problem of inconsistency and shortage of 
specialists could be solved. 
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Chapter Eight:  
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS (THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
ISLAMIC BANKING TO THE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT) 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two the positive role of Islamic banking in economic development was 
discussed.  In Chapter Four the structure of the Iranian Economic System was 
introduced and in Chapter Five the contribution of Islamic banking to economic 
development was shown using quantitative analysis. This chapter will provide a 
qualitative analysis of the interview questions regarding the contribution of Islamic 
banking in Iran to economic development, according to the responses of the 
interviewees.                       
Once again the semi- structured interview was chosen to conduct the interview 
survey. Twelve managers and advisors from the Central Bank and commercial banks 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran were selected for face-to-face interviews. In addition, a 
complementary interview was necessary in order to augment data collection so I went 
to the Islamic Republic of Iran to carry out the interviews. I had to carry out the 
complementary interview with some interviewees by telephone. Also in this chapter I 
have replaced the jurisprudent with an economist who had carried out a great deal of 
theoretical and practical research on Islamic banking. Finally, the collected data were 
analysed using thematic analysis and coding. 
8.2 THE CONTRIBUTION OF ISLAMIC BANKING TO THE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT  
Table 8.1 shows types of effect of Islamic banking on economic development in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. These effects include: Effect on the mobilisation of 
monetary resources (deposits), effect on the allocation of monetary resources 
(financial facilities), effect on efficiency, effect on encouraging people to deal with 
the banking system, effect on the internal economic crisis, effect on and of the 
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external economic crisis, effect on inflation, effect on employment, effect on liquidity, 
effect on internal trade, effect on external trade, effect on real GDP and Profitability. 
 
Table 8.1: Results for Question 1 (Overview of Types of Effects of Islamic 
Banking on Economic Development)  
 
Question 1 What have been effects of Islamic Banking on economic 
development in Iran? 
Focused coding 
            1        Effect on the mobilisation of monetary resources (deposits). 
            2 Effect on the allocation of monetary resources (financial facilities). 
            3 Effect on efficiency. 
           4 Effect on encouraging people to deal with the banking system. 
           5 Effect on the internal economic crisis. 
           6 Effect on and affected of the external economic crisis. 
           7 Effect on inflation. 
           8 Effect on employment.  
           9 Effect on liquidity. 
         10 Effect on internal trade. 
         11 Effect on external trade. 
         12 Effect on real GDP. 
         13 Profitability 
Themes The effect of Islamic banking on economic development in Iran can be 
defined as its effect on the mobilisation of monetary resources(deposits), 
allocation of monetary resources (financial facilities), efficiency, 
encouragement of people, the internal economic crisis, external economic 
crisis, inflation, employment, internal trade, external trade, real GDP and 
profitability. 
Interviewees were questioned about the ways in which Islamic banking has affected 
economic development in Iran and their opinions were coded. 
Table 8.2 shows the opinions of interviewees with regard to the effect of Islamic 
banking in Iran on the mobilisation of monetary resources (deposits). As the table 
suggests one of them, 8.3%, answered ―I don‘t know‖ and one, 8.3%, said that it is 
difficult to say anything positively or negatively.  
83.4% of interviewees answered that converting from conventional banking to an 
Islamic banking system has had a positive effect on the mobilisation of deposits. One 
of them, 8.3%, answered ―I don‘t know‖ and one interviewee, 8.3%, answered that it 
is difficult to say anything, either positively or negatively.  
 
  
211 
Table 8.2: Focused Coding Number 1 for Question1 (Effect of Islamic Banking 
on Economic Development)  
Effect of Islamic banking in Iran on the mobilisation of monetary resources 
(deposits). 
Interviewee 1 Deposits increased. 
Interviewee 2 We are in a society in which there are no conventional banks so it is not 
easy to answer this question, but there is no doubt that religious people 
have been encouraged to deposit in banks since the elimination of riba. 
Interviewee 3 It has definitely had a positive effect because believers who did not 
deposit in banks before have been attracted by banks since the elimination 
of riba but non believers have not left the banks. Non believers are 
looking to maximise their profit and there is no difference between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. 
Interviewee 4 Theoretically it should have a positive effect on deposits and practically it 
has caused an increase in deposits.  
Interviewee 5 Yes. It was positive but it relies on explanation to the people. If we 
explain Islamic banking methods to them more, they will be encouraged 
more. 
Interviewee 6 It was very good. People were attracted after that. Deposits increased 
considerably as can be seen in the data 
Interviewee 7 Our report is different regarding different areas. Sunni brothers often tend 
toward Qardh-Al-Hasanah. Of course, because people believe in the 
system, they look at it from an optimistic point of view; they trust the 
banks and are not wary of them. 
Interviewee 8 Yes, a lot of people are eager to deposit in banks. First of all, because they 
want to obtain halal profit and since the elimination of riba, there is no 
problem regarding shariah-compliance. Secondly, because they trust the 
banking system rather than unofficial markets. Of course, about 10% to 
20% of people go to the unofficial market which is more expensive than 
the banking system. 
Interviewee 9 Religious people, including many businessmen in the markets, did not 
previously deal with banks as they believed the banking system was not 
Islamic. After this law, they started to cooperate with banks. 
Interviewee 10 Actually, I do not know. 
Interviewee 11 I think it was positive. The people were split into two groups; one group 
was looking just for interest and benefit. There was no difference for them 
between different banking systems. The other group, which was the 
majority, was looking for investment in a lawful (halal) way. This group 
was definitely attracted. From an empirical point of view, it can be seen 
that despite the crisis in other economic sectors, the banking system was 
profitable. Also as we try to understand our clients, although, we have 
overdue debt we can say that we do not have unpaid debt and this 
decreases the bank costs.  
 
Interviewee 12 As there is just one banking system in Iran, it is difficult to give an 
opinion. 
Table 8.3 shows opinions of interviewees with regard to the effect of Islamic banking 
in Iran on the allocation of monetary resources (financial facilities). As the table 
shows two interviewees (16.6%) did not answer the question and one interviewee 
(8.3%) believes that it does not have any effect on allocated facilities. However, nine 
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interviewees (75.1% of interviewees and 90% of the respondents) strongly believe 
Islamic banking has had a positive effect on allocated facilities. 
 
Table 8.3: Focused Coding Number 2 for Question1 (Effect of Islamic Banking 
on Economic Development). 
 
Effect of Islamic banking in Iran on the allocation of monetary resources 
(financial facilities) 
Interviewee 1 They have increased. 
Interviewee 3 It was positive. Since the elimination of riba, a lot of believers have been 
attracted by banks. 
Interviewee 4 Theoretically, demand for facilities has increased because: (1) There is no 
interest rate. (2) Investment risk is divided between investors and 
depositors. (3) Due to the partnership between them and banks, as agents 
of the depositor, supervise projects so efficiency increases and leads to an 
increase in profit which attracts both savers and investors. (4) Banks 
usually select a portfolio which includes projects with different levels of 
risk and returns. So, by assuming that facilities have a positive 
relationship with return and negative one with risk, which was approved 
in our research for the Agricultural Bank of Iran, and by noticing that due 
to supervision which is strong in Islamic banks, it is expected that the 
portfolio would be the best one. In practice, the data shows that the effect 
was positive. 
Interviewee 6 It was very good. People were attracted after that. 
Interviewee 7 There was no effect. 
Interviewee 8 A lot of people have been attracted to the banks. 
Interviewee 9 It was positive. 
Interviewee 10 Actually, I do not know. 
Interviewee 11 The effect was good. 
Interviewee 12 The effect was good because a lot of developmental projects have been 
financed by the banking system which may not have economic 
justification, or benefit, in an interest based banking system. 
Table 8.4 shows the opinions of interviewees regarding the effect of Islamic banking 
in Iran on efficiency. As this table shows interviewees three, five, six and ten (33.2%) 
did not respond to the questions and interviewee seven believes that it has not had a 
particular effect on efficiency because there is no major difference between the two 
systems in practice. Interviewee two believes that efficiency according to its 
conventional definition, percentage of output to input, in Islamic banking in Iran is not 
very high. That does not mean that efficiency in this system is lower than in the 
conventional banking system, but we need a new efficiency index for state-owned 
Islamic banks in Iran because the banking system in Iran is not seen as an economic 
organisation which tries to maximise its profit but either as a charity or an instrument 
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by which government can support its developmental policies. Therefore, we should 
consider these extra qualitative services as part of their output. 
State-owned banks have branches in some places which do not have economic 
benefit, but facilitate banking activities for people. Furthermore, the amount which 
they receive for their services, such as receipt of electricity, gas, telephone and mobile 
phone bills, is very low.  
 
Table 8.4. Focused Coding Number 3 for Question1 (Effect of Islamic Banking 
on Economic Development).  
Effect of Islamic banking in Iran on Efficiency 
Interviewee 1 It has been positive. 
Interviewee 2 Efficiency is percentage of output to input. I accept that this percentage is 
not high, but the reason is, as I mentioned before, that the banking system 
in Iran is not counted as an economic firm which tries to maximise its 
profit but is considered either as a charity or an instrument by which the 
government supports its developmental policies so we should not expect 
this system to work efficiently with this criterion. We should consider 
these qualitative services as part of their output. In fact, we should design 
a new efficiency index for state-owned Islamic banks in Iran. In this 
situation the Islamic banking system will have a positive effect on 
efficiency because partnership and supervision can lead to a higher level 
of efficiency. 
Interviewee 4 One thing that decreases efficiency is transaction cost. In some contracts 
such as joaalah, transaction cost is high, but it depends on some laws and 
regulations, not on the nature of contracts itself. In technical efficiency, 
which is related to efficiency in a productive organisation, principally 
there is no difference whether they work with Islamic banks or 
conventional banks. However, due to the partnership between investors 
and depositors, in partnership contracts banks, as agent of the depositor, 
supervise the projects regarding the technology which they want to use so 
this issue has a positive effect on efficiency and increases it. Also, 
supervision can have a positive effect on efficiency by decreasing 
asymmetric information. 
Interviewee 7 It has not had a particular effect on efficiency because there is no major 
difference between the two systems in practice. 
Interviewee 8 Its effect was very good. 
Interviewee 9 
 
The reality is that believers are happy with Islamic banking and non-
believers have no problem with it so it can be useful for the economy and 
can increase efficiency.  
Interviewee 11 Its effect was good. 
Interviewee 12 Its effect was good for the reasons given in the previous table. 
Furthermore, state-owned banking systems limit managers‘ roles. If they had more 
authority, they would be able to act more efficiently. Sometimes governments 
establish one employment group which is responsible for creating new jobs for the 
unemployed and the banking system is ordered to provide facilities according to 
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demand. Also, according to article 138 of the Constitution, the crisis committees of 
productive and agricultural units can extend the period for repaying facilities without 
banks playing any role in this process. In addition, the General Assembly is the 
decision maker in private banks, whereas in state-owned banks, the government is the 
decision maker and they do not consider profit at all. In the case of designing a new 
index, this would have a positive effect on efficiency and increase it. Also, partnership 
and supervision can lead to a higher level of efficiency. 
Interviewee four believes there are some limitations in relation to some contracts in 
Iran which increase transaction costs and have a negative effect on efficiency, but 
they should not be seen as characteristic of Islamic banking. For example, as the 
joaalah contract is counted as the ―contract work‖ in the law of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, from the first they must pay 5% as insurance and 5% as tax which increases 
transaction cost significantly. This is one reason for decreasing the share of joaalah 
after 10 years of its usage in banking system of Iran. However, he emphasises that the 
nature of Islamic banking is such that it increases efficiency because of the existence 
of partnership and supervision. In conclusion, 58.3% of interviewees and 87.5% of 
respondents believe that Islamic banking has a more positive effect on efficiency than 
the conventional banking system but none of the respondents believe that efficiency in 
Islamic banking in Iran is at a high level of efficiency with the present efficiency 
index. All of them believe that the problem is created by government interference. 
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Table 8.5: Focused Coding Number 4 for Question 1 (Effect of Islamic Banking 
on Economic Development).  
 
Effect of Islamic banking in Iran on encouraging people to deal with the banking 
system. 
Interviewee 1 Positive. 
Interviewee 2 There is no doubt that religious people have been encouraged to deal with 
the banks since the elimination of riba. 
Interviewee 3 It has definitely had a positive effect. 
Interviewee 4 Yes, it has had positive effect. 
Interviewee 5 Yes, it has had positive effect. 
Interviewee 6 Yes, it has had positive effect. 
Interviewee 7 It was effective in Qardh-Al-Hasanah accounts. 
Interviewee 8 It has definitely had a positive effect. 
Interviewee 9 A lot of businessmen in the market who believed the banking system was 
not Islamic, were attracted to the banks after they converted to the Islamic 
banking system,. 
Interviewee 10 I do not know. 
Interviewee 11 Its effect has been good. 
Interviewee 12 Due to lack of dual banking system, I cannot answer accurately.  
Table 8.5 shows the opinions of the interviewees regarding the effect of Islamic 
banking in Iran on encouraging the people to deal with the banking system. As this 
table shows interviewee seven believes that it was effective in Qardh-Al-Hasanah 
accounts. Also, two interviewees answered that they do not know or cannot answer 
accurately. However, 75.1% of interviewees believe that its effect has been good and 
positive.  
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Table 8.6: Focused Coding Number 5 for Question1 (Effects of Islamic Banking 
on Economic Development). 
 
Effect of Islamic banking in Iran on the internal and external economic crisis 
Interviewee 1 Due to the entrance of the Islamic banks into containing of contracts 
rather than the shaping of contracts, which is common in the conventional 
banks, Islamic banks, including those in the Islamic banking system of 
Iran, were more successful than conventional banks.   
Interviewee 4 The main characteristic of Islamic banking is the necessity of the 
production of goods in order to obtain a financial income. In instalment 
sale, salam or in partnership, there should be production. The only 
contract which does not need production is the Qardh-Al-Hasanah 
contract. In contrast, in conventional banks it is not necessary for 
production to exist. It is enough to know that the money will return to the 
bank, and it does not matter where it is spent; it can even be used for 
gambling. This is a very important matter in banking systems. The recent 
crisis in the West started because they financed a lot of building and the 
only guarantee for repaying loans was the building itself as collateral. 
When the price of building declined and borrowers were not able to pay 
their loans, banks faced serious problems. In Islamic banks this does not 
usually happen because they cannot go into partnership with a person who 
does not have the ability to repay his loan so, Islamic banks were not as 
badly affected as conventional banks in this regard. 
Interviewee 7 It has no effect because the banking system does not strictly adhere to the 
principles of Islamic banking. 
Interviewee 8 I think it has had positive role. Islamic banks were not affected as badly as 
conventional banks. 
Interviewee 9 In Islamic banks, as financial facilities deal with real goods, these kinds of 
crisis, such as the recent US crisis, do not exist.  
Interviewee 11 Their effect against internal crisis was good but their effect on the external 
crisis was weak. 
Interviewee 12 The official banks did not experience any internal crisis at all but some 
Qardh-Al-Hasanah funds experienced some problems. However, they did 
not affect and nor were they affected by the external crisis because they 
do not have a close relationship with foreign banks.   
Table 8.6 shows the opinions of interviewees regarding the effect of Islamic banking 
in Iran on the internal and external economic crisis. It shows that interviewees two, 
three, five, six and ten (41.5%) did not respond to the questions and interviewee seven 
believes that it does not have any effect because the banking system does not strictly 
adhere to the principles of Islamic banking. Interviewee 11 believes that their effect 
on internal crisis was good but their effect on the external crisis was weak. 
Interviewee 12 differentiates between official banks and Qardh-Al-Hasanah funds 
and believes the former did not affect and was not affected by the internal crisis at all 
but the latter was sometimes faced with some problems. However, he believes that the 
banking system of Iran did not affect and nor was it affected by the external crisis 
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because they do not have close relationship with foreign banks. Interviewees one, 
four, eight and nine strongly support the role of Islamic banking in avoiding internal 
and external economic crisis. Their main reasons for these opinions are: (1) Necessity 
of the production of goods in order to obtain a financial income in Islamic banking. 
(2) Not being allowed to partner those who do not have the means to repay their loans. 
In conclusion, 50% of interviewees and 87.7% of respondents believe that the role of 
Islamic banks in avoiding economic crisis, especially an internal one is positive.  
Liquidity is a factor which plays an important role in inflation. Its movement depends 
on the government‘s monetary policies on the one hand and the creation of money via 
credit by the banking system on the other hand. The government monetary policies 
are independent of the banking system. Creation of money by the banking system is 
based on providing credit and loans. As Islamic banking activities are mainly based 
on partnership, it is expected that its effect on the creation of money is less than that 
in the conventional banking system and hence, increases liquidity less than that 
system. 
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Table 8.7: Focused Coding Number 6 for Question 1 (Effect of Islamic Banking 
on Economic Development). 
 
Effect of Islamic banking in Iran on Liquidity 
Interviewee 1 Due to partnership contracts, the creation of money is slower, causing 
reduction in liquidity. 
Interviewee 4 In the Islamic economic system, demand for money matches real 
economic growth. Also, the Islamic banking system is mainly based on 
partnership rather than loans so growth of liquidity is more limited in the 
Islamic banking system than in the conventional banking system. 
Interviewee 7 No special effect different from the other system because the banking 
system in Iran does not strictly adhere to the principles of Islamic 
banking. 
Interviewee 8 Principally, it should play a role in the reduction in liquidity growth rate. 
Interviewee 9 If money is equivalent with goods, as is the case in the Islamic banking 
system, there would not be a high growth rate in liquidity.  
Interviewee 11 It causes decrease in the liquidity growth rate. 
Interviewee 12 Sometimes it has had a negative effect and increased liquidity more than 
the Central Bank wanted. 
Table 8.7 shows opinions of interviewees regarding the effect of Islamic banking in 
Iran on liquidity. As can be seen in this table interviewees two, three, five, six and ten 
(41.5%) did not respond to the question and interviewee seven believes that it does 
not have any special effect different from the other system because the banking 
system does not maintain the principles of Islamic banking. Furthermore, interviewee 
12 believes that sometimes it has had a negative effect and increased liquidity more 
than the Central Bank wanted. However, five interviewees, 41.5% of interviewees and 
71.4% of respondents, believe that Islamic banking in Iran has played a positive role 
in decreasing liquidity growth rate. This means that by considering expansionary 
monetary policies by the government‘, if there was not an Islamic banking system in 
Iran, the country would have faced a greater growth rate in the liquidity. 
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Table 8.8: Focused Coding Number 7 for Question 1 (Effect of Islamic Banking 
on Economic Development). 
 
Effect of Islamic banking in Iran on inflation. 
Interviewee 1 
 
Due to partnership contracts, the velocity of money is slower, so causing 
reduced inflation. 
Interviewee 4 There is a balance between financial income and value added in real 
economy in Islamic banking. In fact, while there is a one-to-one 
relationship between value added in the financial sector and real economy 
sector, there is no such relationship in conventional banks. Of course, 
classic economists believe that all loans are invested, but Keynes rejected 
their claim and believed that loans could be used for speculative purposes, 
even for gambling. Sometimes the price of houses increases and can lead 
to increased house building but some times the price of shares of houses 
increase. This happened in America and led to financial crisis. However, 
in Islamic banking, a one-to-one relationship will lead to decreased 
inflation. Although, there has been a relatively high rate of inflation in 
Iran, that was because of the government‘s expansionary monetary 
policies, so if there had not been Islamic banking in Iran, the economy 
would have experienced a higher inflation rate.   
Interviewee 7 It has had no effect because the banking system does not adhere strictly to 
the principle of Islamic banking. 
Interviewee 8 It causes decreasing inflation. 
Interviewee 9 If money is equivalent to goods there will be no inflation. Inflation in Iran 
is caused mainly by government expenditure and expansionary monetary 
policy.  
Interviewee 11 The effect of Islamic banking in Iran on reducing inflation was not very 
significant. 
Interviewee 12 It is said that if Islamic banking is implemented properly, it will work 
against inflation. 
Inflation is a factor which makes the process of growth and development slow 
because during periods of inflation more capital is spent on commerce and speculative 
projects than on productive projects. So, if the Islamic banking system can decrease 
inflation, it will support the growth and development process. So, Table 8.8. has been 
designed to consider this matter from the interviewee‘s point of view. It shows the 
opinions of interviewees regarding the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on inflation. 
As this table shows interviewees two, three, five, six and ten (41.5%) did not respond 
to the question and interviewee seven (8.3%) believes that it does not have any effect 
because the banking system in Iran does not maintain the principle of Islamic banking 
strictly. Interviewee one believes that, due to partnership contracts, the velocity of 
money is slower so causes reduced inflation. Interviewees four and nine believe that 
because of the balance between financial income and value added in real economy in 
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Islamic banking, inflation would decrease if there were no other factors such as 
government expansionary monetary policies. 
 
Table 8.9: Focused Coding Number 8 for Question 1 (Effect of Islamic Banking 
on Economic Development). 
 
Effect of Islamic banking in Iran on employment 
Interviewee 1 In Islamic banking, there is no speculative demand for money so the 
financial facilities of Islamic banking are used mainly for the production 
of goods and services leading to increased employment.  
Interviewee 2  It has a positive effect on employment. 
Interviewee 3 It has a positive effect on employment. 
Interviewee 4 Islamic banking not only increases employment but also encourages 
entrepreneurs because Islamic banks work mainly according to 
partnership. So, when they are selecting their partners, they select those 
who are more experienced, more educated and more innovative. 
Consequently, demand for entrepreneurs increases in society 
Interviewee 5 It has a positive effect on employment. 
Interviewee 6 It has a positive effect on employment. 
Interviewee 7 No special effect more than the other system because the banking system 
does not adhere strictly to the principle of Islamic banking. 
Interviewee 8 It has a positive effect on employment. 
Interviewee 9 It has a positive effect on employment. 
Interviewee 10 I am not sure. 
Interviewee 11 It has a positive effect on employment. 
Interviewee 12 It has a positive effect on employment. 
In conclusion, four interviewees 33.3% of interviewees and 57.1%of respondents 
strongly support the role of Islamic banking in the reduction of inflation and two 
interviewees ,16.6% of interviewees and 28.5% of respondents, support it, but not 
strongly. However, in general, 50% of interviewees and 85.6% of respondents support 
the role of Islamic banking in the reduction of inflation. 
Employment is a very important issue regarding both economic growth and income 
distribution so it is necessary to choose a banking system which is able to increase 
employment over other systems. Due to partnership in Islamic banking, it is expected 
to play a positive role in increasing employment. Table 8.9 shows the opinions of the 
interviewees regarding the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on employment. As this 
table shows, only interviewee seven believes that it has no particular effect above 
other systems because the banking system does not adhere strictly to the principle of 
Islamic banking. However, other interviewees, 91.7%, believe that Islamic banking 
has a positive effect on employment.  
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Trade is a topic under consideration in economic literature regarding economic 
growth. It is so important that it has become centre for division of developmental 
strategies.  So, it is important for this research to investigate the role of Islamic 
banking in Iran in this regard. Table 8.10 shows the opinions of the interviewees 
regarding the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on internal and external trade. As this 
table shows only interviewee seven believes that it has had no more effect than other 
systems. Interviewee nine is not sure that Islamic banking in Iran has had a significant 
effect on trade and interviewee ten believes that at least it did not have a negative 
effect. Nine interviewees, 75%, believe that the system has had a positive effect on 
trade, except import, for which providing financial facilities has been prohibited for 
banking system by the Central Bank. Clearly this is not related to the Islamic banking 
system but it is related to the government policies for supporting internal production 
which, according to interviewee number ten, has been successful. 
 
Table 8.10: Focused Coding Number 9 for Question 1 (Effect of Islamic Banking 
on Economic Development). 
 
Effect of Islamic banking in Iran on internal and external trade 
Interviewee 1 The system facilitates internal trade activities but there are some 
restrictions regarding external trade. For example, Iranian banks were 
prohibited from giving financial facility for import by the Central Bank. 
Interviewee 2 In general they finance trade by modharabah contract but there are legal 
prohibitions for import which benefit internal production. 
Interviewee 3 It was good except for imports. Of course, that restriction was to support 
internal production.  
Interviewee 4 When growth increases everything related to it, including trade, increases. 
Furthermore, due to the lack of a fixed interest rate on modharabah, 
investment increases. Of course, some restrictions and prohibitions 
imposed on imports are not related to Islamic banks, but were the 
government policies to support internal production which was effective. 
Interviewee 5 It was effective, except in import. 
Interviewee 6 It was effective, especially in internal trade and export. 
Interviewee 7 No special effect more than the other system because the banking system 
does not strictly adhere to the principle of Islamic banking exactly. 
Interviewee 8 It was effective, except in import. 
Interviewee 9 I do not think that it had a significant effect. 
Interviewee 10 At least, it does not have a negative effect. 
Interviewee 11 Its effect on internal trade was good but not on external trade. 
Interviewee 12 It had positive effect on trade. 
Growth rate of GDP is one of the main aims of the all economic activities so the main 
aim of the every banking system should be to increase GDP. In order to estimate the 
effect of Islamic banking in Iran we interviewed some bank managers and researchers 
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to obtain their point of view. Of course, we are aware that the result is not conclusive, 
but it can be an approximation, especially, as the interviewees have good knowledge 
of this matter.  
 
Table 8.11: Focused Coding Number 10 for Question 1 (Effect of Islamic 
Banking on Economic Development)  
 
Effect of Islamic banking in Iran on real GDP 
Interviewee 1 It should be positive because it has financed a lot of projects and invested 
directly in hundreds of big project such as highways and petrochemical 
factories and so on. 
Interviewee 2 It has definitely been more effective in Iran than conventional banks 
before the Islamic Revolution. 
Interviewee 3 It has been more effective in Iran than conventional banks before the 
Islamic Revolution. 
Interviewee 4 We said before that Islamic banking, due to partnership, encourages 
human capital. This means that it encourages new technology and 
innovation too. Therefore, it definitely leads to economic growth and 
increase in GDP. 
Interviewee 5 It has had a positive effect on GDP compared with conventional banks. 
Interviewee 6 It has been more effective in Iran than conventional banks before the 
Islamic Revolution. 
Interviewee 7 No special effect different from the other systems because the banking 
system does not strictly adhere to the principle of Islamic banking. 
Interviewee 8 It has had a positive effect. 
Interviewee 9 It has had a positive effect. 
Interviewee 11 It has had a positive effect. 
Interviewee 12 It has had a positive effect. 
Table 8.11 shows the opinions of the interviewees regarding the effect of Islamic 
banking in Iran on GDP. As this table shows only interviewee seven believes that it 
had no special effect more than other systems and interviewee ten did not answer the 
question. However, ten interviewees, 83.4%, believe that Islamic banking in Iran has 
had a positive effect on GDP. Some of them referred to the projects which have been 
financed by the banking system and some of them mentioned this effect theoretically. 
For example interviewee 4 says:  ―We said before that Islamic banking, due to the 
partnership factor, encourages human capital. This means that it encourages new 
technology and innovation too. So, it definitely leads to economic growth and 
increase in GDP‖. 
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Table 8.12: Focused Coding Number 11 for Question 1 (Effect of Islamic 
Banking on Economic Development) 
 
Profitability of Islamic banking in Iran  
 
Interviewee 1 The profit is high. At the moment, both state-owned and private banks 
earn at least 25% , and I think this amount for private banks is real amount 
Interviewee 2 The profit rate in this system is low but it has rational reasons such as: 
being state–owned and being considered as a charity rather than an 
economic firm which is looking to maximise its profit; being an 
instrument for the government‘s development policies; existence of 
compulsory facilities and existence of some restrictions on involvement 
involved in profitable activities, such as oil projects, international projects 
etc. 
Interviewee 3 Profitability in private banks is very high but in state–owned banks is not 
very high because: (1) The government obliges them to reduce their 
nominal profit. (2) They have to reduce their honorarium to 0% to 
compete with private banks in collecting deposits. (3) Overdrafts from the 
Central Bank which had a 34% penalty last year.  
Interviewee 5 I believe that its profitability is high because, for example, Post Bank 
started its work in 1996 with a total capital of one billion Iranian Rials, 
but it now has 561 billion Rials. This means that over 13 years its capital 
has increased 561 times. It is worth mentioning that 140 billion Rials was 
from re-evaluation of capital but the rest was profit from internal 
resources. 
Interviewee 6 The profit rate in Iranian banks, especially private banks, is very high. 
Interviewee 7 It is no different from conventional banks because the banking system 
does not adhere strictly to the principles of Islamic banking . 
Interviewee 8 I think Iranian banks differ from all other banks in the world because they 
are state-owned and the government tries to reduce unemployment by 
employing in its bureaus. Principally, profit is not an aim in the Islamic 
banking system of Iran. In addition existence of the obligatory facilities 
reduces profits. So, we should not expect the profit rate to be high.  
Interviewee 9 I think the profitability is high. The price of private bank shares is 
increasing continuously.  
Interviewee 10 In the private banks, profitability is high but in the state-owned banks it is 
low. The reason is government intervention. Also, the banks do not have 
freedom in using their resources. 
Interviewee 11 I think the profitability is good in general but it is different in different 
banks. Usually it is less in state-owned banks than private banks and less 
in specialist banks than commercial banks. The reasons for low 
profitability in state-owned banks are: (1) Existence of expanded branches 
(2) Political issues (changing the managers) (3) Lack or at least weakness 
of motivation (4) Legal limitations with which state-owned banks are 
faced. 
Interviewee 12 Their profitability is not clear because sometimes they have to finance 
unprofitable projects. 
Although, profitability of the banking system is not directly related to its role in 
economic development, it is related to it indirectly because high profitability shows its 
relative success in its job. Table 8.12 shows the opinions of the interviewees regarding  
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the profitability of Islamic banking in Iran. As this table shows only interviewee seven 
believes that it did not have more effect than other systems and interviewee 12 
believes that their profitability is not clear because sometimes they have to finance 
unprofitable projects. However, all interviewees believe that profitability in private 
banks in Iran, which now cover about 22% of banking activities in Iran, is very high. 
Also, five interviewees, 41.5%, believe that profitability of state-owned banks is high 
and the same percentage believes that their profitability is low. It is worth mentioning 
that this group provides several reasons for this low profit rate. First and foremost is 
that Islamic banks in Iran have been considered as a charity rather than an economic 
organisation which is looking to maximise its profits. Second, they are an instrument 
for the government‘s development policies. Third, they offer obligatory facilities. For 
example, interviewee two believes that the orientation of Islamic banking in Iran is 
different from that of other banks. The banking system in Iran is state–owned, and in 
fact the government looks at it more as a charity than an economic organisation which 
is looking to maximise its profit. So, their main purpose is to serve the people‘s needs, 
not to make profit. Also, Iran‘s banking system is an instrument for the government‘s 
development policies so they have to obey the government with regard to paying 
facility and credit. They have to pay compulsory facilities and credits to some 
governmental corporations and some economic sectors which are supported by the 
government due to its development strategy, such as the automobile industry, or to 
strengthen some sectors to help them to become self-sufficient, such as the 
agricultural sector. Although in this sector the government pays a subsidy, in general 
the purpose is not maximisation of profit. Furthermore, there are some limitations on 
Islamic Banks in Iran which do not exist for Islamic banking in GCC countries or 
other countries that reduce their profit as follows: 
1) Islamic banks in GCC countries or other countries are able to share in an oil 
corporation which usually has a high profit rate, but Islamic banks in Iran cannot. 
2) They can invest in foreign countries but Islamic banks in Iran cannot or at least 
Islamic banks in Iran have restrictions. 
3) They are able to enter the capital market, but Islamic banks in Iran are only allowed 
to buy bonds at most equal to 2% of their deposits. 
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4) The most important source of income for Islamic banks in Iran is honorarium but it 
is somewhere between 0 to 3%. 
5) Another source of income for Islamic banks in Iran is work fees, which should not 
be more than the work which has been spent on it. This means that they cannot have a 
margin as additional income. 
6) The return rate in exchange contracts can be predetermined and this rate has been 
determined by the government at much lower than the rate of inflation, while the 
return rate in partnership contracts is determined by the real market and therefore the 
rate of inflation is included in it and consequently it can be higher than the return rate 
in exchange contracts and even inflation. It is worth mentioning that the proportion of 
exchange contracts in Iranian state-owned banks is about 70% while this share in 
private banks in Iran is 10% so it is natural that the Iranian profit rate is low. 
In addition, according to Article 34 of the Monetary and Banking Law, some activities 
have been prohibited in the banking system as follows: 
a) Buying and selling goods for trade. This means that they cannot buy goods and 
ensile them and then sell them. They can buy goods and sell them to the customer 
immediately as instalment selling.  
b) They are not allowed to buy immoveable goods such as land and buildings with the 
purpose of selling them after several months or years. 
c) Iranian banks‘ ability to buy bonds and negotiable papers and to share with 
corporations from inside or outside the country is limited to the extent determined by 
the Central Bank so if we know that the bond market of one foreign corporation is 
good, we cannot buy their bond. These restrictions cause a great loss of profit. 
Interviewee 11 believes that we should firstly make a distinction between private 
banks and state-owned banks and secondly in state-owned bank between commercial 
banks and specialised banks. Also in the private banks we should make a distinction 
on two points. The first is activity antecedent and the second is management. In 
particular we can count four factors as reasons for relatively low profitability in public 
banks as follows: 
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1) Existence of the expanded branches in the state-owned banks. Every state-owned 
commercial bank in Iran has at least 2000 branches and Bank-e Melli and Bank-e 
Saderat have 3500 branches all of which are not necessary, especially now that there 
is electronic banking and customers are also able to go to any branch in the country. 
2) Political issues. In the state-owned banks, every government has tried to change 
high level managers and bring in some who have the same political tendency. This 
affects their activities and efficiency. 
3) Legal limitations with which state-owned banks are faced. 
4) Lack or at least weakness of motivation. Managers and staff have a fixed salary, 
independent of their productivity. Recently, profit rates for Bank-e Saderat (Export 
Bank), Bank-e Tejarat (Trade Bank) and Bank-e Mellat (Nation Bank) were between 
17% and 26%. Bank-e Melli (National Bank) and Bank-e Sepah are also at this level.  
Of course, the state-owned specialised banks are different because they are 
development banks and the aim of their establishment and development is not profit 
but to give service to the economic sectors. So, sometimes, the Agricultural Bank not 
only does not make a profit but is faced with loss. 
In established private banks their profit rate is high. For example, the profit for any 
share (every share is 100 tooman) in these banks was as follows: Kar Afarin Bank 70 
Iranian Tooman, Eqtesad-e Noawin Bank 62 Tooman, Saman Bank 40-50 Tooman 
and Parsian 37-38 Tooman. 
8.3 POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES OF ISLAMIC BANKING IN IRAN 
REGARDING ECONOMIC GROWTH 
While designing questions for the interviews and during the interviews, some 
questions arose regarding some disadvantages which may be faced by Islamic banking 
in Iran regarding economic growth. These disadvantages have been considered for 
deliberation. Table 8.13 shows these disadvantages as follows:  
 Being state-owned, legal restrictions regarding financial facilities on the demand side, 
existence of unnecessary conditions provided in the contract, limitation in financial 
instruments, fixed regulations and impossibility of innovation, dependence of the 
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Central Bank on the government, existence of obligatory financial facilities and 
weakness of competition. 
 
Table 8.13: Results for Question 2 (Overview of Possible Disadvantages of 
Islamic Banking in Iran Regarding Economic Growth) 
 
Question 2 What are the possible disadvantages of Islamic banking in Iran 
regarding economic growth 
Focused coding 
1 Being state-owned. 
2 Legal restrictions regarding financial facilities for demand side. 
3 Restrictions in financial instruments. 
4 Fixed regulations and impossibility of innovation. 
5 Dependence of the Central Bank on the government. 
6 Existence of obligatory financial facilities 
7 Weakness of competition 
   Themes Some disadvantages of Islamic Banking in Iran regarding economic growth 
may be: being state owned; legal restrictions regarding demand for financial 
facilities; fixed regulations and impossibility of innovation; dependence on 
the Central Bank; obligatory financial facilities and weakness of 
competition. 
State-ownership in all productive and service firms has been debatable between 
economists. After the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the government decided to 
nationalize all banks and since the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran this has 
continued. Today it is accepted that state-owned banks are not as efficient as private 
banks and the reason is their dependence on the government which make them an 
instrument for government policies. So, the best way for them is converting to private 
banks. For this reason in recent years some private banks have been established and 
some state-owned banks have been changed to private banks in Iran, covering more 
than 22% of banking activities. What is worth mentioning is that their growth rate is 
very high. For example their growth rate in average in mobilisation of resources 
during 1999-2006 has been 173.2%.
38
 State- ownership of the banking system in Iran 
has been seen by interviewees as a disadvantage. Table 8.14 shows the opinions of the 
interviewees regarding state-ownership of Islamic banking in Iran as a disadvantage to 
economic growth.   
 
                                                 
38
 See table 6.10. 
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Table 8.14: Focused Coding Number 1 for Question 2 (Possible Disadvantages of 
Islamic Banking in Iran Regarding Economic Growth) 
 
state-ownership 
Interviewee 1 Yes. 
Interviewee 2 Yes, it is a disadvantage in general. 
Interviewee 3 Yes. 
Interviewee 4 When the government determines managers, it is probably based on 
political issues not on their ability. As the manager should satisfy share 
holders, the manager of state-owned banks should satisfy the government. 
This may create some problems in efficiency. 
Interviewee 5 Yes. 
Interviewee 6 Yes. 
Interviewee 7 Due to lack of flexibility in the laws related to state-owned banks and lack 
of notice to the principles of management science, they are not efficient. 
Interviewee 8 Although there is a kind of inefficiency in state-owned banks, it is 
necessary to have a few state-owned banks. In particular, National Bank 
(Bank-e Melli) should remain state-owned because there are some 
developmental and public issues which private banks do not carry out. 
Interviewee 9 It depends on the government‘s behaviour. If the government considers 
the banks as its fund it is dangerous, otherwise it is not bad.                         
Interviewee 10 Yes, because the government interferes in their affairs more than those of 
private banks. The banks do not have freedom in their use of resources. 
They are not allowed to act according to maximising their profit. 
Interviewee 11 It is definitely a disadvantage. The reasons are: (1) lack of freedom of 
managers in decision making, They are not free to use their resources as 
they want (2) weakness of motivation: Motivation in private bank staff, 
especially, in high level management is much higher than in state-owned 
banks (3) Slowness of the evaluation process (4) Lack of speed in 
decision-making. The private banks are speedier than government-owned 
banks. For example, decision making for a purchase may take two days in 
the private banks, while, it takes more than one month in the government-
owned banks. 
Interviewee 12 Yes, it is a disadvantage. 
As the table shows, only interviewee nine believes that it depends on the behaviour of 
the government. If the government considers the banks as its fund it is dangerous, 
otherwise it isn‘t bad. However, 91.7% of interviewees believe that state-ownership of 
the banks has disadvantages. Their reasons are: (1) Determining of managers may be 
based on political issues not on their ability. (2) Lack of flexibility in the laws related 
to state-owned banks and lack of notice to the principles of management science. (3) 
Government interference in their affairs is more than that in private banks. (4) Lack of 
freedom of managers in decision making: They are not free to use their resources as 
they want. For example, there are two kinds of contract in Islamic banks, barter or 
exchange contracts and partnership contracts. In the barter contracts, such as joaalah, 
salam and ijarah, the profit rate can be determined in advance. In contrast, in 
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partnership contracts this rate cannot be determined in advance, only expected 
minimum profit rate can be determined.        
In 2007 (1386 in the Iranian calendar), The Iranian Money and Credit Council was 
ordered to determine an expected minimum and maximum profit rate. They 
determined 17% for 2007 (1386) for state-owned banks and recommended that private 
banks should not exceed more than 2% of this rate. 1n 2008 (1387) the Council 
determined 12% and 13% for state-owned banks and private banks respectively, then 
12% for both of them. It is worth mentioning that these rates were fixed for barter 
contracts and is the expected minimum profit rate for partnership contracts.  
We can see that when the inflation rate is about 25%, financial facility with 12% is 
not only free but subsidized. Consequently, private banks have shifted from barter 
contracts to partnership contracts, for which the rate of profit depends on the actual 
profit in the economy which is on average 26%. In contrast, state-owned banks have 
not been allowed to do that so their profit rate is much lower than that of private banks 
on one hand and their delayed claims are higher than those of private banks on the 
other hand. As a result the state-owned banks have to pay their depositors from other 
revenues. This means that they not only do not have any profit from deposits, but they 
make a loss in non-Qardh-Al-Hasanah deposits. (5) Weakness of motivation: 
Motivation among private bank staff especially in the high level management is much 
higher than in state-owned banks because they are encouraged to make good profit, 
Also, salaries in private banks are higher than in public banks (6) Slowness of the 
evaluation process: Evaluation in state-owned banks is very slow. It takes a long time 
to realise that a particular bank or the banking system in general is not succeeding or 
has a problem. In contrast, in private banks, they identify problems very quickly 
because private banks have an annual general meeting and have to report on their 
financial operations, including profit and loss. Moreover, in some banks such as: 
Eqtesad-e Noawin (New Economy), Kar Afarin (Work Creator), Saman, Parsiyan 
(Persians) and Sarmayeh (Capital), their major shareholders are members of the 
directorate so they are aware of the financial operations on a week-to-week basis. 
According to this information they are able to run the operation very quickly and 
easily. (7) Slowness in decision making: private banks are speedier than state-owned 
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banks. For example, decision making for a purchase may take two days in private 
banks, while, it takes more than one month in state-owned banks. 
 
Table 8.15: Focused Coding Number 2 for Question 2 (Possible Disadvantages of 
Islamic Banking in Iran Regarding Economic Growth) 
 
Legal restrictions regarding financial facilities for demand side 
Interviewee 1 It is government policy and also shortage of financial resources so it can 
be an advantage for economic growth. 
Interviewee 2 They were for encouraging producer so in that time they were not a 
disadvantage. 
Interviewee 3 They are reducing every day. 
Interviewee 4 In the agricultural sector it was for support and helped this sector to 
develop. In the early years of the Islamic Revolution the capacity existed 
but there was shortage of capital so it depends on the development stage. 
At that time it was a good decision. Now, during the depression they 
finance the demand side too  
Interviewee 5 There are no considerable limitations in this regard now. 
Interviewee 6 We cannot say they are a advantage or a disadvantage. It depends on the 
economic situation. Today, when the production sector is relatively 
strong, they should be reduced. 
Interviewee 7 There is no considerable limitation in this regard now. 
Interviewee 8 It is based on government policy and shortage of financial resources but 
now restrictions have been reduced. At that time it was useful and 
encouraged production. 
Interviewee 9 These restrictions have been considerably reduced now. 
Interviewee 10 When there is shortage of money, the priority would be with the 
production sector. 
Interviewee 11 These restrictions are not actually useful. 
Interviewee 12 Yes they exist and are not useful. 
In the early years of the implementation of the law of Interest-Free Banking in Iran 
the problem was related to supply, which means there was a shortage of commodities. 
So, decision makers in the banking system decided to direct facilities toward the 
supply side and productive firms. Financing demand was limited to special cases so 
people who required financial facilities for their consumption needs faced some 
problems which sometimes led to breaking the law to get financial facilities. For 
example, some of them obtained facilities for agriculture, but used them to buy a car 
and so on, whereas it should be possible to request financial facilities directly to buy a 
car. It also created some problems even for producers because sometimes they were 
not able to sell their produce because of the low consumption of people. Hence, some 
economists argued that this issue is against economic growth. Interviewees were 
asked about this, and. Table 8.15 shows their opinions regarding legal limitation of 
financial facilities for demand side as a disadvantage to economic growth.  
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According to Table 8.15 interviewees 11 and 12, 16.6% of interviewees, said that they 
exist and are not useful. However six interviewees, 50% of interviewees, said that 
they were useful at that time but at this stage of development they should be reduced 
and four interviewees, 33.2% interviewees, said that they have been reduced 
considerably or there are no considerable restrictions in this regard now. 
 
Table 8.16: Focused Coding Number 3 for Question 2 (Possible Disadvantages of 
Islamic Banking in Iran Regarding Economic Growth) 
 
Restrictions on financial instruments 
Interviewee 2 There is enough diversity in the contracts which are able to cover all 
needs, but that does not mean that they do not need reform. 
Interviewee 3 They have an acceptable diversity. 
Interviewee 4 They could be enough but in order to increase efficiency, it would be 
better to reform the law. 
Interviewee 5 Diversity is not bad; some people believe that they are even more than is 
necessary. 
Interviewee 6 The law isn‘t weak, but we should remember that it was a temporary law 
and should be reformed after several years. 
Interviewee 7 Yes, there are some limitations. 
Interviewee 8 They are enough. 
Interviewee 9 These instruments are enough for our present needs but we need to 
introduce new instruments for the future. 
Interviewee 10 Yes. We started rewriting the Monetary and Banking Law and also the 
law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran as a research project in 2000. One 
council was established of which I was the chair. We completed twenty 
articles by 2007 and up to now 130 articles and two laws have been put 
together. 
Interviewee 11 Yes, there are some limitations some of which have arisen from 
international conditions, some from the development level of our country 
and some from the inflexibility of the laws and regulations of Islamic 
banking.   
Interviewee 12 Yes, there are some limitations. 
Some people believe that financial instruments utilized in the Islamic banking system 
of Iran are not sufficient for all the customer‘s needs. If this is correct it would be a 
disadvantage for the Islamic banking system of Iran in relation to economic growth. 
In order to understand this matter more deeply we asked the interviewees for their 
opinions. Table 8.16 shows their responses regarding the restrictions on financial 
instruments in Islamic banking in Iran as a disadvantage to economic growth.   
As can be seen in Table 8.16 seven interviewees, 58.3% of interviewees and 63.3 % 
of respondents, said that the law is good and there is enough diversity in contracts to 
cover the customer‘s needs but that does not mean that they do not need any reform. If 
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we add the interviewees who believe that the limitation exists to those who believe in 
reform nine interviewees, 75% of interviewees and 81.8% of respondents, believe 
reform would be useful or is necessary. 
 
Table 8.17: Focused Coding Number 4 for Question 2 (Possible Disadvantages of 
Islamic Banking in Iran Regarding Economic Growth) 
 
Fixed regulations and impossibility of innovation 
Interviewee 1 No, innovation is possible. But as the entire banking system in Iran is 
Islamic and every contract is implemented nation-wide, the new contract 
should be approved by parliament.   
Interviewee 2 It is a reality that a law which is implemented nation-wide cannot be 
changed easily but this is not a weakness or a disadvantage. The way for 
innovation is open through parliament. 
Interviewee 3 They have very little flexibility. The method of providing a service has 
been determined by law so any new method or instrument should be 
confirmed by the government and parliament.  
Interviewee 4 I think it is natural that flexibility of the law is low, but it isn‘t a weakness. 
Sometimes it can be strength. What is important is that innovation is 
possible via parliament. 
Interviewee 7 Yes, flexibility is considerably low. 
Interviewee 9 The necessary flexibility exists by which, if bank authorities want; they 
are able to solve their problems. 
Interviewee 10 It is a reality but innovation is possible slowly. 
Interviewee 11 Yes, it affects all aspects. 
Interviewee 12 Unfortunately, this weakness exists.  
As Islamic banking in Iran covers the entire banking system and every instrument 
introduced is implemented in all banks throughout the country, they should be 
approved by parliament and then confirmed by Guardian Council for its compliance 
with the Shariah and the Constitution. Therefore, to change it requires a special 
process which can be time-consuming. So, some researchers and managers count this 
as a disadvantage of Iran‘s Islamic banking system. For clarification, interviewees 
were asked their opinions on this matter and their answers appear in Table 8.17. 
As the table shows three interviewees did not answer the question. Furthermore, one 
interviewee believes that necessary flexibility exists for bank authorities to solve their 
problems if they want and three interviewees, 24.9% of interviewees and 33.3% of 
respondents, mentioned that this disadvantage exists. However, five interviewees, 
41.5% of interviewees and 55.6% of respondents, believe that low flexibility in a 
nation-wide law is not a weakness and a new instrument can be approved by 
Parliament and the Guardian Council if necessary. 
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Table 8.18: Focused Coding Number 5 for Question 2 (Possible Disadvantages of 
Islamic Banking in Iran Regarding Economic Growth) 
 
Weakness of competition 
Interviewee 1 No, competition is good. 
Interviewee 2 Yes, competition is weak, but it is improving, especially since the 
establishment of private banks. 
Interviewee 3 Yes, competition is low. 
Interviewee 4 Competition is not as strong as would be expected, but it is improving. 
Interviewee 5 Yes, competition is low. 
Interviewee 6 Yes, competition is low, but it is improving. 
Interviewee 7 Yes competition is weak. 
Interviewee 8 Competition is not very weak. 
Interviewee 9 Competition exists, especially since the establishment of private banks, it 
has been strengthened.   
Interviewee 10 Actually, competition is weak. 
Interviewee 11 Competition is not enough. By increasing the proportion and number of 
private banks in the banking system, it would improve.  
Interviewee 12 Conditions are not right for competition. 
Competition is an important issue in every economy, so if there is no competition in 
the economy, or it is weak in the Islamic banking system of Iran, it would really be a 
disadvantage and would need to be solved. In order to understand this issue, 
interviewees were questioned and their answers are seen in Table 8.18. As the table 
shows five, 41.5%, believe that competition does not exist; four interviewees (33.3%) 
mentioned that competition is weak but is improving, especially since the 
establishment of private banks and three interviewees; 25%, believe that competition 
exists. 
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Table 8.19: Focused Coding Number 6 for Question 2 (Possible Disadvantages of 
Islamic Banking in Iran Regarding Economic Growth) 
 
Existence of obligatory financial facilities 
Interviewee 1 The aim of the government is good and developmental. The aim is usually 
economic development itself, balanced development or helping the poor. 
On the other hand, the banking system may face the problem of non-
repayment of loans or late payments, so, it is difficult to judge the 
disadvantages. 
Interviewee 2 Although it has been useful in some projects, it has also created some 
problems for banking system regarding repayment facilities. 
Interviewee 4 Although the aim in these facilities is good, this is not a good way to 
support the target groups. 
Interviewee 5 Their negative effects were more than their positive effect. 
Interviewee 7 Principally, these issues are against the principle of economics so their 
disadvantage is clear. 
Interviewee 8 Its effect on our bank was negative. The customers sometimes think that 
this money is free and sometimes they cannot repay it. 
Interviewee 9 Its effect was negative. 50% of delayed loans come from this source. 
Interviewee 10 They should not exist.  
Interviewee 11 It was not useful. The government help should go directly to the target 
sectors. 
Interviewee 12 Unfortunately this is a weakness. 
One phenomenon which exists in the Islamic banking of Iran is obligatory financial 
facilities. The government normally uses this to support special sectors or special 
projects. This matter has been considered over recent years as to whether this kind of 
facility is to the benefit of economic growth or whether it has the opposite effect. We 
asked the interviewees for their opinions and their answers appear in Table 8.19.  
As can be seen in the table, two interviewees did not answer the question; four 
interviewees, 33.3% of interviewees and 40% of respondents, believe that the aim of 
the government was good. The aim is usually economic development itself, balanced 
development or helping the poor, but the method is not good or their negative effects 
were more than their positive effects because they created some problems for the 
banking system. Six interviewees, 50% of interviewees and 60% of respondents, 
mentioned that they were harmful to the banking system and should be stopped.  
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Table 8.20: Focused Coding Number 7 for Question 2 (Possible Disadvantages of 
Islamic Banking in Iran Regarding Economic Growth) 
 
Dependence of the Central Bank on the government 
Interviewee 1 Global experience supports independence, so dependence of the Central 
Bank should be greatly decreased. 
Interviewee 2 Yes its dependence is very high. 
Interviewee 3 Yes it is and it definitely should be decreased. 
Interviewee 4 It is completely dependent and is not to the benefit of the economy so it 
should be decreased. 
Interviewee 5 This dependence is very great and harmful. 
Interviewee 6 Yes it is. 
Interviewee 7 This dependence is very great and harmful. 
Interviewee 8 Yes it is and should be decreased. 
Interviewee 9 This is one of the biggest problems and if it was solved, many other 
problems would be solved. 
Interviewee 10 Yes it is and it should be solved as soon as possible. 
Interviewee 11 It is very dependent and its dependence should be decreased. 
Interviewee 12 Unfortunately, this weakness exists. 
Independence of central banks is a very important issue. Many economists believe 
that central banks should be independent of governments in order to be able to 
perform their duty regarding the sustainability of the economy and constancy of the 
value of the currency. They mention that in the case of dependence, the government 
feels free to do whatever it wants and in fact counts the central bank as its fund. The 
interviewees were asked their opinions regarding the situation of the Central Bank in 
Iran. Table 8.20 shows their answers. As can be seen in the table all interviewees 
believe that dependence on the Central Bank of Iran is very high and it should be 
corrected.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
8.4 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to consider the opinions of the interviewees regarding the 
role of Islamic banking in Iran in economic development. It has been divided into two 
sections. In the first section, interviewees were asked about the types of effects of 
Islamic banking on economic development in the Islamic Republic of Iran. They were 
asked about:  (1) Effect on the mobilisation of monetary resources (deposits). (2) 
Effect on the allocation of monetary resources (financial facilities). (3) Effect on 
efficiency. (4) Effect on encouraging people to deal with the banking system. (5) 
Effect on the internal economic crisis. (6) Effect on and effects of the external 
economic crisis. (7)  Effect on inflation. (8) Effect on employment. (9) Effect on 
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liquidity. (10) Effect on internal trade. (11) Effect on external trade. (12) Effect on 
real GDP. (13) Profitability. 
Their responses were as follows: (1) 83.4% of interviewees answered that converting 
from conventional banking to the Islamic banking system has had a positive effect on 
the mobilisation of deposits; (2) 75.1% of interviewees and 90% of the respondents 
agreed strongly on the positive effect of Islamic banking on allocated financial 
facilities; (3) 58.3% of interviewees and 87.5% of respondents believe that Islamic 
banking has a more positive effect on efficiency than the conventional banking system 
but nobody believes that efficiency in Islamic banking in Iran is at a high level 
according to the present efficiency index. All of them believe that the problem is 
created by government interference; (4) 75.1% of interviewees believe that the effect 
of Islamic banking in Iran on encouraging people to deal with the banking system has 
been good and positive; (5) 50% of interviewees and 87.7% of respondents believe 
that the role of Islamic banks in the economic crisis is quite positive; (6) 41.5% of 
interviewees and 71.4% of respondents believe that Islamic banking in Iran has had a 
positive role in decreasing the liquidity growth rate; (7) 50% of interviewees and 
85.6% of respondents support the role of Islamic banking in the reduction of inflation; 
(8) 91.7%, believe that Islamic banking has a positive effect on the employment; (9) 
75% of interviewees believe that the system has had a positive effect on trade, except 
import, for which the provision of financial facilities to this sector has been prohibited 
by the Central Bank. Of course, that is not related to the Islamic banking system, but 
to government policies which support internal production, which according to 
interviewee number ten, has been successful; (10) 83.4%, believe that Islamic banking 
in Iran has had a positive effect on GDP. Some referred to the projects which have 
been financed by the banking system and some mentioned this effect theoretically; 
(11) All interviewees believe that profitability in private banks in Iran, which now 
covers about 22% of the country‘s banking activities, is very high. Also, five 
interviewees, 41, 5%, believe that profitability of state-owned banks is high and the 
same percentage believes that their profitability is low. 
In section two seven questions regarding the possible disadvantages of Islamic 
banking in Iran regarding economic growth were asked of the interviewees. They 
answered as follows: (1) 91.7% of interviewees believe that state- ownership is a 
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disadvantage to banks (2) 50% of interviewees mentioned that legal restrictions 
regarding demand for financial facilities were useful at that time but at this stage of 
development they should be reduced (3) 58.3% interviewees and 63.3 % of 
respondents mentioned that the law is good and there is enough diversity in the 
contracts to cover the customer‘s needs but that does not mean that they do not need 
any reform. If we add the interviewees who believe that the restrictions exist to those 
who believe in reform nine interviewees, 75% of interviewees and 81.8% of 
respondents, believe reform to be useful or necessary (4) 41.5% of interviewees and 
55.6% of respondents believe that low flexibility in a nation-wide law is not a 
weakness and new instruments can bee approved by Parliament and the Guardian 
Council if necessary (5) 41.5% of interviewees believe that competition does not 
exist, four interviewees mentioned that competition is weak but improving, especially,  
since the establishment of private banks and three interviewees, 25%, believe that 
competition exists (6) 50% of interviewees and 60% of respondents mentioned that 
obligatory financial facilities were harmful to the banking system and should be 
stopped and (7) All interviewees believe that dependence on the Central Bank of Iran 
is very high and it should be corrected. 
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Chapter Nine:  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research aimed to investigate two main questions. First, how do the banking 
authorities in Iran ensure that the deposit and financial facilities they offer are 
shariah-compliant? Second, has Islamic banking in Iran had a positive effect on the 
country‘s economic development? In order to answer these main questions some other 
questions were raised, such as: (1) How does the Islamic banking system in Iran 
work? (2) What was the effect of the Law of Usury-Free Banking of 1983 on Iran‘s 
banking system?  (3) Has the elimination of riba encouraged more people to open 
bank accounts? (4) What is the economic structure in Iran? (5) What was the 
economic development process in Iran?  
In order to examine these issues, in addition to the theoretical approach and analysis 
of the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran both quantitative and qualitative analysis 
was carried out. In the quantitative analysis, secondary data from the Central Bank of 
Iran and the Iranian Statistical Centre were analysed descriptively in order to show the 
effect of Islamic banking in Iran on economic development through the mobilization 
of monetary resources (deposits) and allocating them to the economic sectors. 
Comparisons were made between the periods before and after the Islamic Revolution, 
in particular following the implementation of the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran. 
For the qualitative analysis, semi-structured interviews were conducted regarding both 
of the main questions. It should be stressed that as the banking system in Iran is the 
agent of the depositor, it has to be sensitive to the profitability of projects as a 
shariah-compliant condition. 
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9.2 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
In addition to the role of the banking system in economic development through the 
mobilisation and allocation of saving (monetary resources), there are some factors in 
Islamic banking which facilitate economic development as follows: acquiring 
information and declining the information costs, deduction of asymmetric 
information, feasibility of investment in large and long term projects, facilitating risk 
amelioration and monitoring managers and exerting corporate control by banking 
system in general, working according to profit and loss Sharing (PLS) and its 
similarity to universal banks. So, it could be said that Islamic banking has a more 
important role than conventional banking system in economic development.  
According to the discussion in Chapter Two, the advantages of Islamic banking 
regarding economic development are as follow: (1) It is responsive to the different 
motives of depositors. (2) There is efficient use of money. (3) There is distribution of 
risk between entrepreneurs and depositors.  (3) The quality of the business plan is 
more important than the credit rating of the borrower. (4) There is stability. (5) It 
controls excessive credit creation. (6) There is a decrease in moral hazard and adverse 
selection, due to partnership factor supervision than conventional banks. (7) There is a 
high level of variety and diversity with different levels of risk in contracts (partnership 
contracts and exchange contracts) which can facilitate drawing up contracts in Islamic 
banking for both savers and entrepreneurs. (8) It offers the possibility of establishing 
financial institutions with different approaches which can increase the stability of 
financial system. (9) It provides a facility for Muslims who believe in the prohibition 
of riba (10) It is more resistant to external shocks and delayed repayment loans than 
conventional banks, due to, partnership and consequently symmetry of the liabilities 
side of the balance sheet tends with the assets side. (11) There is the impossibility of 
debt creation without the backing of goods and services. 
9.3 ISLAMIC BANKING IN IRAN 
After the Islamic Revolution in Iran all banks were nationalised and all 37 existing 
banks merged into six commercial banks and three specialised banks. In 1983, the 
Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran was passed by the Iranian parliament (Majlese 
Shawraye Islami). This law shaped the new banking system of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran in which interest rates have been omitted completely and not only has the 
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banking system been changed to an Islamic system but the entire financial system has 
been converted to an Islamic one. 
According to this law some objectives for the Islamic banking system in Iran were 
defined including: (1) Establishment of a monetary and credit system based on 
morality and justice. (2) Enhancement of the health and growth of the economy. (3) 
Creation of necessary facilities for the extension of cooperation between depositors 
and investors. (4) Maintenance of the currency value. (5) Facilitation of payment and 
receipt, exchanges, transactions and other services.  
Moreover, according to the law three main duties were determined for the banking 
system. First, the mobilisation of monetary resources (deposits): There are three kinds 
of account in this sector. (1) Qardh- El-Hasanah Current Account (Free Loan Current 
Accounts): (2) Qardh- El-Hasanah savings deposit account. These two accounts are 
interest free loans with a guaranteed nominal value. (3) Term Investment Deposit 
Accounts (short-term with a minimum time of three months and long-term with 
periods of one, two three and five years). In these accounts, the depositor retains 
ownership of the deposit and the bank is their agent and has to utilise their deposits 
for profitable projects and obtain honorarium. In Term Investment Deposit Accounts 
the banks announces an in-part-payment profit rate and guarantees it (as a third party) 
in order to encourage depositors to increase their deposits, but if the actual profit rate 
is more than the in-part-payment profit rate, banks would have to pay the actual profit 
rate.  
Second: Allocation of Monetary Resources (financial facilities). There are three kinds 
of contract in this sector. (1) Loan contracts: the only loan in the Islamic banking 
system is Qardh-Al-Hasanah (interest free loan). There is no interest in this contract 
and it is used for specific requirements such as essential needs, education fees and 
medical fees and to support small industries. (2) Partnership contracts: These 
contracts function in accordance with profit and loss sharing (PLS) including 
modharabah (bailment of a capital), civil partnership (mosharakate madani), legal 
partnership (mosharekate hoqooqi), mozaraah and mosaqat. (3) Exchange contracts. 
Despite determination of the profit in advance in these contracts, the profit does not 
count as riba. These contracts are: Salam transactions (post delivery sale), joaalah, 
sale on instalment and hire-purchase. 
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Third: monetary policies. The main instruments for the implementation of monetary 
policies in conventional banking are interest rates and open market operation. As, 
interest is prohibited in Islam some other instruments have been designed for Islamic 
banking in Iran. They are: Fixing a minimum and/or maximum ratio of profit for bank 
share, designation of various fields for investment and partnership and fixing the 
minimum prospective rate of profit, fixing a minimum and maximum margin of 
profit, determination of types and the minimum and maximum amount of 
commissions, determination of the types, amounts, minimum and maximum bonuses, 
determination of the minimum and maximum ratio in joint venture and open market 
operation. 
9.4 RESULTS OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS  
The quantitative analysis was carried out in Chapter Five. Trend of GDP, share of 
economic sectors in GDP, trend of investment, mobilization of savings, allocation of 
financial resources and their ratio to the GDP and liquidity were examined. 
9.4.1 Trend of GDP and Share of Economic Sectors. 
According to data relating to different years from the Economic Statistics Office of 
the Central Bank and balance sheets of the Iranian Central Bank (Bank Markazi), the 
average growth rate of GDP at current and constant 1997 (1376) prices between 1989-
2006 was 11.5% and 5.2% respectively and the average growth rate of non-oil GDP at 
current and constant 1997 (1376) prices was for that period 26.4% and 5.6% 
respectively. It is worth noting that the average growth rate of non-oil GDP is higher 
than that of GDP with oil, which shows a negative effect of oil on the growth rate of 
the GDP in the country in that period. 
Despite increasing agricultural product from 5,893 Iranian Rials billion in 1989 to 
211,275 Iranian Rials billion in 2006, its share in GDP decreased from 23.5% in 1989 
to 10.365% in 2006. This could be a sign of development in the country. Moreover, 
mining and industry (manufacturing) products increased from 2,515 Iranian Rials 
billion in 1989 to 261,039 Iranian Rials billion in 2006, and its share in GDP 
increased from 10.028% in 1989 to 12.806% in 2006. Furthermore, the share of oil 
and gas increased from 7.253% to 26.495%, the share of housing and building 
decreased from 4.737% to 4.337% and the share of services decreased from 54.783% 
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to 48.794%.An increase in the share of oil is a negative sign, but a decrease in the 
share of services for the Iranian economy is positive. 
9.4.2 Saving and Capital Formation 
According to Chapter Five, despite some fluctuations in saving and capital formation 
during 1989-2006, the trend was relatively good overall. Gross National Saving 
(GNS) at the current prices and constant 2004 (1383) prices increased from 3,720 
Iranian Rials billion and 59903.38 Iranian Rials billion in 1989 to 796,856 Iranian 
Rials billion and 645,488.86 Iranian Rials billion in 2006 respectively and their 
average amount during this period was 215,507 Iranian Rials billion and 340,325.44 
Iranian Rials billion respectively. Also, their average growth rate at the current and 
constant prices, during the period under consideration was 41.19% and 18.74% 
respectively. 
Also, Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) at current and constant 2004 (1383) 
prices increased from 5,135 Iranian Rials billion and 82689.21 Iranian Rials billion in 
1989 to 538720 Iranian Rials billion and 436387.2 Iranian Rials billion in 2006 
respectively and their average amount during this period was 157680.11 Iranian Rials 
billion and 252308.99 Iranian Rials billion respectively. Their average growth rate at 
the current and constant prices, during the period under consideration was 32.82% and 
11.55% respectively. 
9.4.3 Trend of Deposits and Credits  
According to the discussion in Chapter Five these trends were considered during three 
different periods:  before the Islamic Revolution (1961-1978), after the Islamic 
Revolution until the end of the war between Iran and Iraq (1979-1988) and after the 
war (1989-2006). If we ignore the war period and compare the other two periods, it is 
possible to conclude that, despite the higher growth rate for the period before the 
Islamic Revolution, the average amount of deposits in current and constant 2004 
prices and also credits in current and constant 2004 prices in the 1989-2006 period are 
574.64, 5.54, 380.28 and 3.45 times more than those in 1961-1978 period. This shows 
that Islamic banks were more successful in both mobilisation and allocation of 
financial resources than conventional banks before the Islamic Revolution.  
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9.4.4 The Ratio of Deposits and Credits to GDP and Liquidity 
Although comparing deposits and credits for two periods can be useful it is not 
conclusive because there are some factors which should be considered in analysis 
such as GDP and liquidity. Therefore, the ratios of deposits and credits to GDP and 
liquidity (M2) have been calculated for comparison.  
In comparison with the 1962-1978 period, as discussed in Chapter Five, performance 
of the banking system during years 1979-1988 and 1989-2006 was relatively 
satisfactory because, despite there being 35 domestic and foreign banks at that time, 
the average ratio of deposits to GDP was 24.53% while during the years 1979-1988 
and 1989-2006 it was 49% and 45.8% respectively which shows an increase of about 
100%. However, regarding the ratio of deposits to liquidity the average ratio for 1962-
1978, 1979-1988 and 1989-2006 was 80.64%, 74.77% and 88.84% respectively. 
Despite a high growth rate of liquidity during 1989-2006, a ratio of 88.64% is a 
relative success for the Islamic banking system in Iran in comparison with the 1961-
1978 period.  
9.4.5 Types of Deposits and their Share in Total Deposits 
As mentioned in Chapter Five, the effect of different deposits on economic 
development is not at the same level. Due to the use of long-term investment deposits 
for long-term projects, which are usually large industries, their effect on economic 
development is greater than other deposits. Therefore, whenever the share of long-
term investment deposits is greater, the effect of deposits on economic development is 
more significant. Although long-term investment deposits occupied third place after 
sight deposits and short-term investment deposits, the trend was to the benefit of long-
term investment deposits. The average amount and growth rate of long-term 
investment deposits are more than other deposits during the period under 
consideration. Consequently they went from third in 1989 to second in 2006. 
9.4.6 Trend of Credits and Share of Economic Sectors  
As discussed in Chapter Five, resources allocated to all economic sectors at current 
price and constant 2004 price increased from 9,697.5 Iranian Rials billion and 
156,143.32 Iranian Rials billion in 1989 to 1,023,026 billion and 828,699.1 billion in 
2006 respectively. In comparison with the 1961-1978 period, the average amount of 
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allocated resources at current price and constant price, during the 1979-2006 period 
was 247.48 times and 2.98 times more than that of the 1961-1978 period respectively. 
The trend of credits to the economic sectors can determine the orientation of a 
banking system regarding economic development. As the manufacturing sector has a 
determining role in economic development, an increasing share for this sector shows 
developmental orientation of the banking system. In contrast, the agriculture sector‘s 
share has an opposite role. However, the share of manufacturing and mining sector 
from credits increased from 20.91% in 1989 to the 28.47% in 2006, and the share of 
the agriculture sector decreased from 17.44% in 1989 to 15.66% in 2006. 
9.5 FINDINGS OF THE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS  
 9.5.1 Analysis of Shariah-Compliance  
In Chapter Six the opinions of the interviewees were analysed regarding ensuring that 
banking activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran is shariah-compliant. In order to 
examine this matter three main questions were designed as follows:  (1) How do the 
banks ensure that the deposit and financing facilities they offer are shariah-
compliant? (2) What are the problems with which Islamic contracts are faced at the 
implementation stage? (3) What are the solutions for the above-mentioned problems? 
For each question, there were several sub-questions which interviewees were asked to 
answer.  
 9.5.1.1 Consideration and deliberation of the contract 
As the entire banking system in Iran has to be shariah-compliant, a special law was 
approved in 1984 in the Parliament and confirmed by the Guardian Council. One way 
of ensuring that contracts are shariah -compliant is their compliance with the Law of 
Usury-Free Banking in Iran, therefore a relatively high majority of interviewees 
(75%) believe that it is possible to make sure that banking activities in Iran are 
shariah -compliant by considering and deliberating on the contract which is obtained 
via several instruments explained in Chapter Six. 
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9.5.1.2 Considering and deliberating on the honesty, speciality and experience of 
clients and the profitability of the contract  
As mentioned in Chapter Six, being shariah-compliant has an additional condition 
over and above just choosing the proper contract. This is the use of deposits for the 
best projects with the most profitability because the bank, as the agent of the depositor 
agrees to utilise deposits for the best projects. Thus, they are responsible religiously 
not only to consider the profitability of the project itself but also to consider the 
honesty, speciality and experience of the project manager. Therefore, the vast 
majority of interviewees believe that there is enough consideration to ensure that 
clients of the banking system in the Islamic Republic of Iran, selected by banks for 
receiving financial facilities, are honest and have enough experience and speciality 
regarding their activities and also the project is profitable. 
9.5.1.3 Supervising the process of the implementation project until the end and 
providing training 
The majority of interviewees believe that supervision exists. One way of controlling is 
to pay financial facilities in stages.  This means the bank pays one instalment and, 
after confirming that it was spent on the partnership project, mosharakah, the bank 
pays the next instalment. 
Another factor which plays an important role in the shariah-compliance of contracts 
is the education of staff and even the education of clients. For this reason it is 
necessary for Islamic banks to have a regular training scheme. Therefore, despite 
some training course being delivered by banking system for their staff, it would 
appear to be necessary to provide more training course. This was another question 
asked of interviewees. All interviewees believed that, despite previous staff training, 
the training was not enough and ongoing training courses were needed.  
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9.5.1.4 The problems with which Islamic contracts are faced at the 
implementation stage. 
There are some problems which can affect the performance of Islamic banking such 
as asymmetric information and moral hazard. These problems also exist in 
conventional banks. Many interviewees did not answer this question; this may be due 
their lack of knowledge regarding these issues. However, the majority of respondents 
believe that it is due to Islamic banks being more able to solve or reduce the problem 
of asymmetric information than conventional banks. Although, there is a motivation 
in clients to use moral hazard, their Islamic belief and the strong supervision which 
exists in Islamic banks can also decrease moral hazard. The majority of respondents 
believe that moral hazard in Islamic banks is less that in conventional banks so they 
cannot be problems in Islamic banking in particular.  
Another problem which may exist is low flexibility of the contracts in Islamic banks 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The opinions of the interviewees differed on this issue 
and 50% of interviewees said that there is not enough flexibility in Islamic contracts 
in Islamic banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, it may be the nature of 
an Islamic banking system operating under a special law approved by Parliament. 
One of the strong points of any banking system is its ability to respond to all 
customers‘ applications so interviewees were asked about the impossibility or 
difficulty of positively responding to all applications for credit, especially from the 
demand side. All interviewees believed that although this problem exists it is not due 
to Islamic banking but to government policies or shortage of financial resources.  
Overdue or delayed credits are one of the most important problems for all banking 
systems. They should be greater in Islamic banks for two reasons: The first is the lack 
of interest rates charged of the customer. This can lead to delay in the repayment of 
credit because they do not pay any cost for their delay. Secondly, the Islamic advice to 
Muslims is to give more time to debtors. However, 58.33% of interviewees believe 
that overdue debt is greater than usual. It increased from 7.1% in 2002 to 15% in 2006 
while the average ratio world-wide is 5%. It is worth mentioning that some people 
may abuse this Islamic benevolence so it is necessary to think about ways of solving 
this problem. 
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9.5.1.5 Solutions for the problems 
There are some possible solutions to the above-mentioned problems. The first could 
be a change to the structure of Islamic banking. While Islamic banking is relatively 
similar to universal banking which enters the real economy, sometimes as a 
supervisor, in partnership contracts, and sometimes even as a contractor, in joaalah 
contracts, the structure of Islamic banking has remained the same as the conventional 
banking system which existed before the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Due to the 
importance of this issue, the opinions of the interviewees were asked and more than 
80% of them answered that a change to the structure is necessary. 
Another solution which has been used for solving some problems in Islamic banking 
of Islamic Republic of Iran is conditions provided in the contract (conditions provided 
in the contract). Although these conditions sometimes lead to complications, they 
usually reduce all kinds of financial risks. However, some critics believe that these 
conditions lead to misunderstanding or even sometimes to a departure from the 
essence of Islamic banking. So, this issue is quite debatable and there was no majority 
opinion among the interviewees.  
In order to solve the problem of delayed debt the Iranian banking system uses a late 
payment penalty. This issue has been questioned regarding both its shariah- 
compliance and its usefulness. As with the previous question, there was no unanimity 
among interviewees and not even a clear majority in this regard. It is worth 
mentioning that one interviewee who is a specialist in jurisprudence believes that the 
late payment penalty as in the Iranian case is definitely shariah-compliant. Regarding 
its usefulness some interviewees believes that if it is more than or a least equal to the 
gap between the profit rate in the banking system and the interest rate on the black 
market, or the profit rate in the open market, it could be useful, otherwise, it is not. 
9.5.1.6 Determination of final profit rates and shariah board 
One of the most important issues regarding Islamic banking is the determination of 
final profit rates for depositors and entrepreneurs. As mentioned in Chapter Six there 
is an ―in-part-payment‖ profit rate which is secured by the banking system as a third 
party. When the in-part-payment profit rate is more than the actual profit, the majority 
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of interviewees believe that banks pay the in-part-payment profit rate to the depositors 
and they also believe that where in-part-payment profit is less than actual profit, 
Islamic banks in the Islamic Republic of Iran have been paying real profit to their 
clients. This confirms that their activities are shariah-compliant. 
In terms of the profit rate which entrepreneurs should pay there is no majority among 
interviewees. In both cases where the expected profit rate is less or more than actual 
profit rate, 50% of interviewees did not answer and the issue is debatable among 
respondents. Where the actual profit rate is less than the expected profit rate, 50% of 
respondents believe that banks examine the case in order to determine the reason for 
the abatement of the profit. If the client is to blame they will ask him to pay the 
difference between the expected profit and the actual profit. 33% of respondents 
believe that banks usually ask for expected profit and 16.2% believes that, according 
to the contract-implicit condition, clients also have to pay the difference between the 
expected profit and the actual profit. Furthermore, where the actual profit rate is 
greater than the expected profit rate 50% of respondents believe that banks also ask 
for the difference between expected profit and actual profit, two interviewees, 33.3% 
of respondents, believe that banks usually ask for expected profit and one interviewee, 
16.6% of respondents, believe that banks pay the difference between expected profit 
and actual profit. In conclusion, it could be said that there is no unified behaviour 
among banks regarding profit; it depends on the bank or branch authorities. However, 
there should be unified behaviour according to the law. 
In addition, regarding the shariah board the majority of interviewees who answered 
the question believe that it is possible, useful and necessary for Islamic banking in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran to have a shariah board. They believe that by having limited 
numbers of shariah boards with descriptions of duties the problem of inconsistency 
and shortage of specialists could be solved. 
9.5.2 Role of Islamic Banking in Iran in Economic Development   
Opinions of the interviewees regarding the role of Islamic banking in Iran in 
economic development are discussed in Chapter Seven. In this chapter, some 
questions regarding the effect of the Islamic banking system in Iran on some factors 
which affect economic development and some disadvantages of the Islamic banking 
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system in Iran for economic development were asked which can be summarised as 
follows:  
(1) The majority (83.4% of interviewees) answered that converting from conventional 
banking to the Islamic banking system has had a positive effect on the mobilisation of 
deposits.  
(2) The majority (75.1% of interviewees and 90% of respondents) strongly supported 
the positive effect of Islamic banking on the allocation of financial facilities. 
(3) The majority (58.3% of interviewees and 87.5% of respondents) believe that 
Islamic banking has a more positive effect on efficiency than the conventional 
banking system but none of the respondents believe that efficiency in Islamic banking 
in Iran is at a high level according to the present efficiency index. They all believe 
that the problem has been created by government interference. However, as Islamic 
banking in Iran has some charity aims, a new efficiency index should be designed. 
(4) The majority (75.1% of interviewees) believe that the effect of Islamic banking in 
Iran on encouraging people to deal with the banking system has been good and 
positive. 
(5) The majority (87.7% of respondents and 50% of interviewees) believe that the role 
of Islamic banks in avoiding economic crisis is quite positive. 
(6) The majority (71.4% of respondents and 41.5% of interviewees) believe that 
Islamic banking in Iran has had a positive role in decreasing liquidity growth rate.  
(7) The majority (85.6% of respondents and 50% of interviewees) support the role of 
Islamic banking in the reduction of inflation. 
(8) The majority of interviewees (91.7%) believe that Islamic banking has had a 
positive effect on employment. 
(9) The majority (75% of interviewees) believe that the Islamic banking system in 
Iran has had a positive effect on trade, except import, for which giving financial 
facilities to this sector has been prohibited by the Central Bank. 
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(10) The majority (83.4%) believe that Islamic banking in Iran has had a positive 
effect on GDP. Some of them referred to thousands of large project which have been 
financed directly by the banking system such as highways and petrochemical projects. 
(11) All the interviewees believe that profitability in private banks in Iran is very high. 
In addition five interviewees, 41.5%, believe that profitability of state-owned banks is 
high and the same number believes that their profitability is low. 
(12) The majority (91.7% of interviewees) believe that state-ownership is a 
disadvantage for banks and that most of them should be privatised. 
(13) 50% of interviewees believe that legal restrictions regarding financial facilities 
for demand side were useful in the early years but at this stage of development they 
should be reduced. 
(14) The majority (58.3% interviewees and 63.3 % of respondents) believe that the 
law is good and there is enough diversity in the contracts to cover the customer‘s 
needs but that does not mean that they do not need to reform. Therefore 75% of 
interviewees and 81.8% of respondents believe that reform would be useful or 
necessary. 
(15) The majority (55.6% of respondents and 41.5% of interviewees) believe that low 
flexibility in a nation-wide law is not a weakness and new instruments could be 
approved by Parliament and the Guardian Council if necessary. 
(16) There is no majority regarding competition in the Islamic banking system of Iran. 
It is particularly debateable since the establishment of private banks. 
(17 The majority (60% of respondents and 50% of interviewees) believe that 
obligatory financial facilities are harmful for the banking system and should be 
stopped. 
(18)  All interviewees believe that dependence of the Central Bank of Iran is very high 
and this should be corrected. 
In conclusion, it can be said that regarding shariah-compliance, despite the existence 
of some conditions provided in the contract itself or in another contract which 
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sometimes lead to confusion or misunderstanding, the Law of Usury-Free Banking in 
Iran is definitely shariah -compliant but it needs to be updated. Also, regarding the 
practical issues, according to the majority of interviewees the banking system usually 
acts according to the law with some exceptions which in an extensive banking system 
with thousands of branches is natural. In terms of development, in theory, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, there is a great deal of evidence that the Islamic banking 
system is more efficient than conventional banking. In practical terms, as can be seen 
in Chapter Five, data show that after changing the banking system in Iran to Islamic 
banking activities improved. Also the majority of interviewees believe that Islamic 
banking in Iran has had a positive effect on economic development, both by a 
considerable increase in mobilisation and allocation of monetary resources and effect 
on the liquidity and inflation. Also, due to profit and loss sharing which leads to more 
care in the selection of projects and partners, supervision of the project as a partner 
which cause decreasing asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse selection 
affects economic development. Moreover, due to a lack of speculative demand for 
money in the Islamic economic system, employment and consequently economic 
development have increased. 
9.6 PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS 
As this research is a case study of the contribution of the Islamic banking system in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran to economic development, there have been some 
problems and limitations in carrying out the research. First of all was the limitation of 
resources, especially in English. There have been few studies regarding Islamic 
banking and economic development. The second problem relates to data collection. 
Due to being far from Iran, in the first years of the study there was some difficulty 
regarding data collection. Of course after that most data became available on line on 
the websites of the Central Bank of Iran and the Statistics Centre of Iran but they were 
not comprehensive. 
In addition, two of the chapters concern qualitative analysis. For these chapters I 
interviewed fourteen people including religious scholars (jurisprudents), commercial 
bank managers, the Central Bank managers and academic researchers. As they were 
very busy and some of them did not know me it was very difficult to call them and 
make appointments with them, so I had to ask mutual friends to arrange meetings with 
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them for me or to introduce me to them. Even after meeting some of them were 
sensitive regarding the information which I wanted from them. Furthermore, I had to 
go to Iran twice, the first time for the main interviews and the second time for 
complementary interviews. Some of them were not available for the second 
interviews due to having changed their jobs, so I had some problems finding them. 
Also, because of the time limitation, I had to conduct the complementary interview 
with some of them by phone or even by email. It took a long time for some of them to 
respond to my emails. 
9.7 RECOMMENDATIONS 
1) Reform in the Law of Usury-Free Banking in Iran: As mentioned before, this 
law was temporary and should have been reformed after it had been in place for 
several years and on receiving feedback. Now, after about 25 years, it is time to 
reconsider it and analyse its strength and weaknesses and start reforming it 
accordingly.  
2) Change in the structure of the banking system: As the entire banking system of 
Iran was interest-based prior to the Islamic Revolution and was changed to the Islamic 
banking system afterwards, the structure was not adequate for the new system. 
Despite some changes having been made to the structure, they were not sufficient so it 
is necessary for a major change to be made to the structure as soon as possible. The 
most important issue to be considered is restructuring regarding profit and loss 
sharing needs. As in profit and loss sharing, the bank acts as a partner and profitability 
of the project is important for them, it is necessary for the banking system to monitor 
the project carefully. Furthermore, in some contracts such as joaalah, banks act as a 
contractor in which the existence of some skilled and specialised staff or some 
dependant engineering company is necessary. 
3) Independence of the Central Bank: One duty of the Central Bank in all banking 
systems, especially according to the Law of Usury-Free Banking of Iran, is the 
implementation and fulfilment of monetary policies for the stability of the economy, 
protection of currency value and economic development. In the case of dependence on 
governments, they usually use it as an instrument for solving their problems, 
especially in budget deficit times. At such times governments are eager to borrow 
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from central banks leading to inflation and consequently reduction in currency value. 
The biggest problem in Iran before and after the Islamic Revolution has been a high 
inflation rate caused by increasing liquidity imposed by government. So, 
independence of the Central Bank could solve the historic problem of the Iranian 
economy. 
4) The establishment of a shariah board: Although, the Law of Usury-Free Banking 
in Iran was approved by Parliament and then confirmed by the Guardian Council 
which means that it is in accordance with the Iranian Constitution and is shariah-
compliant, it is clear that the existence of a shariah board which monitors and 
supervises contracts regarding their shariah-compliance is necessary. The question is 
how many shariah Boards does the Iranian banking system need? There are several 
opinions on this matter, including: one for every bank, one in the Central Bank and 
one in the central branch of every bank, one in the Central Bank and one in the central 
branch of every bank and one representative in every province. I think it would be 
better if there was one shariah board in the Central Bank and one or more 
representatives in each bank in every city in order to monitor and supervise contracts 
in accordance with the shariah.  
5) Giving more freedom to the bank managers: In order to provide facilities to the 
most efficient projects and enter the new market without obtaining permission from 
the government, the managers need more freedom in decision making. As speed in 
decision-making is a key factor in utilising deposits efficiently, and freedom is a vital 
element in speed in decision making, therefore, freedom is a vital factor for bank 
managers to be able to allocate financial facilities to the most efficient projects. 
6) Privatisation: Due to some problems faced by the banking system after the Islamic 
Revolution regarding a lot of money having been removed from the country by the 
Shah‘s family and their dependents, as well as some big capitalists, banks were almost 
bankrupt. Therefore, the government had to nationalise all banks. Of course, the left 
thought the environment may be a factor in this decision too. In those days, some 
scholars and Muslim scientists thought that nationalisation was closer to Islamic 
economics. It seems that it is time for the privatisation of all or at least the majority of 
commercial banks. 
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7) Stopping or at least reducing obligatory facilities: Although the aim of the 
government from these facilities is to support some special projects or industry for 
developmental purposes, they have a negative effect on efficiency and should be 
stopped or reduced. 
8) Reducing contract costs: Due to partnership operation and the necessity of more 
monitoring and supervision in Islamic banks than conventional banks, contract costs 
are expected to be greater. However, that does not mean that efficiency in Islamic 
banks is lower than conventional banks because these extra costs are not wasted since 
they provide some information which is very useful to banking systems‘ decision 
makers regarding some kinds of risks such credit risk; furthermore, reducing contract 
costs while achieving the same information will increase efficiency. 
9.8 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
The aim of this research has been to examine the contribution of Islamic banking in 
Iran to economic development, so it has concentrated mainly on the experimental 
analysis. However, as Islamic banking is relatively new in the banking industry, both 
theoretical and empirical researches are necessary. Some areas where more research is 
necessary are as follows: 
1- How efficient is Islamic banking compared with conventional banking and how 
can Islamic banks improve their efficiency? 
2- A comparative study between Islamic banks in different countries regarding the 
instruments they are using. 
3- How can Islamic banks solve or reduce the problems of asymmetric information, 
moral hazard and adverse selection? 
4- How can Islamic banks compensate depositors‘ losses in times of inflation? 
5- How can the profit rate be determined in an Islamic banking system such as Iran 
and Sudan? 
6- What new instruments can be used in Islamic banking? 
7- How can Islamic banking systems perform monetary policies successfully? 
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8- What kind of relationship is possible between Islamic banks and conventional 
banks? 
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Appendix 
Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews 
Q1- How do banks ensure that the deposits and financing facilities they offer are 
shariah-compliant?           
Q2- What are the problems with which Islamic contracts are faced in the 
implementation stage? 
Q3- What are the solutions to the problems? 
Q4- How do you behave with ―in-part-payment‖ profit rate in order not to be in 
contravention of shariah-compliance? 
Q5- How do you (banks) deal with ―expected profit rate‖ in order not to be in 
contravention of the shariah-compliance? 
Q6- What do you think of a shariah board in Iran‘s Islamic banking?  
Q7- What are the problems regarding shariah boards in Islamic banking? 
Q8- What are the solutions to the problems regarding shariah boards in Islamic 
banking in Iran?  
Q9-What has been the effect of Islamic banking on economic development in Iran? 
Q10- What has been the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on the mobilisation of 
monetary resources (deposits)? 
Q11- What has been the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on the allocation of 
monetary resources (financial facilities)? 
Q12- What has been the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on encouraging people to 
deal with the banking system? 
Q13- What are the possible disadvantages of Islamic banking in Iran regarding 
economic growth? 
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Q14- What has been the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on efficiency? 
Q15- What has been the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on liquidity?  
Q16- What has been the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on inflation? 
Q 17- What has been the effect of Islamic banking in Iran on employment? 
Q18- How was profitability of Islamic banking in Iran?  
Q19- What is your opinion regarding independence of the Central Bank from the 
government? 
Q20- What is your opinion regarding the existence of obligatory financial facilities? 
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